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INSPECTOR GENERAL
77-1908

30 AUG 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: Acting Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

FROM : S. D. Breckinridge
Deputy Inspector General

SUBJECT : Comments on Book V, SSC Final Report, The Investigation of the Assassination of President Kennedy: Performance of the Intelligence Agencies

1. Forwarded herewith is the report of a review that Mr. Knoche requested last fall. The undersigned was designated as chairman or coordinator of an Agency working group that was to conduct the study. It proved a more ambitious undertaking than had been anticipated. The extensive files of CI Staff on the Warren Commission inquiry into President Kennedy's assassination were reviewed in detail, as were the very large file holdings of LA Division on its Cuban operations during the period preceding and following the death of President Kennedy. The most painstaking review and analysis was required, and the files proved to be so extensive that the research became a major task. The files of the Office of Security and the Office of the Inspector General presented a less formidable problem.

2. The attached report, with its annexes, is the formal result of the effort. If the attachments seem bulky, it is noted that additional back-up materials are being held for the record in the event of future inquiry. These papers represent the result of a conscientious and painstaking effort, conducted with high standards of review and testing kept foremost in mind. We believe that there is little likelihood of oversight or omission in coverage; the work was so extensive and carefully done that we feel there is small chance of surprises remaining in CIA files on this subject.

3. In brief, we found that many of the presentations of Book V of the Final Report of the Senate Select Committee were based on incomplete information or distorted perceptions. While the record of CIA was not perfect, the performance at the time, under the understanding of the period, seems reasonable. The fact remains that evidence of a Castro conspiracy to assassinate President Kennedy still has not been discovered. The Warren Commission and

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CIA could well have perceived the usefulness of inquiring into specific sources of possible provocation of Castro at the time of the 1964 investigation; it is clear that the general consideration was recognized by all concerned, and pursued, but the concept of specific possible provocations was not. A review into such possibilities has now been conducted, with essentially negative results.

4. The report is not to be considered a report of the Inspector General, as such, being the result of a representative working group. However, the report should be considered as being for internal CIA consumption only. It contains third agency reports, liaison reports, and involves sources and methods materials, as well as evaluation and comment of a nature that is advisory to management. Any release of this report and its annexes outside the Agency, even in classified form, would require considerable sanitization. It is recommended that this report be held against future inquiries, providing a basis for appropriate responses, and that it not be volunteered at this time.

S. D. Breckinridge

Attachment:
As Stated

DIG/S.D.Breckinridge:js (23 Aug 1977)

Distribution:
Original - Addressee w/Copy #1 of Att. ltd
1 - SA/DCI (Robert D. Williams) w/Copy #2 of Att. ltd w/att dated 8/7/80
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1 - DIG (S.D.B. Chrono) w/Copy #10 of Att.
1 - IG Subject w/Original Copy of Att. (UNNUMBERED)

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SUBJECT: Comments on Book V of the Final Report of the U.S. Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities

1. Book V of the SSC Final Report, titled The Investigation of the Assassination of President John F. Kennedy: Performance of the Intelligence Agencies, presents a number of issues that address themselves to the conscience of the Agency. The criticisms of CIA are based on a series of presentations of how various investigative leads were handled, and on the non-reporting of various Agency operational activities that the SSC Final Report judges to have been relevant to the Warren Commission inquiry.

2. A stated thesis of the SSC Final Report is that the operations of the intelligence agencies against Cuba exercised a negative influence on the quality of their support for the Warren Commission investigation. The following statements appear in the Report:

> "It (the SSC Report) places particular emphasis on the effect their Cuban operations seemed to have on the investigation." Page 2.
>
> "They (senior CIA officials) should have realized that CIA operations against Cuba, particularly operations involving the assassination of Castro, needed to be considered in the investigation. Yet, they directed their subordinates to conduct an investigation without telling them of these vital facts." Page 7.

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The significance of these statements, to the authors of the SSC Report, is highlighted as follows:

> "Certainly, concern with public reputation, problems of coordination between agencies, possible bureaucratic failure and embarrassment, and the extreme compartmentation of knowledge of sensitive operations may have contributed to these shortcomings. But the possibility exists that senior officials in both agencies made conscious decisions not to disclose potentially important information." Page 7.

A central feature of the rationale is the concept that if Castro had learned of these activities it would have provoked him into retaliation against President Kennedy. The SSC Final Report makes it clear that it feels this theory should have been perceived and accepted at the time by the intelligence agencies (not to mention the Warren Commission) leading to a review of the various anti-Castro programs to see what it might reveal.

The provocation theory, in the specific form postulated by the SSC Final Report and the press, is of more recent vintage than the perceptions that prevailed in 1964 when the Warren Commission was conducting its investigation. There was a general concern in 1964 that the USSR or Cuba might be behind the assassination of President

Kennedy. This was based on a more broadly recognized understanding of the tensions that existed between the Kennedy administration and the Soviet and Cuban regimes. The Bay of Pigs in 1961 and the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962 must have appeared remarkably provocative to Fidel Castro, along with the array of American anti-Cuban programs. The humiliation of the USSR in having to retreat in the Cuban Missile Crisis cannot be dismissed completely as to how it might have been perceived by a foreign power as a provocation. To note these events serves only to remind the reader of the tensions well recognized at the time. The SSC Final Report has elected to emphasize instead CIA operational activity against Cuba as requiring specific attention. This emphasis on CIA's Cuban operations as a possible source of provocation of Castro represents the result of an evolution in perceptions. In response to it we undertook an extensive review of the various operational activities against Cuba and Castro.

Organization for the Review

As there are no persons now in CIA who were directly involved at a senior level in the investigation of 1964, it was felt necessary to organize a fresh approach to the matter. The persons who, in 1963 and 1964, knew the details of the various operational activities are no longer available, for the most part, to provide the current and detailed factual familiarity that existed at the time of the investigations. Primary reliance had to be placed instead on the records for

the period preceding President Kennedy's death and the period following it.

It was determined that a special research effort would be mounted to review those Agency files that might relate to this problem. The organization for this research is summarized at Tab A of this paper. It required not only the meticulous review of all Cuban operations, it necessitated careful analysis of the content and nature of the operations with special attention to their security. Files relating to the Warren Commission inquiry were reviewed as well as those relating to plotting against Castro.

The results of the efforts of those assigned to the task are contained in this covering report and in the separate annexes to it, Tabs B through G.

CIA has now conducted such a review -- looking at "the other end" of a possible chain of evidence, where things theoretically could have started. This has produced no new evidence bearing on the assassination, although it has produced the basis for new lines of speculation. In fact, the review sometimes seemed to become a futile exercise in trying to fit facts to the provocation theory rather than being able to identify evidence actually bearing on the assassination of President Kennedy. The emphasis sometimes became one of asking if this activity

(whichever was under review) could have provoked Castro to order the assassination of President Kennedy, had he (Castro) learned of it. The SSC, in its Final Report, fell into this very trap, trying to make the AMLASH operation actually fit the theory for which the SSC's presentation seemed to be tailored. (See Tab D.)

We have looked at other operational activities with the SSC's theory in mind, but have been unable to provide tangible substance in support of the theory. In the final analysis the reviewer is compelled to fall back on the evidence. A wide variety of theories can be--as they have been--advanced in strident and challenging tones. Not all of them are susceptible to conclusive answers; the primary possibility of finding such answers was lost with the death of Lee Harvey Oswald. The fact is that the Warren Commission considered the possibility of Cuban or Soviet involvement, but could not find evidence of it. Were it known at the time of the Warren Commission, it would have been reported and dealt with then; that it was not is a simple reflection of the fact that it did not exist at that time in the minds of Americans knowledgeable on the subject. To hold differently would be to accept uncritically a social paranoia often prevalent today, which would hold that a significant number of government employees could engage in such a well-disciplined conspiracy to suppress evidence.

Operations Against Castro

The AMTRUNK Operation, starting in 1963, sought to develop a capability to join dissident elements among the Cuban leadership into a group that could oust the Castro regime. It was conceived by Cuban exiles and sold to the Kennedy Administration, which assigned it to CIA. The program was very slow in developing substance and momentum, with little concrete progress during President Kennedy's life. At a later date, in 1965, it was believed to be compromised and CIA withdrew from its association; the key members were arrested later and tried in Cuba. There are basic questions about the security of the activity from its inception, due to the involvement of personalities who are suspected of having pro-Cuban sympathies, including possibly having been foreign agents. While the suspicions cannot be verified, the reservations are sufficiently basic to consider the possibility that Castro knew of the operation from its earliest days. Its long range objectives--the overthrow of Castro and his regime--would have been an irritant to Castro; its inability to develop any substance and momentum until long after President Kennedy's death suggests that it is unlikely that it, of itself, would have moved him at that time to resort to assassination in retaliation. This is discussed at Tab C.

Operation AMLASH centered on a high-level Cuban official, AMLASH/1, who had expressed his opposition to Castro and to the Castro regime. The SSC Final Report undertakes to demonstrate that the operation planned Castro's assassination during the period preceding the murder of

President Kennedy; to the contrary, a full review of the operation shows that prior to the President's assassination not only had CIA not agreed to give any support to AMLASH/1, but had rejected his proposals to assassinate Castro. When evidence supporting this view was offered the drafters of Book V of the SSC Final Report, it was dismissed out of hand as false, despite confirming evidence. The SSC Report, instead, having asserted that assassination was the character of the operation at that time, then undertook to show that AMLASH/1 was at least indiscreet in his conduct, risking exposure of the plot. Alternatively, it suggested that he may have been acting for Castro as a provocateur, to lead the United States into a plot against Castro's life which in turn was then to provide Castro with the justification to order President Kennedy's assassination. In either event, had Castro learned about the relationship between AMLASH/1 and CIA he would have known only that there was an inconclusive association that certainly had not progressed to the point that it constituted the basis for the postulated provocation. This is discussed in some detail at Tab D of this paper.

The SSC Final Report discounts (at page 68) the possibility that actual plotting by CIA with the criminal syndicate served as a source for provocation for Castro to have President Kennedy murdered. There are new considerations that developed in the course of the present review that throw more light on the role of the criminal syndicate, but they do not provide a basis for taking issue with the judgment of the SSC Final Report, which dismissed the activity as having provided Castro with the postulated provocation. This is discussed at Tab C.

Items Selected by the SSC for Critical Comment

The SSC Final Report picked out a number of selected subjects for treatment in support of its criticism of the thoroughness of the investigation by the intelligence agencies. One of these had to do with the allegations in Mexico City by a man designated as "D". These allegations were demonstrated conclusively by the Warren Commission to have been false; why they are discussed at all in the SSC Final Report is a question in itself. In another instance, reference is made to a reported five-hour delay of a Cubana flight from Mexico City, awaiting arrival of a private aircraft with a mysterious passenger; not only was the Cubana flight on the ground for four hours (in contrast to the alleged five hour delay in departure) it departed an hour before the alleged arrival of the private aircraft. After CIA reported on a Cuban-American who departed on another Cubana flight, the FBI investigated the man extensively, as is revealed by the information available for use in the SSC Final Report; a single report that caused him to be dramatized is so full of errors as to be highly suspect, essentially being placed in doubt by other evidence in the record. In another instance considerable emphasis was given by the SSC Final Report to a cable from the Mexico City Station, replying to a 23 November 1963 inquiry from CIA headquarters asking for reports on contacts with certain named Soviets. The true name of AMLASH/1 was given in the Mexico City reply, but not as having had contact with the Soviets -- which was the purpose of the inquiry -- but as the subject of a meeting in December

1960 between a functionary of the Cuban embassy with a Soviet, concerning a press conference to be held in Mexico City by AMLASH/1 in February and March 1961. AMLASH/1's name could have been omitted from the cable altogether, so far as its having any relevance to the inquiry about persons having contact with Soviets is concerned. In any event, the meeting in December 1960 was prior to President Kennedy's inauguration, which removes it yet further from any possible relevance to the subject matter. It really is not difficult to understand why the reference to AMLASH/1's name did not lead to detailed research about him. This is discussed further at Tab D.

Conclusions

Basically, the research effort for the present paper produced two general conclusions. First, the SSC Final Report contains numerous factual errors, both in the extensive treatment of a selected operation (AMLASH) and in a number of separate incidents that it presents. Second, while one can make the point in principle that the Warren Commission could well have broadened its review to include the anti-Cuban programs of the U.S. Government, in trying to make the case for that concept Book V of the SSC Final Report went to such lengths in its treatment as to detract from the point at hand. It is difficult to characterize it more generously.

In a very real sense, the SSC Final Report has compounded the problem of public perception. On a flawed presentation it has accused the intelligence agencies of derelictions and worse. While it has reinforced the public sense of unfinished business yet to be done, it has so badly beclouded the issue as to have done a disservice to

future attempts at objective and dispassionate inquiry.

While one can understand today why the Warren Commission limited its inquiry to normal avenues of investigation, it would have served to reinforce the credibility of its effort had it taken a broader view of the matter. CIA, too, could have considered in specific terms what most saw then in general terms--the possibility of Soviet or Cuban involvement in the assassination because of tensions of the time. It is not enough to be able to point out erroneous criticisms made today. The Agency should have taken broader initiatives then, as well. That CIA employees at the time felt--as they obviously did--that the activities about which they knew had no relevance to the Warren Commission inquiry does not take the place of a record of conscious review. The present research effort has undertaken to conduct such a review; it is noted that the findings are essentially negative. However, it must be recognized that CIA cannot be as confident of a cold trail in 1977 as it could have been in 1964; this apparent fact will be noted by the critics of the Agency, and by those who have found a career in the questions already asked and yet to be asked about the assassination of President Kennedy.

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Tab A

ORGANIZATION FOR AND CONDUCT OF REVIEW

Organization for and Conduct of the Review

1. Many years have passed since the inquiry by the Warren Commission. The persons who were most familiar with the activities of the Agency during the period preceding the death of President Kennedy, and during the investigation of the Warren Commission, are no longer in place in the same work. Some of the employees have retired or have been transferred to other work. Some have died.

2. To respond to the questions raised in Book V of the SSC Final Report, it was necessary to review old files and to assign to this undertaking personnel not really familiar with the activities of the Agency during a period of a dozen or more years before. A study group was established to consider the size of the problem and to develop a plan for conducting the review. Chaired by a representative from the Office of the Inspector General, the group also consisted of members from CI Staff, LA Division, and the Office of Security. Terms of Reference for the review were agreed upon in early August 1976. Points emphasized for the review, because of the thrust of Book V of the SSC Final Report, were (1) to conduct a full review of information and operations on the Cuban target to identify any activity that might relate to the assassination of President Kennedy, and (2) to review the possibility that CIA activities against Cuba did, by their nature, cause Castro to order the assassination of

President Kennedy. A copy of the Terms of Reference is attached.

3. The two main holdings of files for the period in question were in LA Division and CI Staff, of the Directorate of Operations, with less voluminous files being held in the Office of Security and the Office of the Inspector General. The organization for the review of those files is described below.

4. LA Division: LA Division was the repository of the files for Agency operations conducted against Cuba. These files were known to be extensive. Under the Terms of Reference those files for the period 1 January 1961 to 1 January 1965 were selected for review, covering a three-year period prior to the death of President Kennedy and the following year. A research group was formed composed of five full-time researchers, a group leader and a task force supervisor. An additional four researchers participated in different phases of the research, which continued to mid-May 1977.

5. Reference to material for this research was obtained from the LA Division registry, the Cuba Desk machine runs, and a special comprehensive file listing prepared for this purpose by Information Services Staff (ISS). On the basis of this it was originally believed that material pertinent to the search would number approximately 900 operational folders, plus numerous related 201-files. It was later determined, however, that a thorough review should include additional operational and subject files which brought the total to well over two thousand files. In view of the date of the material, much of it,

both operational and subject, had been retired to Archives at [Warrenton, Virginia] 10. The remainder is held at Headquarters in the files or archival material of Information Processing Group. This material is easily retrievable through the use of specific job numbers and file reference numbers recorded and retained in the LA Division research group files (too numerous to cite herein).

6. Following is a breakdown of the types and numbers of files reviewed, criteria employed in the research, the findings, and organization of the material:

a. Types and Number of Files Reviewed

(1)	Operational (601 with findings and 1,128 with no findings)	1,729
(2)	Subject Files (186 with findings and 361 with no findings)	547
(3)	Cuba Policy Files	101
(4)	Chief, WH Division Chrono Files (Task Force W Chronos)	37
(5)	Official 201 Dossiers	100-plus
	Total	2,514

b. Criteria Used in the Research

As a guide the research group followed the Terms of Reference referred to above. In addition to the Terms of Reference, the group remained alert to other items of interest

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brought to its attention by the IG Staff, on an ad hoc basis, and to additional questions raised in the course of the study. A name trace was always run, and/or the 201-file was reviewed, if available, on any individual allegedly involved in an assassination plot against President Kennedy or Fidel Castro. This task was made somewhat easier as the result of a memorandum prepared by the Cuba Desk, in August 1975, based on traces of the names in the so-called Black Book that Fidel Castro passed to Senator McGovern, which dealt with individuals the Cubans alleged were involved in assassination attempts against Castro.

c. Findings and Organization of the Findings

Each researcher submitted a draft paper noting the subject of the folder(s) reviewed, a brief description of the activity, and a copy of those document(s) or findings which contained information believed to be pertinent to the review. Also included were job numbers, official file numbers, inclusive dates of material researched, and the number of volumes reviewed. Beginning in January 1977, at the request of the IG Staff, the researchers also began noting FBI and/or other government agencies knowledge of information, to the extent recorded in Agency files. Separate finished memoranda were prepared, on the basis of these data, including the heading Findings. This heading lists the specific document number(s) and other pertinent data, and a few lines providing

the gist of the document(s) for purpose of easy and quick reference. These memoranda, with a copy of the document(s) attached, are filed in alphabetical order, by project and subject, in hard-back green folders as part of the official LA Division research group files under the official classification number 019-604-001 (Volumes XI through XX). Also included in the records are two folders (Volumes IX and X) containing 1,439 draft memoranda with negative findings. These records are restricted in LA Division.

7. The LA Division research effort proved to be far more complex than originally estimated. Research continued to lead to new files, and the requirements for meticulous analysis and correlation of material further extended the time required to complete the undertaking. By completing this exhaustive review of files the Agency can speak with considerable confidence as to what the records of Cuban operations show, so far as they relate to the question of the death of President Kennedy.

8. CI Staff: CI Staff assigned one senior officer to review its files on Lee Harvey Oswald, working under the general Terms of Reference referred to above, and also to generate papers on points not covered by the guidelines but pertinent to the general subject.

9. Since December 1963, the CI Staff has served as the point of record for all questions relating to Lee Harvey Oswald and the

Agency's role in the investigation conducted by the Warren Commission. The so-called "Oswald File" now fills 57 volumes comprising some 142 file folders and portfolios. In addition, the Staff has accumulated some 50 supplemental files including the master copy of those documents released under provisions of the FOIA to the public in March 1976 (first series) and those documents (second series) released in September 1976 and March 1977.

10. By necessity the documents in the file are held in chronological order; however, the file has become much more than just a chronological file on Lee Harvey Oswald. It has now become the Agency's central repository for information and documentation that it holds on:

a. The life of Harvey Oswald;

b. The Agency's role in the investigation conducted by the Warren Commission, 1963--1964;

c. The testimony by various Agency officers before the several commissions and committees set up to review the validity of previous investigations. (NB: It should be pointed out that this portion of this file is not complete); and

d. The point of record for Agency action taken in response to requests submitted to the Agency under provisions of the Freedom of Information Act.

11. In order to come to grips with the voluminous material in the Oswald files, it soon became obvious that, in order to be in a position to respond effectively and expeditiously to the Terms of Reference and to allegations and accusations in Book V of the SSC Final Report, it would be necessary to copy much of the file and to place these copies in folders set up according to general and specific subjects. In order to check charges that this Agency had withheld information from the FBI and the Warren Commission, and that there was "no evidence that the FBI asked the Agency to conduct an investigation or gather information," the following files were set up:

a. Correspondence from the Warren Commission;

b. Correspondence from the Agency to the Warren Commission;

c. Agency disseminations to the Intelligence Community, particularly the FBI;

d. Correspondence from the FBI to the Agency requesting assistance and information;

e. Chronological summary of information on and actions taken relating to Silvia Tirado de DURAN; and

f. Chronological summary of information on and actions taken relating to Gilberto ALVARADO Ugarte.

These files provided a basis for checking statements included in the SSC Final Report and to determine what the Agency actually did do in relation to the Warren Commission inquiry.

12. The approach to the problem at hand was to assemble by chronological and statistical compilations the Agency's record on the matter, (a) its initiation of collection requirements for information, and the papers it originated on various aspects of the investigation for passage to the Intelligence Community, particularly the FBI and the Warren Commission, and (b) its response to requirements and requests levied upon it by the Intelligence Community and the Warren Commission. Certain parts of the record were summarized to record what actually happened in those instances in which it differs from representations in the SSC Report.

13. Office of Security: The Office of Security assigned one officer to identify material in its records believed to have some possible relation to the Kennedy assassination. During the course of this review, approximately fifty subject files were identified as containing material of some relevance. This material amounted to the equivalent of approximately two safe drawers. The files reviewed included volumes on Lee Harvey Oswald, AMLASH, various individuals connected with the Criminal Underworld Plot, and a collection of files containing the results of name traces conducted at the time of the "Garrison Investigation."

14. Office of the Inspector General: The Office of the Inspector General held the report that it produced in 1967 on plotting against Castro, as well as related materials accumulated subsequently. It also received files developed in 1973 in response to a 9 May 1973

request by the DCI to Agency employees concerning questionable activities. Two members of the Inspection Staff were assigned to the project, responsible for overall coordination of the research effort. Additionally, because of the emphasis given to events in Mexico by Book V of the SSC Final Report, the Office of the Inspector General employed on contract a retired employee who had served as a special case officer in Mexico City during the period preceding President Kennedy's death and during the investigation afterwards. The retired employee recalled for this task conducted an extensive review of all Mexico City files and materials held in Headquarters or retired to Archives. The result of her research is found in Tabs B and F.

15. The file holdings in the Office of the Inpsector General are less than one safe drawer. However, the AMLASH file, held by LA Division/Directorate of Operations, was reviewed by a member of the Office of the Inspector General, as were parts of the AMTRUNK file, also held by LA Division. These two activities are discussed in Annexes D and C, respectively.

16. There were a limited number of interviews to clarify specific points.

* * * * * * * *

Detailed records of the research undertaken are held in the respective components participating in this effort. Selected back-up material for the final report is also held in the Office of the Inspector General.

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TERMS OF REFERENCE

FOR REVIEW OF

ISSUES RAISED IN

BOOK V, SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE

FINAL REPORT

1. The Schweiker Subcommittee has two basic theses--(1) the general idea that the intelligence community--primarily CIA and FBI--did not undertake a full review of the possibility of Cuban involvement in the assassination of President Kennedy, and (2) the idea that CIA activities against Cuba were provocative and may have led to the assassination of President Kennedy. The former by itself is not too difficult a problem to address. Either there was or there was not an extensive intelligence collection program to ascertain all possible information on the subject. Either there was or there was not an exhaustive review of all information in the Agency that might in some way relate to this question. Either the Agency did or did not report what it had to the Warren Commission for further inquiry and review.

2. The second portion of the Subcommittee's presentation is somewhat more diffuse and complex. By way of general background it summarizes Agency and U.S. operations against Castro's Cuba. There is an inference--almost subliminal--that these general activities were provocative. More specific, however, is the detailed treatment of the AMLASH operation as an activity that the report suggests could have provoked Castro into retaliatory action against President Kennedy. The failure of CIA to report this to the Warren Commission, in the context of the provocation theory, is advanced as a failure to report relevant information. Detailed treatment of the operation is given in the report in support of the thesis.

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3. The issue of operational activity that could have provoked a retaliatory strike by Castro against President Kennedy cannot be restricted to the AMLASH operation. In itself it may be one of the poorer examples of something that might have proven so provocative as to stimulate a retaliatory strike by Castro against President Kennedy. There were other operations with the unqualified objective of killing Castro. These contrast with the AMLASH affair in which the agreed purpose was not so clear and in which the sequence of events throws considerable doubt on the Subcommittee's treatment of the activity in this respect.

a. The following questions are intended to serve as a guide in a records review of the extent of the Agency's investigation prior to the end of the Warren Commission.

(1) What collection requirements were issued to the field with regard to Kennedy's assassination?

(2) What follow-up of these requirements was there during 1964?

(3) What form did the follow-up take?

(4) Identify and describe the records with regard to this activity.

(5) What reporting was there from the field in response to Headquarters' requirements?

(6) What dissemination and review was this reporting given?

(7) Was dissemination made on this reporting to the CI Staff?

(8) Was this reporting given to the Warren Commission?

(9) What review of Headquarters' material was ordered through 1964?

(10) What were the parameters of these instructions?

(11) What responses were there and where are they?

(12) What evidence is there that the "provocation" theory was considered during the Warren Commission enquiries, either in CIA or the Warren Commission?

(13) What action was taken with reference to this concept as a basis for reviewing relating Agency programs?

(14) What records are there on this and where are they?

(15) Were there any efforts made to develop an Oswald/Cuban connection?

(16) What form did they take?

(17) What exchanges were there with the FBI on this subject?

(18) What action developed from these exchanges?

(19) What records are there on these exchanges and where are they?

(20) To what extent were elements of the Agency other than the CI Staff and LA Division involved in investigating the assassination during the Warren Commission tenure?

(21) What is the total CIA information on the two flights from Mexico City to Havana?

(22) What was done at the time to develop further information on this matter?

(23) Can further information be acquired on this matter now?

(24) What is the total CIA information on "D"?

(25) Is further information on "D" needed in view of the SSC Subcommittee reference to it?

(26) What information does CIA have on Oswald FPCC relations?

(27) What does CIA know about the New Orleans training activity and was anything provided on this to the Warren Commission?

(28) What is the total CIA information on "A"?

(29) Who is the man photographed in Mexico City?

(30) What is the CIA information on the 4 December 1963 report of an agent meeting Oswald in Cuba?

(31) What is the total CIA information on Cuban assassination policies and programs up to November 22, 1963?

(32) What is the total CIA information on Castro's 7 September 1963 statements re retribution?

(33) Does the testimony before the SSC of CIA employees contain anything on the above questions? If so, what?

b. On the subject of possible provocation for the assassination plots against Castro, each of the known activities should be reviewed to the extent possible in order to determine any additional relevant information on this plot.

(1) What is the total information on the plots involving the criminal syndicates?

(2) Who was witting of the planning for the syndicate operation?

(3) Are there current considerations on the syndicate operation not faced previously (e.g., a former Office of Security officer may have knowledge that was not surfaced in the interviews with him with the SSC or Agency personnel. Additionally, a former LA Division career agent may have some insights that could throw light on one of the operations).

(4) There are a couple of cases based on agent traffic (reported to the SSC during the study of alleged assassination plots) indicating plans during the Bay of Pigs period to shoot Castro. What is the total CIA information on these?

(5) What is the significance on the subject of provocation in the book given Senator McGovern by Castro?

(6) While the AMLASH operation is subject to fairly detailed reconstruction from a very complete record, there are points that should be addressed particularly, because of their treatment in the SSC Subcommittee report. For instance, is there significance in the fact that CIA contacted AMLASH/1 in September 1963 after such a long time? Or was it simply that this was the first time the opportunity had presented itself since earlier meetings?

(7) Just what did the case officer tell AMLASH/1 when making plans for the 22 November meeting?

(8) What was the security of the relationship with AMLASH/1 during the period preceding the assassination of President Kennedy?

(9) In what time frame was Fitzgerald's Executive Officer speaking when he stated his judgment that the AMLASH/1 operation was an assassination plot?

c. What other action might CIA have taken in connection with the investigation? An effort should be made to list these, including consultation with surviving officials to determine not only what they considered the requirement at the time, but what was omitted and why.

4. In conclusion, these "Terms of Reference" undertake to address the entire question of possible provocation of U.S. policy and CIA programs in the period preceding the assassination of President Kennedy. An aspect of this is the SSC Subcommittee's apparent view that CIA assassination plotting could have instigated a retaliatory strike by Castro against President Kennedy, which, therefore, should have been reported to the Warren Commission. Just as importantly, the final paper should reflect findings in the area of what the Agency did in response to Warren Commission requirements (both stated by the Warren Commission and those that could have been conceived by the Agency), and how it pursued these lines of action and reported them to the Commission. This will include consideration of specific new and unanswered questions raised in the Schweiker report.

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Tab B

CIA PERFORMANCE ON THE INQUIRIES

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CIA's Performance on the Inquiries

Book V of the SSC Final Report challenges the performance of the intelligence agencies during the Warren Commission inquiry, emphasizing things that it feels should have been done but which it asserts were not.

It is correct to say that CIA has not produced evidence or analysis that addresses every theory that has been advanced over the years. A record of the volume of CIA reporting to the FBI and the Warren Commission is at Tab E. As a practical consideration, every theoretical question that can be conceived cannot be answered conclusively; there simply may be no evidence at all, or if there is evidence somewhere it may not be accessible. The issue is what the intelligence agencies did -- in the present instance, what was the performance of CIA -- with Book V of the SSC Final Report portraying a pattern of neglect or avoidance that is not supported by the record.

The SSC Final Report offers a number of separate subjects in support of its case:

a. It refers to an allegation by a person identified as "D" (pages 28-30, 41-42 and 102-103) that he overheard and saw Oswald being handed money in Mexico City for the purpose of assassinating President Kennedy; this was proven false, both by polygraph and by determining that Oswald was in New Orleans instead of Mexico City at the time the incident was supposed to have occurred. This subject is treated in a confusing and inconclusive manner in the SSC Final Report.

b. A considerable portion of the Report is given to the AMLASH operation. The operation is described inaccurately. The Report assigns it characteristics that it did not have during the period preceding the assassination of President Kennedy, in order to support the SSC view that it should have been reported to the Warren Commission. This is treated in some detail at Tab D of this report.

c. Space is devoted to two aircraft flights from Mexico City to Havana, on 22 November and 27 November (see pages 60-63). The first of these flights, as described in the SSC Report, is based on an inaccurate report about a delay of the 22 November flight to meet a mysterious private aircraft; the correct story removes the basis for the inferences of the SSC version. The second of these flights had to do with a man whose significance arises from a patently erroneous report; the FBI investigated him thoroughly, as is apparent from the condensed summary in the SSC Final Report.

These examples illustrate the problem of commenting on the SSC Final Report, the question becoming that of how to deal with Congressional criticism presented on the basis of inaccurate factual perceptions. To treat the problem it was felt necessary to review the record in-depth and to report the findings, whatever they are.

Recognizing the possibility of error or oversight in 1964--both on the part of CIA and the Warren Commission--consideration was given to courses of action CIA might have taken to throw some light on the

questions as understood at the time, as well as considering those * questions that have developed since then. What would be the areas of inquiry? Oswald was an obvious subject of investigation.

Oswald was known to have been out of the country twice subsequent to his return to private life from the Marine Corps in September 1959. These overseas adventures were appropriate for CIA attention. The first of these overseas trips was when he went to the Soviet Union in October 1959 from which he returned in June 1962. The second of these trips was when he went to Mexico City in late September 1963, from which he returned in early October 1963.

In addition to these two areas of obvious specific inquiry for CIA, there is the problem of general foreign intelligence collection that might in some way produce information on the subject. The SSC Final Report adds to these considerations operations being conducted by CIA as part of a general U.S. program against the Castro regime. These four general areas of inquiry are covered below.

I. Travel to and from the USSR 1959-1962

On 26 November 1963 a cable was sent to Paris, Rome, Madrid, [Copenhagen, Oslo, Helsinki,] Brussels, The Hague, London, and Ottawa giving biographic information on Lee Harvey Oswald. It noted his discharge from the Marine Corps in September 1959 and his travel to the Soviet Union in October 1959, including sketchy details as to his employment and marriage while in the USSR. The cable requested:

> "any scrap information which bears on President's assassination...."

On 27 November the various addressee stations replied, with [Helsinki 14-1] and London providing additional details on the travel of Oswald to the USSR. Additionally, London reported that a British journalist claimed that during his own imprisonment in Cuba in 1959 there was a U.S. gangster there by the name of Santos, who was living in luxury in jail because he could not return to the U.S.; the source stated that Santos was "visited frequently by another American gangster named 'Ruby'." (See pages 24--25, Tab C.)

Also on 27 November Ottawa reported the "delight" of the Cuban Embassy staff over the assassination of President Kennedy although the staff was instructed to "cease looking happy in public," in conformance with instructions from Cuba to "govern their actions by official attitude of Govt to which they accredited." [Oslo 14-4] on the same date, reported that the Soviets were shocked, blaming the assassination on extreme right-wing elements. Otherwise, the initial responses produced no other information.

On 29 November The Hague and Frankfurt were queried about Oswald's travel back from the USSR. This query was followed on 2 December by a similar cable to Berlin, Frankfurt, Bonn and The Hague. Various reporting produced details about the travel of Oswald and his wife from the USSR through Germany and the Netherlands enroute to the United States in June 1962.

The other stations involved in these inquiries had no traces or information on Oswald; liaison services were also queried without

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detailed results although there were some technical operations that produced peripheral information about the reactions of various groups under intelligence surveillance. Considerable exchanges were held with the Warren Commission on Oswald's Soviet record and its possible significance. No evidence was found tying the Soviet Union to Oswald's assassination of President Kennedy. Book V of the SSC Final Report, in not criticising the Agency's performance in this aspect of the investigation, seems to have accepted it as adequate, and it will not be detailed here.

II. Oswald Mexico Visit -- September-October 1963

The visit by Oswald to Mexico City, in his attempt to get visas for travel to the Soviet Union and Cuba, has received extensive attention. The details concerning the coverage of Oswald's visit to Mexico is treated in another annex to this paper (Tab F). The concern felt by all initially for the possible significance of Oswald's visit, and his contacts with the Cuban and Soviet embassies, was obvious at the time. The following statement is in a cable to Mexico City on 28 November 1963:

> "We have by no means excluded the possibility that other as yet unknown persons may have been involved or even that other powers may have played a role. Please continue all your coverage of Soviet and Cuban installations and your liaison with Mexicans."

The allegations made by "D," about having seen Oswald taking money from Cubans in the Cuban embassy in Mexico City, received intensive attention from CIA and the FBI, working together closely on the matter, and with the Mexican authorities. This was demonstrated conclusively to have been a false allegation. Oswald was in New Orleans at the time of the reported incident, and the person making the allegations was demonstrated by polygraph to have been lying. After the allegations by "D" had been demonstrated to be false, Headquarters made the following statement to the Mexico City Station on 1 December 1963:

> "Pls continue to follow all leads and tips. The question of whether Oswald acted solely on his own has still not been finally resolved."

Again, on 13 December 1963 the Mexico City Station was cabled as follows:

> "Plse continue watch for Soviet or Cuban reaction to investigation of assassination, evidence of their complicity, signs they putting out propaganda about case. FYI only, Soviet Intel in India had letters sent to [U.S. Government] leaders demanding full investigation of case."

On 17 December 1963 Headquarters forwarded a dispatch to the Mexico City Station stated as follows:

> "...Mexico City has been the only major overseas reporter in the case. While this partly dictated by the facts of Lee Oswald's

> life, we have not overlooked the really outstanding performance of Mexico City's major assets and the speed, precision, and perception with which the data was forwarded. Here it was relayed within minutes to the White House, [Department of State] and [the FBI].
>
> "Your LIENVOY data, the statements of Silvia DURAN, and your analyses were major factors in the quick clarification of the case, blanking out the really ominous spectre of foreign backing."

Essentially, Oswald's visit to Mexico City was investigated as thoroughly as possible, producing no evidence there of Soviet or Cuban complicity in the assassination of President Kennedy. If anything, events during Oswald's visit there are more subject to being seen as counter to such a possibility, given his troubles with both Cubans and Soviets. We do not offer this thought as the final word, but more simply that if it bears on the subject at all it is inconsistent with speculation that he had some special relationship with either nation.

It is noted that various allegations have been made in the press in connection with the House Select Committee on Assassinations inquiry concerning CIA information regarding Oswald's Mexico visit; these are commented on at Tab G.

III. General Collection Requirements

On 22 November 1963 all CIA stations abroad received a cable from Headquarters with the following statement:

"Tragic death of President Kennedy requires all of us to look sharp for any unusual intelligence developments. Although we have no reason to expect anything of a particular military nature, all hands should be on the quick alert at least for the next few days while the new President takes over the reins."

It is appropriate at this point to observe the general reaction to be expected from such a communication. Without any leads, other than those arising from Oswald's identification, the requirements to field stations were necessarily general. General reporting can be stimulated by general requests, if there is something to report, and this is what was undertaken. In addition, in any event, intelligence assets and liaison services overseas are quick to realize the significance of important information and will report it on their own initiative. It is significant, in the light of these considerations, that there has been the most limited reporting on the subject. Were there relevant or significant information on the subject it would have been reported either in responses to the expression of general interest, or spontaneously, if such information was known to Agency sources.

If one believes that there was a conspiracy, with Oswald involved, one must accept the likelihood that his fellow conspirators would not have shared their knowledge beyond the narrow circle of those directly involved. Conversely, if there were no conspiracy, there obviously

would be nothing to report in the first place. The absence of concrete reporting seems to serve, regardless of which is the case, as the basis for the apparent SSC view that no collection effort was undertaken.

As has been noted above, there were initial CIA collection requirements to the field. What they could be realistically expected to produce must be related to whether there was any information to collect at all, and if so whether it was accessible. The requirements were issued, but in retrospect it is doubtful that they could produce much of the who-what-where-when-how information that typifies intelligence collection reporting. A reflection of the basic nature of the problem is found in the Headquarters cable to Mexico City on 17 December 1963 (note above) which contains the following comment about the limited reporting from other stations:

> ". . . this partly dictated by the facts of Lee Oswald's life. . ."

The SSC Final Report speaks in rather unqualified terms at page 10 about the resources of the intelligence agencies, including a description of "an extensive intelligence network in Cuba," suggesting that it was only necessary to ask to get. It is correct to say that there were sources in Cuba able to report on events, such as troop movements, but there were no penetrations of Castro's inner circle, where any information on the subject in question would exist. The distinction apparently was missed -- or ignored -- by the authors of the SSC Final Report. As stated by the Miami Chief of Station, quoted at page 58 of the SSC Report:

> "Now if you are referring to our capability to conduct an investigation in Cuba, I would have to say it was limited."

This does not mean that such assets as there were did not have reporting

requirements levied on them, in fact, there was considerable activity in this respect. In the course of the present review a number of case officers at the Station during that period have described the frenetic activity in this respect. The characterization by the Chief of Station as to passive collection by CIA inside the United States should not be extended to apply to what was done with reporting assets outside the United States, as the SSC Final Report attempts to do at the bottom of page 58.

The SSC Final Report has undertaken to paint this in very different terms than the record supports. The extensive reporting to the FBI and the Warren Commission provides a truer reflection of the level of activity by CIA (see Tab E), even if its sources did not bear on every question that has been conceived since then.

IV "Unpursued Leads"

At pages 60-67, in Book V of the SSC Final Report, there is a section that addresses leads that were felt to not have been followed by the intelligence agencies. This follows the section on CIA's Performance on the Inquiries. This section first addresses two Cubana flights to Havana from Mexico City on 22 November (the date of President Kennedy's murder) and 27 November 1963, raising questions about passengers reported to be aboard those flights.

By way of background it is noted that during that period Cubana flights traveled on a round trip basis between Havana and Mexico City every other day. More specifically, there were flights at this time on 22 November, 25 November and 27 November. The flights on

22 and 25 November to Havana were passenger flights, while the one on 27 November appears to have been essentially a cargo flight, with one passenger, the man referred to in the SSC discussion. All flights to Havana apparently carried some freight.

CIA conducted regular surveillance of Cubana flights, filing cable reports to Headquarters. There was one [unilateral] CIA surveillance team (LIFIRE) that observed arrivals and departures of Cubana flights, reporting any unusual incidents and providing copies of flight manifests. The [Mexican authorities] also had a surveillance team of its own at the airport, which provided photographs of passports and also provided copies of passenger lists. Additionally, a telephone tap operation (LIENVOY) against the Cuban embassy provided transcripts of conversations with the Cubana office and the Mexican Airport Control Office.

The 22 November 1963 Flight

At pages 30, 60, 61 and 103 of Book V of the SSC Final Report, reference is made to a reported five-hour delay of a Cubana flight from Mexico City to Havana the evening of President Kennedy's assassination, 22 November 1963. The SSC Report describes the delay as being from 6:00 P.M. EST to 11:00 P.M. EST. The especially intriguing aspect of the report was that the reported delay was to await arrival at 10:30 P.M. EST of a private twin-engined aircraft, which deposited an unidentified passenger who boarded the Cubana aircraft without customs clearance and traveled to Havana in the pilot's cabin. The SSC Final Report emphasized CIA's apparent failure to follow up by inquiring further into the matter.

Book V of the SSC Final Report states that CIA could not explain, at the time of the writing of the SSC Report, why there was no record of a follow-up. In fact, the SSC was advised that the Mexican authorities were asked about the reported flight delay, although there was no recorded response. The current review revealed additional information from the surveillance noted above, which bears directly on the subject. In reviewing that information below, it is noted that the conversion of Mexico City time to Eastern Standard Time (EST) in the SSC Final Report tends to distort the time perspective somewhat. Mexico City times are used in the following discussion.

The LIENVOY transcripts record a series of discussions about the status of the 22 November flight--when it was to arrive and when it departed. These records show that the flight arrived at the platform at the airport at 1620 hours Mexico City time; presumably it landed a few minutes earlier. At one point prior to arrival of the aircraft, one person speaking on the telephone stated that the aircraft was due at 1630 hours and "it will go" at 1730, suggesting a quick turnaround that would have reduced unloading and loading time, as well as servicing, to a relatively short period. However, the key report on the departure of the aircraft was a statement at 2040 hours that the aircraft had taken off five minutes earlier, i.e., 2035 hours.

The following facts stand out, in contrast to the presentation in the SSC Final Report:

1. The Cubana flight was on the ground in Mexico City for a total of four hours and about ten minutes. It was not

delayed five hours, as alleged.

2. The Cubana flight took off at 2035 hours Mexico City time, 55 minutes ahead of the alleged arrival at 2130 of a private flight with a secret passenger. This also contrasts further with the alleged departure time of the Cubana flight, which the report stated to be 2200. Actual departure preceded substantially the reported arrival of the aircraft for which it allegedly was delayed.

In view of the surveillance coverage of the Cubana flight, it is very doubtful that the alleged activity involving the private twin-engined aircraft and passenger would have gone unnoticed or unreported had it occurred. Personnel in Mexico City at the time were aware of these sources and probably knew the above facts, feeling no need to follow further.

The report in question was in error, and misled the SSC in its summary of the matter.

The Passenger on the 27 November 1963 Flight

At pages 61-63 and 104, the SSC Final Report describes in considerable detail information concerning a Cuban-American who came to the attention of the CIA and the FBI in the period following the assassination of President Kennedy. The introductory comments of the SSC Final Report state that:

" . . . one source alleged that the Cuban-American was 'involved' in the assassination."

The SSC Report states that the CIA reported the case to the FBI, "almost immediately," but that the Bureau did not conduct a follow-up investigation "as part of (its) work for the Warren Commission." Further down the same page the SSC Report states that "(t)he FBI did investigate this individual after receiving the CIA report of his unusual travel." At page 63 the SSC Report observes that "...the suspicious travel of this individual coupled with the possibility that Oswald had contacted the Tampa chapter (of the Fair Play for Cuba Committee--FPCC) certainly should have prompted a far more thorough and timely investigation than the FBI conducted..." We do not know just what the Bureau did in this respect, nor have we tried to resolve the apparent inconsistencies in the SSC Report noted above, but the SSC Final Report contains considerable detail about the man, presumably reflecting the results of FBI inquiries.

While this section of the SSC Report is directed primarily at the FBI, we reviewed the reporting because of CIA's initial role in reporting about the man. There is also one implicit criticism of CIA, which will be noted.

Book V of the SSC Final Report has the following summary statement at page 104, in the chronology section:

> "December 5 - Mexico Station cables that someone who saw the Cuban-American board the aircraft to Havana on November 27 reported that he 'looked suspicious'..."

At page 61 it states that there "is no indication that CIA followed-up on this report (that the man was "involved in the assassination"),

except to ask a Cuban defector about his knowledge of the Cuban-American's activities."

The presentation of this matter in the SSC Report contains some inaccuracies. First, the Mexico City Station did not cable Washington that the man "looked suspicious." There was a cable, dated 5 December 1963, but it reported that the man had "crossed at Laredo, Texas on 23 November," that he registered at a certain hotel in Mexico City at a certain time on 25 November, that he checked out of the hotel at a certain time and departed for Havana "as only passenger on Cubana flight on night 27 November," and that there was a good photograph of him taken at the airport. This was followed by a dispatch the same date, repeating the basic information in the cable, enclosing the photograph, and containing the following cryptic statement:

> "Source states the timing and circumstances surrounding Subject's travel through Mexico and departure for Havana are suspicious."

This comment is cryptic, at least, and--given that dramatic moment in history--doubtless reflects a preliminary comment of a person who was on the alert at that time for anything that might be construed as possibly unusual. The above quotation was the Station's actual report of the observation by the source, and is what was reported to the FBI; it differs from the quotation in the SSC Report. There was an internal memo in the Station that was even more cryptic, but which was in the nature of an informal reminder, which stated that the man was reported

to have "looked suspicious"; but this formulation never found its way into the more careful statements that usually characterize official reporting. The point is that the observation was cryptic and impressionistic, rather than constituting a tangible basis for dramatic activity or final conclusions.

There is one piece of reporting that could confuse those reviewing the record, but which is essentially resolved when considered in the context of known facts. On 19 March 1964, Monterrey Base cabled that a source of a local (Monterrey) "agent of the federal judicial police" had information on a man; the description seems to have the same Cuban-American in mind. The following should be noted about the report: it misspelled the man's name; it offered a bare statement that he "was involved in Kennedy assassination"; it states that he entered Mexico "on foot" from Laredo, Texas (according to the SSC Final Report, the FBI concluded that he entered by automobile); it asserts that he stayed at the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City (while the dates and times of his registration and check-out at a specific hotel in Mexico City, where he stayed, were known); it gave an incorrect number for his passport; and, it stated that his Mexican tourist card was issued in Nuevo Laredo (when it was known to have been issued in Tampa, Florida). The report, on its face, was factually incorrect on a number of known points. The source patently was extensively misinformed, the hard facts of his report being in error. The Chief of Base at the time, when queried about the report in the course of the present review, could not recall it.

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There is one additional aspect of the matter, in which the record is confused. If we are to comment negatively on the presentation by the SSC in its emphasis on report, we must point out that the Mexico City Station's response to the Monterrey report contributes to such confusion as may exist on the matter. When Mexico City received the Monterrey cable the Deputy Chief of Station replied that the information in the report "jibes fully with that provided Station by (Mexico City source) 4 December 63." It did not jibe in most respects, other than the date and place of entry into Mexico. The mistake of that cable cannot be explained today, but wrong it obviously was. It does, however, serve to highlight the basic unreliability of the report and indicate how it should be considered responsibly.

Implicit criticism of CIA's not collecting more information on the man is not well founded. It had no real sources with access to information concerning him; when a defector from Cuba became available with such information he was queried and the results were provided the authorities.

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Tab C

CIA OPERATIONS AGAINST CUBA

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CIA Operations Against Cuba

The SSC Final Report speaks of operations against Cuba and the Castro regime, and contends that they should have been reported in detail to the Warren Commission as part of the subject matter that it consciously took into consideration. A case can be made for specific considerations of these various activities by the Warren Commission, at least as part of the unique background of the times; it might have provided it additional investigative leads. However, to advance the general thought is not to discard the usual tests of evidence that must still control how the findings are treated.

It should be noted that at the time of the Warren Commission inquiry there was no secret about the tensions between the Kennedy Administration and the Castro regime. Book V of the SSC Final Report refers briefly to some of the more dramatic events, such as the Bay of Pigs in April 1961 and the Missile Crisis in October 1962 (see pages 2, 3, 10 and 11). In fact, the totality of American policy and practice must have appeared threatening to the Castro regime, and most certainly must have been considered by it as provocative.

Additional U. S. policies and programs that could have been viewed negatively by Castro were the breaking of diplomatic relations,

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economic and political sanctions, paramilitary operations (which received recurring publicity in the press), as well as a variety of covert operations that were not known publicly. On 18 November 1963 President Kennedy -- four days before his death -- delivered a major policy address in Miami, accusing Castro of having betrayed the Cuban revolution; at the time the press, reportedly on the basis of what "White House sources" said about it, viewed it as a call for the Cuban people to overthrow the Castro regime.

The United States provided a haven and base for Cuban exiles, who conducted their independent operations against the Castro government. Some of these exiles had the support of CIA, as well as from other elements of the U.S. Government, and still others had support from private sources. With or without official U.S. support these exiles spoke in forceful Latin terms about what they hoped to do. The Cuban intelligence services had agents in the exile community in America and it is likely that what they reported back to Havana assigned to CIA responsibility for many of the activities under consideration, whether CIA was involved or not.

We do not know the extent to which the Warren Commission took what might be characterized as "judicial notice" of the tensions between the two governments and their leaders; it certainly was in the public domain. That consideration was given the possibility of

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Cuban or Soviet involvement in the assassination is no secret, clearly reflecting a recognition of the question at the time. That a request was not made by the Warren Commission, nor volunteered by the intelligence agencies, for extensive review of all Cuban operations is being faulted today. Yet, in the light of understandings at that time, it could well have appeared to members of the Warren Commission and its staff as not directly relevant, in fact, to the specific issue of the murder of the President. In the absence of evidence to the contrary a case could still be made for that view, although the evolution of public perceptions probably would not accept it without reservation.

The SSC Final Report has fixed on the Cuban operations of the intelligence agencies--primarily those of CIA--for special attention in considering the question. Implicitly it accepts the theory that there could well have been conspiracy in the murder of President Kennedy, and that Castro could have been behind it, having been provoked by depredations against Cuba or plotting against his own life. However, in advancing its thesis, the SSC Report cautioned that it had "seen no evidence that Fidel Castro or others in the Cuban government plotted President Kennedy's assassination in retaliation for U.S. operations against Cuba."

In response to this perception, conveyed in Book V of the SSC Final Report, we have conducted a major review of Agency files (the

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organization of that effort is discussed at Tab A of this report). This was for the express purpose of identifying any separate activities that could have provoked Castro to order the assassination of President Kennedy had he learned of them, and to evaluate their security.

Today, in 1977, it is difficult to reconstruct exactly everything that did and did not occur in the course of the Warren Commission inquiries in 1964. Not all that happened is a matter of record. For instance, in CIA at that time there were many individuals assigned to various aspects of Cuban operations. They were familiar in detail with those activities, with what they were and with their strengths and weaknesses. They doubtless made numerous conscious but unrecorded judgments about what seemed relevant or irrelevant to the considerations of the Warren Commission. Had they been aware of any aspects of those activities that may have related to the assassination of the President it is safe to say it would have been surfaced in some way. While CIA produced considerable material for the investigation (see Tab E) that more was not reported is a meaningful indication of what was known then by those actually involved, as distinguished from what might be hypothesized at a later date. To contend to the contrary -- which has been suggested by some -- would require a unanimous conspiracy of many American citizens, employees of CIA, many of whom knew aspects of even the most closely guarded activities.

Today, the knowledge of the persons involved directly in the various Cuban operations in the period preceding President Kennedy's death cannot be recaptured in the form that it existed then. Those persons are scattered, their memories are blurred by time, and some are dead. The SSC, for instance -- in its attempt to capture elements of the past -- seems to have led some employees into expressing opinions on subject matter they did not know in 1964, apparently in response to representations by SSC staff members as to the facts; this illustrates at best the difficulties in resolving hypothetical issues, today, on a responsible basis.

The SSC Final Report devotes considerable time to the so-called AMLASH operation, which centered on a high Cuban official who was dissatisfied with the Castro regime. The Agency had only a tentative relationship with this man during President Kennedy's life, although the SSC Final Report -- in trying to prove its thesis -- has attempted to present it differently. Because the case is discussed so extensively in the SSC Final Report, it is treated in a separate annex in this paper, at Tab D. The key point is that prior to President Kennedy's death the relationship with AMLASH/1 was amorphous and without substance. Had Castro learned of it he could learn only that there was a contact that had not developed to the point of an undertaking. This will not be treated further in this section of this discussion.

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In the face of the hypotheses advanced by the SSC Final Report, it has been felt necessary to review in depth all records of Cuban operations conducted by CIA during the period in question, 1961-1964. The organization of the review is described at Tab A. It was not possible to predict the form that information turned up by this inquiry might take, and special care had to be exercised in the effort. In doing this the "provocation concept" of the SSC Report was kept in mind. In the months that it took to complete this extensive review, it is significant to observe that three areas of specific operational activity were found that either might meet some of the requirements of the provocation theory, or throw some further light on issues already considered. To report this conclusion is not to dismiss the original questions that faced the Warren Commission as to whether there might have been Cuban or Soviet connections with Oswald. That such possibilities remain unresolved in some minds is apparent, but that the records of CIA, in such a review, do not add significantly to evidence on the subject, is the conclusion of the present inquiry.

The areas of operational activity noted above can be described briefly as follows:

1. Operations directed against the Cuban leadership (AMTRUNK).
2. Operations involving the criminal underworld.
3. Other reports of plans to assassinate Castro.

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Operation AMTRUNK

There is one other general activity that was considered in the course of the present research, which is discussed below. This activity, AMTRUNK, was to develop a capability for splitting the leadership of the Castro regime and eventually overthrowing it. It never reached the point of implementation; however, because it suffered possible security vulnerabilities, it is treated here even though it never materialized. In our professional judgment this activity, because of its failure to ever develop substance, is not really relevant to the question. It is included simply because it might be viewed, by virtue of its security vulnerabilities, as fitting in part the hypothesis of the SSC Final Report; it seemed better to include it than try and explain at some later date why it was omitted, although the reasoning should be apparent. If its inclusion in this report is subject to question because of its lack of substance, perhaps it serves some purpose in indicating how little turned up in the course of this research to meet any of the rather loosely formulated provocation thesis of the SSC Report.

In early 1963 there were Cuban exiles who wished to change the direction that events seemed to have taken in Cuba. Two of them, Nestor Antonio Moreno Lopez and Enrique Cayardo Robera, developed an operational concept to overthrow the Castro government, which came to be known as the Leonardo Plan. Cayardo had been a public figure in Cuba, who had no apparent role in the activity following original inception of the plan. Moreno was the son of a Cuban senator and Minister of Public Works; as a lawyer in Cuba he had been involved in only a minor way in the anti-Batista movement.

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Moreno defected to the United States in April 1961, settling in Miami where he associated with anti-Castro exiles. Among his associates was Jorge Ajbuszyc Volsky, a Cuban citizen of Polish origin. Volsky had been in prison in the USSR in the 1940's, and enlisted in the Polish Air Force during WWII under the British Air Command. After WWII he married a Cuban national, and for a period operated his own business in Havana. Although avidly pro-Castro he reportedly was imprisoned for a few weeks following the Bay of Pigs invasion. As he held a valid U.S. visa, he left Cuba, arriving in Miami in May 1961.

Cayardo and Moreno discussed the Leonardo Plan with Volsky. He, in turn, discussed it with Tadeus (Tad) Witold Szulc, a reporter with the New York Times. Szulc had reported on Cuban activities for the New York Times prior to the fall of Batista, during which time he had developed a wide acquaintance among Cubans. He was transferred to the Times Washington Bureau in April 1961, where he claimed to have an entree to the White House through his uncle, Ambassador John C. Wiley. He also claimed to have a standing invitation for direct contact with President Kennedy, Attorney General Robert Kennedy, and McGeorge Bundy on matters concerning Cuba. While the actual nature of this entree is not known to CIA, it is through his intercession that the Leonardo Plan gained government-level support and approval.

In early 1963 Szulc arranged an interview in Washington with Mr. Richard Goodwin, a White House advisor. Volsky and Szulc then met with Robert Hurwitch, a senior official in the Department of State, who presented the concept to the CIA with Department approval. CIA assigned it to its Miami Station, where it became known as AMTRUNK.

AMTRUNK was conceived as first identifying disaffected key personnel in the Cuban armed forces with the long range objective of uniting them against the Castro regime. On 4 April 1963 CIA cabled certain stations and bases orders to identify Cubans who might be used in the activity. During that period the CIA Chief of Station in Miami questioned CIA control of the operation. Noting uncertain security considerations, he felt it best to fund the operation generously in order for it to proceed independently.

On 17 April 1963 Szulc informed Hurwitch that the Miami Station had given Volsky responsibility for the decision of whether or not the operation was to proceed; this was not consistent with CIA intentions.

In August 1963 things still had not progressed very far. A Headquarters cable on 5 August 1963 to certain stations and bases complained about the absence of responses to the 4 April cable. It emphasized that activity to penetrate the Cuba armed forces was a high priority objective. In early September 1963 AMTRUNK had three intelligence sources in Cuba: Miguel A. Diaz Isalgue, Ramon Guin Hector Robello, and Modesto Orozco Basulto. One of these sources, Guin, was reportedly close to AMLASH/1, a man with whom CIA was dealing separately through a Headquarters case officer -- but at

that time unsuccessfully -- in trying to develop an operational approach similar in some respects to AMTRUNK. The AMLASH operation is discussed at Tab D.

It was decided at the end of October 1963 that Moreno should be separated from the operational details of the AMTRUNK operation because of numerous indiscretions and poor security practice. Arrangements were made to involve him in a radio program to be used in connection with the Rebel Army that eventually it was hoped would arise against Castro. Moreno threatened to appeal this decision through Volsky and Szulc to the President.

In November 1963 the program was still trying to develop leads into higher echelons of the military and civilian leadership. The operation moved slowly, with preliminary infiltrations designed to set up infiltration/exfiltration routes. Although it had successfully recruited some persons during 1963 in Cuba, it had made practically no progress in establishing an organization or any capability for action. At a much later date as its numbers increased its security became less certain. In 1965 its security was believed to have been seriously compromised and the decision was taken to cut off relations with it. Various figures were arrested, including Guin, Diaz and AMLASH/1.

The reason for selecting this operation for discussion here is just not its denouement in 1965, but possible security weaknesses from the beginning. Szulc and Volsky are considered to be highly suspect and they are discussed below, with another person who became involved in the activity.

a. Tad Szulc. Szulc has been suspect since 1948 when the FBI recorded reports that he was a communist. Reportedly he was in frequent contact with communist party leaders and functionaries throughout Latin America. Suspicions about his motives or possible connections with foreign intelligence services have never been proven. Nicole Szulc, daughter of Tad Szulc, is reportedly an avid communist. Philip Agee's Inside the Company: A CIA Diary credits Nicole Szulc with having "obtained vital research materials in New York and Washington, D.C." She is believed to be an agent of the Cuban DGI. Doubts about Tad Szulc are unconfirmed but remain alive. Of Polish origin Szulc became a U.S. citizen in 1954 by a special bill of Congress.

b. Jorge Ajbuszyc Volsky. Like Szulc, he is of Polish origin. He and Szulc became acquainted in 1959-1960 in

Cuba. A CI Study of Volsky, dated 24 August 1964, prepared by a JMWAVE analyst, makes the following statement: "Volsky's knowledge of clandestine methods of operation, together with his Russian prison background and his ingenuity as a middleman in U.S. Government/CIA activities, made him an excellent candidate for a communist penetration agent and that the possibility existed that he might be a singleton, sleeper or stringer for the RIS." There has been no confirmation of these suspicions. Volsky became a naturalized U.S. citizen on 10 April 1969.

c. Jose Ricardo RABEL Nunez. Born in Cuba, he was the son of a native born American citizen. He was educated both in Cuba and in the States and later (1940) enlisted in the U.S. Army. After discharge he returned to Cuba but kept moving back and forth between the U.S. and Cuba. Viewed in retrospect, his career presents a patter of changing allegiances. He enjoined the anti-Batista forces in March 1952 first with the Cuban exiles in the United States and later from inside Cuba. He joined the Cuban Army under Batista and was the Cuban liaison officer with the U.S. Army mission in Cuba from November 1954 until 1956. During his

entire period in the Cuban Army, he was involved with dissident army elements. RABEL was arrested in April 1956 when he participated in an attempted coup. After a short imprisonment he returned to the U.S. and worked with one of his brothers. In October 1957, he returned to Cuba and became involved with the 26th of July Movement and later with the Cienfuegos Group. Shortly after the Castro victory, Castro called upon RABEL to set up a Cuban Marine Corps, a job he held until 1960, at which time he was appointed Chief of Viviendos Campesinas (Rural Housing). Approached by CIA, he refused to work in place but was willing to defect, which he did in December 1962, being recruited by JMWAVE Station where he was used in AMTRUNK activities. He returned to Cuba on his own in 1965, reportedly to attempt the exfiltration of his family. Upon return to Cuba he was arrested and sentenced to 30 years imprisonment but was set free in July or August 1967. There were accusations that RABEL was a Cuban agent as early as July 1963. The accusations were never proven.

In view of the later roll-up of the AMTRUNK operation the tentative opinion has been offered that the operation could have been an ingenious plan by the Cubans from the beginning, using access at high levels in the U.S. Government to learn the identities of

individuals in the Cuban hierarchy who were disloyal to the regime. Whatever the later penetrations by Cuban intelligence, the role of Szulc and Volsky, in the early phase of the operation, could have exposed both its members and eventual objectives to Cuban intelligence.

Accepting the possibility of vital security flaws in the operation, it must be observed that there was very little progress and no concrete planning during the life of President Kennedy. The eventual objective was to develop sufficient support and organization to overthrow the Cuban regime. It never made much progress, although it did lay down caches and conducted some infiltrations and exfiltrations in 1964 and 1965.

An attempt to build support that might eventually have the capability to attempt a coup against the Castro regime obviously would have been irritating to Castro. That it never really progressed very far during the life of President Kennedy is a relevant consideration to whether or not the tentative beginnings would have provoked Castro to order the assassination of President Kennedy.

New Considerations on the Syndicate Operation

In the course of the present review a by-line story by Paul Meskil in the New York Daily News attracted special attention because

of one statement that it contained. One of a series of stories printed 20-25 April 1975, it quoted Frank Sturgis as follows:

> "The third (assassination) scheme involved planting a bomb in Castro's office. 'I had access to the Prime Minister's office,' Sturgis said. 'I knew Fidel's private secretary Juan Orta. I recruited him to work with the embassy (American Embassy in Havana).'"

Sturgis has been something of a soldier of fortune over the years, having served in different branches of the U.S. military and having been in the anti-Batista movement prior to Castro's takeover. Sturgis stayed on in Cuba until mid-1959, during which time he reportedly had some role in the Castro regime's control of the gambling interests. He came to the United States in 1959. Sturgis gained notoriety when arrested on 17 June 1972 in the Watergate break-in. He has claimed on a number of occasions to have been an employee of CIA, although there is no record of any such relationship. He was in contact with some of the CIA Cuban employees in the Miami area, but had no direct relationships with the Agency.

The particular feature in the above excerpt from the newspaper story is that it constitutes the first public reference to Juan Orta in the role of an assassin in plans against Castro. Orta was,

in fact, the first man who reportedly was to have been used in the operation that CIA had, with the criminal syndicate, to kill Castro. Orta was the director of the Office of the Prime Minister, which gave him the access that would make it possible for him to poison Castro. The plan failed because Orta lost his position, and with it his access, in late January 1961. This was prior to delivery of the poison pills to him in late February or early March 1961. Orta's role in this connection was over when he took refuge in the Venezuelan Embassy in Havana in April 1961. He was allowed to leave Cuba in October 1964 and settled in Miami in February 1965. As for Sturgis' assertion that he recruited Orta to work with the embassy, CIA files have no record that Orta was recruited for CIA by anyone during the period there was an embassy in Cuba. While Orta was reported in early 1961 as being used in the CIA-syndicate attempt against Castro, CIA had no direct relationships with him until he left Cuba, at which time he was used as a source of information on the Cuban leadership.

The fact remains that Orta did at one time have the role of intended assassin. Sturgis' identification of Orta in this capacity, prior to its becoming known to external investigators in 1975, raised the question of just what Sturgis had known, and whether he could

have been a source of information on the subject whereby Castro could have learned of CIA's earlier plan against his life.

Newspaper stories are not necessarily reliable sources of information. However, because the statement by Sturgis in 1975 indicated a familiarity with Orta's availability to play the role of assassin in 1960, additional attention was given the statement in the press to see how it might fit in with other things that are known. What follows is subject to reservations that must attach to the reliability of newspaper stories.

The New York Daily News stories (20-25 April 1975), and another story by the same author on 13 June 1976, refer to possible relationships between Sturgis and Trafficante, also mentioning a Norman Rothman as a gambling partner of Trafficante. The Office of Security wrote a memorandum in 1975, in conjunction with the first set of New York Daily News stories, noting that there was a connection between Sturgis and Rothman in 1960, citing FBI reports. It is pertinent to note here that in addition to the role Sturgis is reported to have had with the Castro government in relation to the gambling activities, Juan Orta's availability for the assassination assignment was understood to be due to his having lost payoffs that he had once received from the gambling interests. One can deduce that Sturgis and Orta could have known one another because of their connections

with the gambling activities as well as having contacts with the men heading the gambling organizations.

The New York Daily News story of 1976 also reports a claim by a Marie Lorenz that she acted in 1960 in behalf of Sturgis, in an attempt to assassinate Castro. She had also been mentioned in the 1975 stories. Ms. Lorenz reportedly was Castro's mistress at one point, and her access, so the story indicates, was used as a means for getting to him. The 1976 news story concludes that "soon after her murder mission failed the CIA recruited Mafia mobsters . . . to kill Castro . . ." In the news story she claimed that the plan involved the use of poison pills which she concealed in a jar of face cream; they dissolved and could not be used.

On page 79 of the SSC Interim Report on Alleged Assassination Plots the following is extracted from an 18 October 1960 memorandum from the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation to the CIA Deputy Director for Plans:

> "During recent conversations with several friends, (Sam) Giancana stated that Fidel Castro was to be done away with very shortly. When doubt was expressed regarding this statement, Giancana reportedly assured those present that Castro's assassination would occur in November. Moreover, he allegedly indicated that he had already met with the assassin-to-be

> on three occasions . . . Giancana claimed that * everything has been perfected for the killing of Castro, and that the 'assassin' had arranged with a girl, not further described, to drop a 'pill' in some drink or food of Castro."

This seems to confirm some plot involving a woman to kill Castro with poison. However, the dating of events does not fit the time frame known to CIA. While consideration had been given to various schemes, there were no CIA pills for delivery until February 1961. It suggests that the syndicate may have been moving ahead on its own.

Following collapse of CIA's access to Castro through Orta, Johnny Roselli, the man who had served as the Agency's original intermediary with the syndicate, stated that he knew a Cuban exile leader who might participate. This man, Tony Varona, headed the Democratic Revolutionary Front, one of the exile groups that also received support from CIA as part of the larger Cuban operation. Varona was dissatisfied with the nature and extent of that support; Miami Station suspected that he was not keeping his bargain with the Agency. In fact, it is possible that Varona already was involved in independent operations with the criminal syndicate when first approached prior to the Bay of Pigs in March 1961 to carry out the Castro assassination. The 1967 IG Report refers to two FBI reports that bear on this. One of them, on 21 December 1960, indicates support by the criminal

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underworld for some of the Cuban exiles. The other report, on 18 January 1961, suggests that Varona was one of those receiving that support, although this was not confirmed. As a matter of interest, as late as 10 June 1964 there was a report that gangster elements in the Miami area were offering $150,000 for anyone who would kill Castro (an amount mentioned to the syndicate representatives by CIA case officers at an earlier date). These bits of information, fitted together, could provide the basis for an explanation of why Varona was so readily available when approached by Roselli. It also may throw light on a question noted in the 1967 IG Report. The operation with the syndicate had been called off following the Bay of Pigs in April 1961; yet, when it was reactivated in April 1962 the case officer felt there was something already ongoing in spite of the fact that the operation had been terminated a year earlier. It is possible that CIA simply found itself involved in providing additional resources for independent operations that the syndicate already had under way. The criminal syndicate had important interests in Cuba, and to recover them may well have sought on its own to eliminate Castro. In a sense CIA may have been piggy-backing on the syndicate and in addition to its material contributions was also supplying an aura of official sanction.

What do these various considerations suggest? It is obvious that many lines of speculation can be developed, not the least of which is that the Agency did not know the full extent of syndicate activities. Clearly, the Agency's case officers felt that they were initiating a new activity that had the sole purpose of accomplishing the elimination of Castro. The additional considerations can be listed as follows:

1. The criminal syndicate may well have had some independent activities of its own underway prior to CIA involvement in late 1960. These operations could well have continued after the CIA standdown following the Bay of Pigs, being ongoing in some form when CIA reactivated the plan in April 1962.

b. The syndicate operations could have activities such as those that are reported in the New York Daily News stories in 1975 and 1976.

3. Frank Sturgis seems to have had contacts with the criminal syndicate, although from outward appearances he was not a member of it. He could well have been used by the syndicate in its activities.

4. Sturgis has not been a reliable source, so his statements are treated with considerable reserve. He probably did know Juan Orta when both of them were in Cuba. He was outside of Cuba, however, when Orta was given the

role of assassin. Whatever he knew at that time--and his knowledge may be of a much later date--could have been in the form reported fifteen years later in the 1975 newspaper stories. If there was such an operation it was not CIA's; it could have been an earlier operation of the syndicate. While Sturgis could have known of or have been involved in earlier activity by the syndicate, whatever its form, he may also have had no part in any of it; he may merely have fabricated a story from bits and pieces learned by him from gossip in the Miami community after Orta settled there in 1965.

5. If the syndicate was conducting its own operations, that would tend to reinforce the thought that the details of its operations would have been characterized by discretion--or security--despite the FBI report in October 1960.

The authors of Book V of the SSC Final Report felt that the operation seeking to employ the resources of the criminal syndicate would not have provided Castro the clear provocation that was hypothesized for the AMLASH operation. At page 68 the Report stated:

" . . . it is unlikely that Castro could have

> distinguished the CIA plots with the underworld from those plots not backed by CIA. In fact, the methods the CIA used in these attempts were designed to prevent the Cuban government from attributing them to the CIA."

In a sense the SSC made a conscious judgment, in the context of its provocation theory, that was made less consciously and in a different context in 1964 by the few CIA employees who knew of the operations with the syndicate -- that they bore no relation to the assassination of President Kennedy.

Possible Ruby--Trafficante Contact

There are fragments of unevaluated reports that leave one aspect of the involvement of the criminal syndicate as a question. This can only be noted here, as the means for resolving it one way or another are not within the Agency's capabilities.

As noted earlier (see Tab B, page 4), a 27 November 1963 report records statements by a British journalist that during his own imprisonment in Cuba in 1959 he knew of a gangster type named "Santos" who was in jail where he was visited by another American gangster type named "Ruby." Current speculation has considered the possibility that "Santos" was Santos Trafficante who may have been in jail there in 1959. An FBI report of 14 August 1964 recorded a statement by a person jailed in Cuba that he shared a cell with Trafficante.

If the "Santos" in the British report was Trafficante, the British and FBI reports tend to support one another on the narrow point of his imprisonment in Cuba in 1959. This is a material consideration, as there are reservations about both sources. It may be that the FBI has more information on this point, but there is no further known relevant information in the Agency on the matter.

The significance of this is that if Trafficante was in jail in Cuba in 1959, he could have been available for a visit by Jack Ruby if such visits were allowed. Ruby, in fact, did visit Cuba in 1959. The long time gap between 1959 and November 1963 removes the two incidents from candidacy for consideration as evidence of conspiracy against President Kennedy. However, if Ruby was running an errand for someone in 1959, it would provide an interesting lead for those inquiring into the possible significance of past assocations or contacts.

Both the British report and the confirmation of Ruby's 1959 visit were known to the Warren Commission, and Ruby reportedly spoke at length about his visit when questioned.

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However, Ruby is dead and Trafficante has declined to testify at all. A later allegation of a visit by Ruby to Cuba in late 1962 or early 1963 is believed not to be true.

Other Reported Assassination Proposals

There were other references to possible assassination plots against Castro that seem not to have been addressed in the Interim Report of the SSC on Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders. They are summarized briefly below:

In May 1975 a Cuban exile who came to be a contract employee stated that in February 1961 he was given a rifle and the mission to enter Cuba to assassinate Castro. He claimed to have tried to enter Cuba three times, but failed each time in gaining entry to Cuba. Agency files have no further records on this matter.

As a result of a column by Jack Anderson in May 1977, a check was made of Agency files referring to an Antonio Veciana, cited by Anderson as a CIA employee. The man was never an employee of the Agency, but he was connected with ALPHA-66, a Cuban exile movement. On three separate occasions (December 1960, July 1962, April 1966) he proposed to CIA employees the assassination of Fidel Castro. He was rebuffed on each occasion. Again in 1970 there was a report of his making a similar proposal while an AID employee at an overseas post. The details of his actual role is unknown to the Agency, although the FBI may have more details on him. This is touched on in Tab G, which comments on selected newspaper stories published in the course of this research effort.

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Agent Messages in 1961 Mentioning Plans to Kill Castro

1. During the investigations in 1975 five agent messages were identified that made reference to plans to kill Castro, or proposing such action. Three of these messages related to the same operation, the other two relating to separate proposals; there is no indication that any of these proposals was the result of CIA initiative. The existence of these messages was mentioned during Mr. Colby's testimony before the Church Committee. In response to a request from the Deputy Inspector General, LA Division prepared a summary of the messages and on 8 August 1975 forwarded it to the Review Staff, then charged with serving as an interface with the congressional committees. Records of the Review Staff do not show how this paper was handled. The subject was not covered in the Church Committee's interim report on Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders and is summarized again below.

I

2. Three of the messages involved the same group of agents, and seem to relate to the same plan. The first message, dated 27 March 1961 (prior to the Bay of Pigs) was sent by an Agency asset, AMBRONC/5. The message requested the Agency's opinion on a proposed sabotage of the electric company in Havana, stating that this could be coordinated "with attempt against Fidel in public appearance (at) Sports Palace." The cable expressed the view that

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an "attempt against Fidel (is) in accordance with general plan." There is no record that this message was answered. Two days later, on 29 March 1961, possibly because of the absence of a reply, the same agent sent another message. This stated that the plan was scheduled for 9 April. Castro was to speak at the Palace, and an "assassination attempt at said place (will be) followed by a general shutting off of main electric plants in Havana." General anti-regime developments to follow this were then outlined. This message was answered on 30 March agreeing that a "major effort should be launched Havana on date you selected." It recommended contacting other named persons, looking to a more general uprising. The message addressed the general issue, making no comment on the proposal to kill Castro. A third message, on 5 April 1961, presumably from the same agent, reported that the persons he had been directed to contact had arms for only 50 men. While stating that the sabotage of the electric company and "possibly attempt on Fidel" would be carried out 9 April, he emphasized that to do so would make it impossible to maintain a clandestine organization in Cuba; "your military aid is decisive. If it does not come that date we are lost." There is no indication that this message was answered. No further reference to this plan has been found.

3. We have reviewed the files of the persons identified in the cables, and have interviewed a case officer who was responsible for one of them, in an attempt to learn more about the matter. The four agents in question are commented on briefly below:

a. AMBRONC/5 is the agent who sent the messages outlining the proposed sabotage effort and attempt against Castro.

(1) 201 file opened 15 July 1960. A POA was not issued until 18 December 1961, and an OA on 31 January 1962. A debriefing of him in November 1960, prior to the Kennedy Administration, revealed that he had been in touch with people who had plotted the assassination of Fidel Castro, and claimed to have tried himself to make similar plans. He was infiltrated on 9 December 1960, exfiltrating 15 February 1961.

(2) AMBRONC/5 was infiltrated again 3 March 1961 and exfiltrated again 19 June 1961. This covered the period of his messages and the Bay of Pigs. His sole mission was to organize resistance groups.

(3) AMBRONC/5 was infiltrated again on 19 December 1961, exfiltrating 29 March 1962, again with the same mission.

(4) AMBRONC/5 was infiltrated finally 2 May 1962, was arrested 29 May 1962, and was executed 30 August 1962. He has been reported as never admitting that he was a CIA agent. His name is not one of those

in the book given Senator McGovern by Castro, listing those claimed by Castro to have plotted attempts against his life.

b. AMCOAX/1 was one of those AMBRONC/5 was told to contact for his general plan for April 1961.

(1) POA on 5 January 1961. His mission was to organize paramilitary activities in Cuba. He infiltrated in February 1961 and exfiltrated in July 1961 following the Bay of Pigs. This period covered the above messages.

(2) Re-infiltrated 29 July 1961, with the same organizing mission, he was arrested on 17 August 1961, and is serving a thirty year term. His name appears in the book given Senator McGovern.

c. AMPUG/1 was another of those AMBRONC/5 was told to contact for his general plan in April 1961.

(1) Recruited in September 1960, he was infiltrated that month, receiving airdrops in December 1960. He returned to the U.S. 15 May 1961, following the Bay of Pigs.

(2) Infiltrated again on 29 June 1961, with the mission to organize resistance groups and conduct sabotage operations, he was arrested in July 1961, and is serving a thirty year term. His name is among those in the book given Senator McGovern by Castro.

d. AMPANIC/7 was another of those that AMBRONC/5 was told to contact for his general plan in April 1961.

(1) This man was a "walk-in" 15 April 1960, a POA being issued 30 January 1961 (although there was a MOC since 12 July 1960). He was to organize resistance groups in the Havana and Pinar del Rio areas.

(2) Infiltrated 3 March 1961, he was arrested 23 April 1961, and is serving a thirty year term. His name is among those in the book given Senator McGovern by Castro.

(3) Records relating to this man mention his infiltration into Cuba in August 1960 and exfiltration in November 1960 (prior to his being issued a POA). His "mission" during that period is mentioned tersely as being "to organize resistance groups . . . for mounting sabotage operations . . . and assassination of prominent Cuban Communist members in the Castro entourage . . ." The records refer to "his own personal objectives" during this period and criticizes how he functioned during his stay in Cuba from August to November 1960. The record then specifies how he is to conduct himself and focus his efforts on his return, which was to develop sabotage operations. We were able to contact one of his two case officers, who has retired

(the other had died), to ascertain his recollections. Stating that at the time the focus was on developing organizations for operations, he stated that an assassination mission, such as attributed to AMPANIC/7 on his earlier time in Cuba, not only was not authorized, but would have compromised the effort to organize. Any such assassination mission, the case officer states, would have been at AMPANIC/7's own initiative.

4. It is clear that AMBRONC/5 envisioned a general uprising in Cuba, to commence with sabotage of the electric plant in Havana and an attempt on Castro's life. The third of his messages reflected pessimism, and the fact is that the operation did not come off. While the man had no express mission from the Agency to mount an operation against Castro personally, it is clear that no specific objection was recorded to his statement of intentions. The one recorded reply addresses the concept of general action and makes no reference to the proposal to make an attempt on Castro.

5. The fact is that the 9 April 1961 operation did not come off, and AMBRONC/5 has not been identified as an Agency asset. Nor was his name included in the book given Senator McGovern by Castro. The other men, none of whom had a mission of assassination from the Agency, are now serving thirty year terms. That their names were included in the list given Senator McGovern by Castro may be an attempt on Castro's part to enlarge on the facts

rather than to report what he truly believes. They were not executed, a consideration that may support this view.

6. The records are incomplete on the events identified by the three messages. The time in question predates the Bay of Pigs. The men mentioned above had more specific missions, other than that of assassination. They exfiltrated subsequent to the event described in the messages, and were arrested during subsequent infiltrations into Cuba. There is no record that any of them had a mission from CIA to kill Castro. The person who proposed the act in 1961 -- AMBRONC/5 -- never acknowledged that he was a CIA agent, and is not listed among those Castro reportedly believes had the mission of his assassination.

II

7. Another agent message dated 4 June 1961 asked about a man who had identified himself as Moratori of the Italian Embassy, who claimed to work for U.S. intelligence and to be in touch with one Martin Elena and others (none identifiable), who "have plans for an invasion within 30 days, after the killing of Fidel." A reply, dated 6 June, stated that the information was untrue and that Moratori was not known and should not be trusted. (Insofar as CIA records show, there was an Italian diplomat of that name in Cuba at that time. Little is known about him.) The originator of the agent message cannot be identified from present records.

III

8. Another agent message dated 3 May 1961 from a member of the Revolutionary Recovery Movement in Cuba said "will try to kill Fidel today." A reply to this message dated 4 May told the agent and his companions to "lay low" for the time being, and "Will advise when operations can resume." There were no follow-up messages on this subject in the records. The agent who sent the message possibly was AMPUG/1, but as noted earlier his mission did not include instructions to kill Fidel. His companions have not been identified.

AMLASH OPERATION

Tab D

~~SECRET~~

I. AMLASH OPERATION

Comment on the AMLASH operation, in the context of its presentation in Book V of the Final Report of the SSC, is complicated by the treatment given it in the Report. Rather than being treated in a unified way, reference and discussion is found throughout the Report.*

The actual nature and the significance of the AMLASH operation differs materially from that presented in the SSC Report. The Report leaves the inference that AMLASH/1 was perhaps an agent of Castro, with the mission of provoking a plot against Castro (pages 3, 74 and 79), which in turn provided Castro with the justification for launching Lee Harvey Oswald against President Kennedy in retaliation. Alternatively, the Report suggests that AMLASH/1 was so insecure in the conduct of his activities that the details of his plotting could have become known to Castro, thereby providing the same basic motivation (pages 74 and 75). Whichever of these alternatives, so the reasoning would be, the AMLASH operation should have been reported to the Warren Commission. We believe that neither thesis applies. The character of the relationship between CIA and AMLASH/1, prior to Oswald's assassination of President Kennedy, was so insubstantial and inconclusive that it provided no basis for

*See pages 2, 3, 5, 6, 13, 14, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28 29, 31, 35, 36, 59, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 77, 78, 79, and 86 of the 97-page text, and pages 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, and 105 of the eight-page chronology following the text.

AMLASH/1 to feel that he had any tangible CIA support for plotting against Castro. Whether one is inclined to see AMLASH/1 as either a double agent or provocateur, or simply as a man who carelessly revealed what he was doing, there was little for him to report or to leak.

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In preparing the current comment on the AMLASH operation, as treated in the SSC Report, it was judged best to approach it in two ways. A sequential summary of the AMLASH operation is intended to present the Agency's understanding of the true nature of the activity. Following that, selected points made in the SSC Report are addressed. It is hoped that this presentation will help establish a clearer perspective for judging the actual substance of the operation.

* * * * * * * * * * * * *

As early as March 1959, AMLASH/1 was reported as expressing directly to Castro his dissatisfaction with the situation in Cuba. At that time he also was reported as expressing his disillusionment and that if he "...did not get out of the country soon, he would kill Castro himself."

Two years later, in March 1961, AMLASH/1 was met in Mexico City by a CIA case officer stationed there. The occasion was AMLASH/1's presence at the leftist-sponsored Latin America Conference on National Sovereignty, Emancipation, and Peace. The meeting was arranged by AMWHIP/1, a long-time friend of AMLASH/1. A dispatch in July 1961, giving a general round-up on operational activity against Cubans in

Mexico City, described the meeting (along with others) as follows:

> "...the Station made an unsuccessful 'approach' to (AMLASH/1)...the 'approach' consisted of a 'friendly' talk between a case officer, a mutual friend of (AMLASH/1) and (AMLASH/1) when he last was visiting in Mexico. While (AMLASH/1) did not pick up the opportunity at that time, he apparently did not report the incident to his superiors and the ground work may have been laid for a similar action in the future."

Later in March there was a report that AMLASH/1 and another Cuban wanted to defect and needed help in escaping. Consideration of their exfiltration ended with a report that the Cuban police were aware of AMLASH/1's intention and plans.

In August 1961 AMWHIP/1 reported plans by AMLASH/1 to attend the French National Student Union Cultural Festival, and that AMLASH/1 wanted to meet with a "friend" of the Mexico City case officer's. The files do not reveal that such a contact actually occurred.

In June 1962 there was a report that AMLASH/1 would be travelling via Prague to the World Youth Festival in Helsinki. AMLASH/1 was reported as wanting to defect, and also that on his return from Helsinki he would pass through Paris where he hoped to meet AMWHIP/1. The FBI, which was aware of CIA's association with AMWHIP/1, met with AMWHIP/1 in Miami and took steps for him to be referred to CIA if he should contact the Paris Legal Attache.

In July 1962 CIA contacted AMWHIP/1, who made known his dissatisfaction with the way CIA handled AMLASH/1's "planned defection" in Paris in August 1961. Plans were made for a CIA case officer and AMWHIP/1 to travel to Helsinki and anywhere else necessary in an attempt to bring about AMLASH/1's defection.

The first of a series of meetings with AMLASH/1 was held in Helsinki on 1 August 1962. The original objective of his defection became one of recruiting him in place. AMLASH/1 was reported as feeling that if he could "do something really significant for the creation of a new Cuba, he was interested in returning to carry on the fight there." AMLASH/1 spoke of sabotage of an oil refinery and the execution of a top ranking Castro subordinate, of the Soviet Ambassador and of Castro himself. The case officer's report stated:

> "While we were making no commitments or plans, we pointed out to [AMLASH/1] that schemes like he envisioned certainly had their place, but that a lot of coordination, planning, information-collection, etc., were necessary prerequisites to ensure the value and success of such plans." (Emphasis in original).

The security hazard of too frequent meetings in Helsinki led to further meetings in Stockholm and Copenhagen. AMLASH/1 was next met on 16 and 17 August in Paris where AMWHIP/1 and the case officer were joined by another case officer. AMLASH/1 was given SW training and supplies. On 20 August he was taken to the south of France for

a demolition demonstration. He refused to be polygraphed. The case officer reported on 17 August:

> "Have no intention give [AMLASH/1] physical elimination mission as requirement but recognize this something he could or might try to carry out on his own initiative."

The Headquarters cabled reply the next day stated:

> "Strongly concur that no physical elimination missions be given [AMLASH/1]."

On 29 August 1962 AMLASH/1 left Prague by air for Havana. This was the last time that he was met until he next left Cuba in September 1963.

COMMENT:

It is noted at this point that AMLASH/1 was not a recruited agent at that time--nor was he ever for that matter, as Operational Approval was never granted for this purpose. By the end of August 1962 the CIA relationship with AMLASH/1 had made no real progress, although he was viewed as an operational contact with potential. Over a year passed between August 1962 and September 1963 when he was next contacted by CIA. In terms of the relationship that he had with CIA the critical period, for purposes of this paper, is therefore between 5 September and 22 November 1963.

AMLASH/1 attended the Collegiate Games in Porto Alegre, Brazil from 5 through 8 September 1963, as a representative of the Cuban

Government. He was met there by AMWHIP/1, and by the CIA case officer who was to take over the relationship with him. AMLASH/1 said that he had written two SW messages (only one had been received). He expressed his reluctance to use this form of communications because of Cuban postal censorship.

It is pertinent to what followed to note where the relationship between AMLASH/1 and CIA stood at that time. At page 13 of Book V of the SSC Final Report the following statement appears:

> " . . . the CIA took steps to renew its contact with a high-level Cuban official named AMLASH. The CIA's previous contact with him had been sporadic; he had not been in contact with the CIA since before the missile crisis of October 1962. The exact purpose the CIA had for renewing contact is not known, but there is no evidence the CIA intended at this time to use AMLASH in an assassination operation."

The reason for there having been no contact since August 1962 was simply that AMLASH/1 did not leave Cuba after that until September 1963. If it is narrowly correct to state that the "exact purpose" for renewing contact was not known to the authors of the SSC Report, it nevertheless is quite clear why he was met. He was an important potential asset whose usefulness remained to be explored. At this point, not only was there "no evidence (that) . . . an assassination operation" was intended, it is quite clear that it was not under consideration. The problem at the time was how to deal with the man.

At page 14 of the SSC Report it is stated that the first meeting

in September 1963:

> " . . . may have been to gain intelligence and to cultivate him as an asset for covert operations . . ."

A 7 September cable, cited on another point in the SSC Report, provides an insight as to how AMLASH/1 was assessed at the time, as well as emphasizing the uncertainty in the minds of the case officers of how to deal with him in the future:

> "AMLASH cocky totally spoiled brat who will always be a control problem . . (he) will not take time or have patience prepare or receive constant stream S/W messages,let alone OWVL. AMLASH also needs strong confidant inside who will push and serve as chaplain . . ."

CIA headquarters replied on 9 September, saying in part:

> " . . . Based on what little feel we here have for subject however appears he is hopeless as intell performer and is best approached as a chief conspirator allowed to recruit his own cohorts among whom we may then find persons susceptible to long distance and covert disciplines . . . "

The cable then went on to spell out long-range requirements prior to any action based on such internal organization as AMLASH/1 may put together.

Clearly, at that point, while AMLASH/1 was viewed as potentially important, he also was viewed as a person of uncertain capabilities, requiring careful but long-range development for whatever course of action that might later ensue.

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Page 14 of the SSC Final Report cites the 7 September 1963 cable reporting the first 1963 meeting with AMLASH/1 as follows:

> "AMLASH was interested primarily in getting the United States to invade Cuba, or in attempting an 'inside job' against Castro, and that he was awaiting a U.S. plan of action." (Empahsis added).

This suggests a plan of action targetted specifically against Castro himself. That may have seemed implicit to the authors of the SSC Report, but the actual language of the cable states it somewhat differently:

> "AMLASH still feels there only two ways accomplish change either inside job or invasion he realistic enough realize latter out of question. According AMWHIP, AMLASH still awaiting for US reveal plan of action."
>
> COMMENT:
>
> At this point, after a year out of touch with a man with whom there had been no working understanding, AMLASH/1's views were of interest, but were very general, as might be expected after such a long time. The actual reference to an "inside job" did not specify Castro, as suggested in the SSC Report, but was directed towards the more general question of how to bring about change. It was offered alternatively, in the context of considering both external and internal action, and not with the specific connotation provided by the SSC presentation.

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The point is, as stated in the SSC Report, that it left AMLASH/1 "awaiting a U.S. plan of action." There was nothing substantive or conclusive. To the contrary, things were left very much up in the air.

Footnote 17 on page 14 of the SSC Report states that "characterization of this phase of the AMLASH operation is disputed." (Emphasis added). The footnote observes that the SSC Interim Report on Alleged Assassination Plots concluded that the AMLASH operation was an assassination operation, which begs the question of what it was for "this phase" of the matter. In fact, the SSC Interim Report on Alleged Assassination Plots notes specifically that "From the first contact with AMLASH until the latter part of 1963, it was uncertain whether he would defect or remain in Cuba." (Page 86). The point is that the SSC Final Report, Book V, itself describes the very general nature of the approach by AMLASH/1, and the absence of a U.S. response (supra). Any dispute over how to characterize the operation at that time arises from the presentation of it in Book V of the SSC Report. Reference to the dispute may reflect views expressed by CIA representatives on reviewing the draft of the SSC Final Report.

The next paragraph in the SSC Report, Book V, presents in inferential sequence, an interview Castro held with an AP reporter, Daniel Harker, in which Castro inveighed

against anti-Cuban terrorist plans of U.S. leaders. The intended inference, as is known from discussions with SSC staff members, was that AMLASH/1 may have reported (or leaked) to Castro what the authors of the report elected to see then as assassination plotting. This characterization is even more explicit at pages 3-4 of the Summary and Findings of the SSC Report, presenting the interpretation as categorically as though it were fact. The fact remains that whatever views AMLASH/1 may have expressed, he had no response from his CIA contacts of any support for his proposals at that time. Whatever may have been the cause for Castro's remarks at that time they could not have stemmed from anything said to AMLASH/1 by CIA officers as they proposed nothing and undertook nothing.

AMLASH/1 flew to Paris on 14 September, ostensibly to attend a meeting of the Alliance Francaise. The trip actually was for an extended vacation, which AMLASH/1 intended to report to Castro after the fact. On 16 September he wrote AMWHIP/1 that he did not "intend to see (be interviewed by) your friend again" referring to the CIA case officer. On 3 October 1963 the case officer nevertheless arrived in Paris to meet with AMLASH/1. Station officers were already in contact with him, two of whom participated in meetings that followed.

On 11 October the case officer cabled Headquarters reporting that AMLASH/1 claimed to have the "necessary people and equipment inside

[Cuba] to accomplish overthrow without [U.S.] assistance." AMLASH/1 was reported as wishing a meeting with a senior U.S. official, preferably Robert F. Kennedy, for assurance of "moral support" for any action AMLASH/1 undertook in Cuba. The cable recommended that the request for a meeting:

> "be given highest and profound consideration as feeling drawn by all who in contact AMLASH is that he determined attempt op against [Castro] with or without [U.S.] support."

A 21 October cable to Washington reported a 17 October meeting with AMLASH/1--"Basically he wants assurance that [U.S.] will support him if his enterprise is successful." (Emphasis added).

Desmond Fitzgerald, then Chief of the Special Affairs Staff, was going to Paris on other business and undertook to meet with AMLASH/1. The plan for the meeting, written in advance, was outlined as follows:

> "Fitzgerald will represent self as personal representative of Robert F. Kennedy who traveled to Paris for specific purpose of meeting [AMLASH/1] and giving him assurances of full U.S. support if there is change of the present government in Cuba." (Emphasis added).

On 29 October Fitzgerald met with AMLASH/1 in Paris, representing himself as a spokesman of Attorney General Kennedy. The third person at the meeting was the case officer, who served as an interpreter.

On 13 November the case officer wrote a memorandum summarizing highlights of the meeting. It reads in part as follows:

> "Fitzgerald informed [AMLASH/1] that the United States is prepared to render all necessary assistance to any anti-communist Cuban group which succeeds in neutralizing the present Cuban leadership and assumes sufficient control to invite the United States to render the assistance it is prepared to give. <u>It was emphasized that the above support will be forthcoming only after a real coup has been effected and the group involved is in a position to request U.S. (probably under OAS auspices) recognition and support</u>. (Emphasis added). It was made clear that the U.S. was not prepared to commit itself to supporting an isolated uprising, as such an uprising can be extinguished in a matter of hours if the present government is still in control in Havana. As for the post-coup period, the U.S. does not desire that the political clock be turned back but will support the necessary economic and political reforms which will benefit the mass of the Cuban people."

At the time of the CIA Inspector General's report on the subject in 1967, additional details were elicited from Fitzgerald, who re-

called that AMLASH/1 spoke repeatedly of the need for an assassination weapon. He wanted a high-power rifle with telescopic sights, or some other weapon that could be used to kill Castro from a distance. Fitzgerald stated that he rejected this request. Fitzgerald's Executive Officer, although not present at the meeting, was kept posted by Fitzgerald and had a recollection the same as the one noted above. The case officer is reported as not recalling the exchange on the weapon. His memorandum stated that:

> "Nothing of an operational nature was discussed at the Fitzgerald meeting. After the meeting [AMLASH/1] stated that he was satisfied with the policy discussion but now desired to know what technical support we could provide him."

On 14 November 1963 AMWHIP/1 was met in New York City. He reported on AMLASH/1's reaction to the 29 October meeting in Paris. The contact report on what AMLASH/1 understood, as relayed by AMWHIP/1, is as follows:

> "The visit with Fitzgerald, who acted in the capacity of a representative of high levels of the Government concerned with the Cuban problem satisfied [AMLASH/1] as far as policy was concerned, but he was not at all happy with the fact that he still was not given the technical assistance for the operational plan as he saw it. [AMWHIP/1] said that [AMLASH/1] dwelt constantly on this point.

He could not understand why he was denied certain small pieces of equipment which promised a final solution to the problem, while, on the other hand, the U.S. Government gave much equipment and money to exile groups for their ineffective excursions against Cuban coastal targets. According to [AMWHIP/1], [AMLASH/1] feels strongly on this point, and if he does not get advice and materials from a U.S. Government technician, he will probably become fed up again, and we will lose whatever progress we have made to date."

COMMENT:

At this point it is important to note that Agency documents summarize what AMLASH/1 was to be told, and what he was told, which matches a later report of what he understood. In essence he was told there would be no U.S. support until after the fact, and then only if he was successful. While that may not seem a very realistic way in which to bring about the overthrow of a government, it is directly relevant to the question of what AMLASH/1 was told and what he understood. It is contrary to the statement in the SSC Final Report (page 18) to the effect that it was not clear how AMLASH/1 interpreted the put-off by Fitzgerald.

Interesting confirmation of AMLASH/1's understanding is provided by a July 1964 FBI report (mentioned variously at pages 35, 72 and 74 of Book V of the SSC Report). This report was from an FBI informant who stated that AMLASH/1 was unhappy with the CIA response and that Attorney General Kennedy had refused to support the plan. Given the substance of this aspect of the report it is apparent that although the date of the report is June 1964, this particular information dates back to 29 October 1963 when AMLASH/1 was told by Fitzgerald, representing himself as speaking for Robert F. Kennedy, that he would not be given support in this operation. While this is not the reason the FBI report was cited in Book V of the SSC Final Report, it provides additional clear confirmation that AMLASH/1 understood that he had been turned down at the 29 October meeting.

Following the 14 November meeting with AMWHIP/1 CIA reviewed what could be done to maintain the contact with AMLASH/1. On 19 November 1963 Fitzgerald "approved telling AMLASH/1 he would be given a cache inside Cuba. The cache could, if he requested it, include ...high-power rifles w/scope..."

On 19 November AMLASH/1 told a CIA officer that he planned to return to Cuba. On 20 November Headquarters cabled Paris requesting that AMLASH/1 "delay departure...(to) permit one more meeting which AMLASH/1 requested." On the same day (20 November) in response to

a telephonic request, AMLASH/1 agreed to delay his departure "if it is something interesting." The case officer told him that "he could not assure it interesting but that it was to be a meeting which AMLASH had requested." The cable reporting this exchange noted that it was a "rapid conversation" inhibited by the presence of a second person in the room.

The SSC Final Report (page 19) attempts to expand this brief and cryptic telephone conversation into the "first indication that he might receive the specific support he requested." More factually, and quite significantly, the Report acknowledges that no specific support had been offered up to then. Beyond that it is at best a piece of highly speculative analysis, not supported by the evidence.

The case officer from Washington arrived in Paris the morning of 22 November and met with AMLASH/1 late that afternoon. As they left the meeting they learned of President Kennedy's assassination. They probably were meeting when President Kennedy was shot.

Whatever the relationship with AMLASH/1 following the death of President Kennedy, there is every indication that during President Kennedy's life AMLASH/1 had no basis for believing that he had CIA support for much of anything. Were he a provocateur reporting to Castro, or if he was merely careless and leaked what he knew, he had no factual basis for leaking or reporting any actual CIA plot directed against Castro.

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II. SPECIFIC SECTIONS OF THE SSC REPORT

Section 1, B

This section of the SSC Final Report, the Summary, states that "it places particular emphasis on the effect their (the intelligence agencies) Cuban operations seemed to have on their investigation." It states that the report "details these operations to illustrate why they were relevant to the investigation." It states that presentation of the AMLASH operation is to illustrate why that operation should have been examined by the Warren Commission.

The view of the Subcommittee, as to why the AMLASH operation warranted such review, is summarized at page 5 of the Report as follows:

> "The AMLASH plot was more relevant to the Warren Commission's work than the early CIA assassination plots with the underworld. Unlike those earlier plots the AMLASH operation was in progress at the time of the assassination; unlike the earlier plots, the AMLASH operation could clearly be traced to CIA; and unlike the earlier plots, the CIA had endorsed AMLASH's proposal for a coup, the first step to him being Castro's assassination, despite Castro's threat of retaliation for such plotting."

As stated in the preceeding discussion the AMLASH operation was without substance prior to President Kennedy's death; it is particularly

unsuited to make the Subcommittee's intended point. It is literally accurate to note a coincidence in time, of the contacts with AMLASH/1 prior to the death of President Kennedy, but that is all. It is incorrect to say that "CIA had endorsed AMLASH's proposal." There was no agreement with AMLASH/1, or commitment to him, and even had Castro learned of the contacts with him there was nothing to learn beyond the fact of the contact. The relationship was most tenuous and without any support promised to him for whatever he planned. Castro's "threat" --as noted above--must be considered irrelevant to the substantive nature of the AMLASH relationship at that time.

This viewpoint was conveyed to the Subcommittee prior to publication of the report. At the same time it was observed that theoretically there was greater possibility of leaks from the earlier operations involving the criminal underworld, although there was no known evidence of such leaks. While general rather than specific, this could have provided more reasonable support for the Subcommittee's view that there were CIA operations that should have been reported to the Warren Commission. The SSC Subcommittee saw otherwise, outlining its position at page 68 as follows:

> "...it is unlikely that Castro could have distinguished the CIA plots with the underworld from those plots not backed by CIA. In fact, the methods the CIA used in these attempts were designed to prevent the Cuban government from attributing them to the CIA."

The result this has on the present comment on the SSC Final Report may seem anomalous. It places CIA in the position of contesting the interpretation given the AMLASH operation in the SSC Final Report, and to that extent the thesis that the presentation was supposed to support. At the same time, however, we are inclined to acknowledge in principle the possibility--not seriously considered as a likelihood during the Warren Commission inquiry--that other operations could have suffered the defects attributed to the AMLASH operation by the SSC Report. In protesting the presentation in one instance, and the specific conclusions it seeks to support, the effect is to disagree with a substantial portion of the report as written. On the other hand we tend to not contest a general thesis that more specific attention could have been given by the Warren Commission to the anti-Castro programs of the U.S. Government, including CIA activities.

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At page 4 of the SSC Final Report Desmond Fitzgerald, in a meeting with AMLASH/1, is quoted as having:

> "stated the United States would support a coup."

Again, at page 19, the report states that Fitzgerald:

> "also gave general assurances that the United States would help in bringing about the coup."

The last version is attributed to the case officer who was present at the meeting in 1963, in his testimony before the SSC in 1975. This presentation of the case officer's statements in 1975 does not match

the report of the meeting in 1963, which was written by him at the time. In considering the processes by which this version came into being, it is noted that the following statement appears at page 87 of the SSC Interim Report on Alleged Assassination Plots:

> "Fitzgerald met AMLASH/1 in late fall 1963 and promised him that the United States would support a coup against Castro,"

citing testimony by the case officer who was present at the meeting. An interesting footnote (#3) on that page reads as follows:

> "3. The contact plan for the proposed meeting stated: 'Fitzgerald will represent self as personal representative of Robert F. Kennedy who travelled to (foreign city) for specific purpose meeting AMLASH/1 and giving him assurances of full support <u>with</u> a change of the present government in Cuba.'" (Emphasis added).

The underscored portion--the word "with"--in fact read in the actual document "if there is." This substitution of language in a purported quotation may seem only a matter of nuance, but it treats with what Fitzgerald <u>planned</u> to say, which takes on special significance when matched with the expressly limited statements that he actually made (as discussed at pages 11 and 12 of this annex) and what AMLASH/1 understood (as discussed at pages 13-15).

* * * * * * * * * *

At page 5 the SSC Final Report quotes officers in CIA responsible

for the investigation at the time of the Warren Commission as stating to the SSC that had they known about the AMLASH operation in 1963 it would have affected the investigation. It is only noted that it is likely that views elicited from CIA employees in 1975 probably were responsive to representations by SSC staff members as to what the operation involved, as distinguished from what it actually was.

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At page 24 the SSC Final Report contains the following statement:

> "According to the 1967 Inspector General Report, CIA Headquarters cabled the AMLASH case officer on the morning of November 23, and ordered him to break contact with AMLASH due to the President's assassination and to return to Headquarters."

This statement is at least a literary extension of the statement of the IG report, which was in its entirety as follows:

> "[The case officer] states that he received an OPIM cable from Fitzgerald that night or early the next morning telling him that everything was off."

The SSC was unable to get the case officer to support its expansion on the reference in the 1967 IG report. His testimony is cited, apparently despite suggestive prompting, that:

> " . . . he recalled receiving such a cable, but could not recall whether it made specific mention

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of the President's assassination as the reason for breaking contact . . ."

It is noted that the cable was never found; it may never have been sent, being a misrecollection of the case officer. In any event, the two sources cited in the SSC Report do not support its version.

* * * * * * * * * *

Footnote 30 on page 17 treats the question of the security of the AMLASH operation. As noted in the above review of the AMLASH operation, AMLASH/1 was on the record as expressing his disenchantment with the Castro regime. He had told colleagues of his meetings with AMWHIP/1. Through sensitive sources we know that other Cubans were aware of his fulminations against the Castro regime. We do not know, beyond these generalized statements, what he actually conveyed at that time to what persons. We do know how little substance there was to his relationships with CIA during this period, and how little he had to tell others were he inclined to do so.

Assuming that AMLASH/1 was to attempt to organize a coup, he obviously had to try and associate himself with people of a like mind. To crystallize their support he might have felt constrained to convey assurances of external support. To the extent that he may have, we do not know whether he would have claimed to have been promised things that in fact had been denied him. It was not until much later that the question of security--always a consideration, especially when more than one person is involved--became a point of sufficient concern for CIA to break relations with him.

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Some have speculated that AMLASH/1 was, in some way, Castro's provocateur. Such a possibility is always a proper subject for consideration. There are questions that feed the theory, but the issue remains debatable. We do not offer an opinion here, although we do note that he was rewarded strangely if he was. When finally arrested he served ten years of a thirty-year term. His public trial did not mention his Agency associations for the period March 1961 to November 1964. An interesting consideration is that when Castro provided Senator McGovern with a list of persons the Cubans claimed had the mission of his assassination, although AMLASH/1 was among those included, the reported period for his activity also omitted this earlier period.

* * * * * * * * * * * * *

At page 26 of the SSC Final Report it is stated that on 24 November the Mexico Station responded to a Headquarters request for the names of known contacts of certain Soviet personnel in Mexico City. The SSC Report acknowledges that the purpose of obtaining these names was to determine the significance of Oswald's contact with Soviets and to assess their activities. The SSC Report states that:

> "AMLASH's real name was included in the list of names on the Mexico Station cable."

This is used as a basis for a discussion in the SSC Final Report of why the inclusion of that name in the cable did not lead to the identification of the AMLASH operation.

The treatment of this point in the SSC Final Report seems to rest on a misconception of the context in which the name of AMLASH/1 was mentioned. The reference had to do with a contact between a member of

the Soviet embassy and a Cuban cultural attache -- in December 1960 -- about a press conference planned for AMLASH/1 in Mexico City in February and March 1961. It was not a report of a contact between AMLASH/1 and the Soviet, which was the subject of the inquiry; the name of AMLASH/1 could well have been omitted from the cable. In any event, the December 1960 date preceded the inauguration of President Kennedy, which further removes the question from any relevance to the subject. There was no reason to check the name. The presentation in the SSC Final Report is confusing and misleading on this point.

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Page 72 of the SSC Report refers to a July 1964 FBI report concerning a CIA meeting with AMLASH. The SSC Report states "that the purpose of those meetings had been to plan the assassination of Castro." This is the same FBI report that helped confirm the earlier turn-down of AMLASH/1 at the 29 October 1963 meeting (pages 14 and 15, this paper). While it stated that "there is now under discussion some plan to kill Fidel Castro" (July 1964) it badly mixes times and events. In any event, this aspect of the report substantially post-dates the death of President Kennedy, and is not directly relevant to the Warren Commission inquiry.

* * * * * * * * * * * * *

At page 75, the SSC Final Report quotes the testimony of the Chief, SAS Counterintelligence. His recollections are very uncertain. He is quoted specifically as saying that he could not recall the exact time frame, which is central to analysis of the operation, and speaks of his "vague recollections" that the Fitzgerald meeting was related to an assassination plot against Castro. The SSC Report nevertheless gives this opinion full play despite the extensive qualification as to its reliability.

* * * * * * * * * * * * *

At pages 68-75 of Book V of the SSC Final Report, consideration is given to what was known of the AMLASH operation by certain CIA employees, how they understood it, and what conclusions they could or should have drawn from what they knew. The treatment seems to accept as a premise that the relationship was an assassination plot throughout, and overlooks the basically inchoate quality of the relationship with AMLASH/1 during the period in question.

There will always be uncertainties in the developing relationship with political action assets; that such was the case with AMLASH/1 is noted in the discussion above. In the present instance the uncertainties were recognized and clearly recorded, as well as the limits placed on positions that would be and were taken with AMLASH/1. It is important to keep this in mind in considering the testimony of witnesses, as presented in the SSC Final Report.

Different witnesses before the SSC would obviously view the AMLASH affair in different lights, the basis for their understanding relating to different levels of knowledge at different periods in time. What did they know in 1963, and what more did they learn under what circumstances at a later date? What they testified to in 1975--perhaps on the basis of representations by SSC staff members as to what it was--required quite a clear and precise treatment. The SSC Final Report did not accord the subject that treatment.

* * * * * * * * * *

At pages 78, 79 and 105 of the SSC Final Report reference is made to a Cuban exile designated as "A," who informed the FBI and CIA in mid-1965 of activities of AMLASH/1 in Cuba to eliminate Castro, and of his involvement with CIA. A careful reading of the SSC Report made it clear that "A" was unaware of AMLASH/1's 1963 associations with CIA.

This information, reported in the context of the badly blurred time frame of the SSC Final Report, was given a significance that it did not otherwise have. First, the information was a year and a half after the death of President Kennedy. Further, the informant had no knowledge of the earlier period of CIA-AMLASH/1 relationships. When this is placed alongside the clear record of the inconclusive nature of the relationships in the 1963 period, it becomes something of an irrelevancy. It is noted that a footnote in the SSC Report, at this point, records the fact that the book of material given to Senator McGovern by Castro on persons who allegedly had plotted his

assassination also contained no reference to that period, although AMLASH/1's later activities were cited.

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

It is useful to recap the sequence of events. The record shows that initially there was uncertainty as to what AMLASH/1 represented as a potential asset. There was early consideration of his defection, which changed to his possible use for intelligence purposes. As his self-discipline was assessed as being inadequate for this task it was determined that it was best for him to go it alone, developing his own organization for whatever followed. The reservations that were held concerning his qualities were reflected in the specifically conditional arms-length position taken with him during the period preceding President Kennedy's death. He had to succeed with his own program before he could expect support from the U.S.

Eventually -- but not until after the death of President Kennedy -- firmer indications of support were offered. Even then the volume of equipment promised was not large, especially to a man who claimed to have the "necessary people and equipment inside [Cuba] to accomplish (the) overthrow . . ." The nature of the relationship never did firm up. As late as the fall of 1964 (page 77, Book V of the SSC Final Report) CIA was telling AMLASH/1 that it could not be associated with his concept of the first step of a coup, which he viewed as requiring the death of Castro. While one can reason that any association with AMLASH/1 included association with all his plans, it nevertheless appears that those directly involved structured their thinking differently.

The Inspector General's report in 1967 treated the AMLASH operation in its study of assassination, as did the SSC Interim Report on Alleged Assassination Plots. At the time of the 1967 IG report there was no issue of how to characterize the operation at different times, and the question was not addressed. Facing that question now, it is clear that however the operational relationship developed after the death of President Kennedy, it was unformed and without substance during his life. During that time it was not an assassination plot. The treatment of this question in the SSC Report is both imprecise and misleading.

MATERIALS FORWARDED TO WARREN COMMISSION AND FBI

Tab E

Volume V of the SSC Final Report conveys an impression of limited effort by CIA in the course of the Warren Commission inquiry. As is noted in other annexes to the present report, CIA did seek and collect information in support of the efforts of the Warren Commission. Additionally, it conducted studies and submitted special analyses and reports.

The following pages list reports and other papers submitted to the FBI (which had primary responsibility for the investigation) and to the Warren Commission. It is felt that this compilation is appropriate to consideration of the extent of the CIA effort, to the extent that it reveals something of the results of that effort.

The lists fall into the following sections:

E.1 Dissemination to the Intelligence Community

E.2 Dissemination of Information to the Warren Commission

E.3 Disseminations to the FBI on Rumors and Allegations

E.4 Memoranda to Warren Commission

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AGENCY SUPPORT TO THE FBI AND THE WARREN COMMISSION

Information received from the Agency's field stations was disseminated to appropriate agencies and departments as soon as possible after receipt. The following list of some 100 cabled disseminations, CSCI's, and memoranda were forwarded to the Federal Bureau of Investigation, et al. The listing covers the period from 10 October 1963 through September 1964.

AGENCY DISSEMINATION OF INFORMATION TO THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY (FORMAL AND INFORMAL DISSEMINATIONS)

I	II	III
*10 October 1963	DIR 74673	(WH/3/Mexico)

"On 1 October 1963, a reliable and sensitive source in Mexico City reported that an American male, who identified himself as Lee OSWALD, contacted the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City ..."
Recipients: FBI, I&NS, Navy, State. [Warren Commission]

*24 October 1963	DIR 77978	(WH/3/Mexico)

Request for two copies of most recent photograph of Lee Harvey OSWALD.
Recipients: Navy. [Warren Commission]

23 November 1963	DIR 84915	(WH/3)

Information relating to telephone call on 28 September 1963 to Soviet Embassy in Mexico City.
Recipient: FBI

I - Document Date
II - Document Number
III - Originating Office

* - An asterisk indicates that the document was also made available to the Warren Commission.

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24 November 1963 TDCS-3/565,829

Subject: Cuban Precautions following Assassination of President Kennedy.
Recipients: State/INR, State/DIR, DIA, Army/ACSI, Navy, Air, JCS, SECDEF, NSA, NIC, AID, USIA, OCI, ONE, OCR, ORR, OO, EXO.

25 November 1963 DIR 84950 (WH/3/Mexico)

Subject: Silvia T. DURAN, Mexican Employee of the Cuban Embassy [sic - Consulate] in Mexico City; Contact with Lee Harvey OSWALD.
Recipient: FBI.

25 November 1963 DIR 84951 (CI/SIG)

Agency requests information relating to OSWALD's Activities in Mexico City.
Recipient: FBI

26 November 1963 CSCI- (WE/BC)

Subject: Reported Anonymous Telephone Message.
Recipient: FBI.

26 November 1963 CSCI-3/778,826 (WH/3)

Subject: Lee Harvey OSWALD, Suspected Assassin of President Kennedy. Encloses transcripts of telephone calls made on 27 and 28 September and 1 and 3 October 1963.
Recipient: FBI.

26 November 1963 CSCI-3/778,829 (WH/3)

Subject: Lee Harvey OSWALD, Suspected Assassin of President Kennedy. (Encloses transcripts of telephone calls made by OSWALD or concerning OSWALD between 27 September and 3 October 1963).
NB: This dissemination may be identical with CSCI-3/778,826. The above CSCI number appears to be the correct one, according to a copy of the document in CI/SIG file No. 568.
Recipient: FBI.

26 November 1963 DIR 85069 (WH/3)

Subject: Travel of Pro-Communist Costa Rican Congressman to Texas on 26 November 1963.
Recipient: FBI

*26 November 1963 DIR 85089 (C/WH/3)

Gilberto ALVARADO, a professed Castroite Nicaraguan, stated to U.S. Embassy in Mexico City on 26 November 1963 that "on 18 September 1963 he saw Lee Harvey OSWALD receive six thousand five hundred dollars in a meeting inside the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City".
Recipients: FBI, State, White House; Secret Service received copy. [Warren Commission]

26 November 1963 DIR 85176 (WH/3)

Subject: Marina Nikolaeva OSWALD (information volunteered on Marina OSWALD by Moroccan student Mohamed REGGAB studying in West Germany).
Recipients: FBI, State, White House; Secret Service received copy.

26 November 1963 DIR 85177 (WH/3/Mexico)

Subject: Telephone communication between Cuban President DORTICOS and Joaquin HERNANDEZ Armas, Cuban Ambassadro to Mexico.
Recipients: FBI, State, White House; Secret Service received copy.

26 November 1963 Unnumbered (CI/SIG)

Subject: HUNTER Report No. 10815.
Recipient: FBI.

26 November 1963 Unnumbered (CI/SIG)

Subject: HUNTER Report No. 10816.
Recipient: FBI.

27 November 1963 CSCI-3/778,881 (WH/3/Mexico)

Subject: Lee Harvey OSWALD, Soviet Activities in Mexico City, 18 - 24 November 1963.
Recipient: FBI.

*27 November 1963 DIR 85182 (WH/3/Mexico)

Subject: Lee Harvey OSWALD. On 23 November, Richard Thomas GIBSON, an American living in Switzerland, who was acquainted with OSWALD, made statements regarding latter to a close friend in Bern.
Recipients: FBI, State, White House; Secret Service received copy. [Warren Commission]

27 November 1963 DIR 85195 (C/WH/3)

United States Ambassador to Mexico requests passage of message to Secretary of State RUSK, Mr. McCONE, and Mr. HOOVER.
Recipients: FBI, State, White House; Secret Service received copy.

27 November 1963 DIR 85196 (C/WH/3)

According to information from Nicaraguan Security Service, Gilberto ALVARADO Ugarte was a Nicaraguan intelligence source from 1962 to August 1963.
Recipients: FBI, State, White House; Secret Service received copy.

*27 November 1963 DIR 85199 (WH/3/Mexico)

Information solicited from Gilberto ALVARADO Ugarte.
Recipients: FBI, State, White House; Secret Service received copy. [Warren Commission]

27 November 1963 DIR 85222 (WH/3/Mexico)

Subject: Silvia T. DURAN, Mexican Employee of the Cuban Embassy [sic - Consulate] in Mexico City, contact of Lee Harvey OSWALD.
Recipient: FBI.

27 November 1963 DIR 85246 (WH/3)

Dr. Jose GUILLERMO Aguirre of Mexico reports information regarding Lee Harvey OSWALD.
Recipients: FBI, State, White House; Secret Service received copy. (Also relayed to S. PAPICH of the FBI by CI Staff on 27 November 1963.)

27 November 1963 DIR 85471 (C/WH/3)

Subject: Rearrest of Silvia DURAN.
Recipients: FBI, State, White House.

27 November 1963 DIR 85573 (WH/3/Mexico)

Information from U.S. Ambassador MANN for Secretary of State RUSK regarding Ambassador HERNANDEZ, Cuban Ambassador to Mexico, and Gilberto ALVARADO.
Recipients: FBI, State, White House.

27 November 1963 Unnumbered (CI/SIG)

Information on Ernesto RODRIGUEZ relayed by telephone to S. PAPICH.
Recipient: FBI.

27 November 1963 Unnumbered (CI/SIG)

Information regarding photographic coverage of Cuban and Soviet Embassies in Mexico City passed to S. PAPICH of the FBI.
Recipient: FBI.

27 November 1963 Unnumbered (CI/SIG)

Telephone contact with S. PAPICH with regard to OSWALD's presence in New Orleans in September 1963.
Recipient: FBI.

28 November 1963 DIR 85657 (C/WH/3)

On 26 November 1963 a British journalist named John WILSON-HUDSON gave information to the American Embassy in London indicating that an "American gangster-type named RUBY" visited Cuba around 1959.
Recipients: FBI, State, White House.

*28 November 1963 DIR 85662 (C/WH/3)

Further interrogation of Gilberto ALVARADO Ugarte. Recipients: FBI, State, White House. [Warren Commission]

*28 November 1963 DIR 85665 (C/WH/3)

The Hague Station reports that on 23 November 1963, a local Castroite named Maria SNETHLAGE talked to Third Secretary Ricardo SANTOS of the Cuban Embassy. SNETHLAGE claimed she knew the Mr. LEE [sic] who murdered President Kennedy.
Recipients: FBI, State, White House; Secret Service received copy. [Warren Commission]

29 November 1963 CSCI-3/778,893 (WH/3/Mexico)

Subject: Interrogation of Silvia Tirado de DURAN and Horacio DURAN Navarro.
Recipient: FBI.

*29 November 1963 DIR 85666

Acting upon FBI request, the Agency requests ALVARADO be turned over to Mexican authorities for additional interrogation and investigation.
Recipients: FBI, State, White House. [Warren Commission]

29 November 1963 DIR 85668 (WH/3/Mexico)

Highlights from interrogation of Horacio DURAN Navarro and his wife, Silvia Tirado de DURAN.
Recipients: FBI, State, White House-

*29 November 1963 DIR 85670 (C/WH/3)

Sensitive sources ... have reported that when the 23 November arrest of Silvia DURAN became known to the personnel of the Cuban Embassy there was a great deal of discussion.
Recipients: FBI, State, White House. [Warren Commission]

29 November 1963 DIR 85676 (WH/3/Mexico)

Subject: Travel of Soviet diplomatic couriers.
Recipient: FBI.

*29 November 1963 DIR 85691 (C/WH/3)

Series of anonymous telephone calls to the office of the Naval Attache in Canberra, Australia, by a man claiming to have knowledge about a Soviet plot to assassinate Kennedy.
Recipients: FBI, State, White House; Secret Service received copy.

29 November 1963 DIR 85714 (C/WH/3)

Release of Silvia DURAN for second time on 28 November.
Recipients: FBI, State, White House; Secret Service received copy.

*29 November 1963 DIR 85715 (WH/3/Mexico)

Subject: Travel of Lee Harvey OSWALD (October 1959 to May 1962).
Recipients: FBI, State, White House; Secret Service received copy.

29 November 1963 DIR 85744 (C/WH/3)

Interrogation of Gilbert ALVARADO Ugrate.
Recipients: FBI, State, White House; Secret Service received copy.

*29 November 1963 DIR 85758 (WH/3/Mexico)

Translation of interrogation of Silvia DURAN and Horacio DURAN Navarro.
Recipients: FBI, State, White House; Secret Service received copy. [Warren Commission]

*29 November 1963 DIR 85770 (C/WH/3)

Series of incidents which have produced a report alleging advance information on assassination.
Recipients: FBI, State, White House; Secret Service received copy. [Warren Commission]

29 November 1963 Unnumbered Memorandum (CI/SIG)

Telephone contact with S. PAPICH concerning rumor that Oswald had made a bank deposit.

29 November 1963 Unnumbered Memorandum (CI/SIG)

Telephone contact with S. PAPICH relaying the Director's suggestion that FBI check all bank accounts and safe deposit records in New Orleans, Fort Worth, and Dallas.

30 November 1963 CSCI-3/778/894

Subject: Article in 29 November 1963 issue of Washington Post suggesting two men involved in assassination.
Recipient: FBI.

*30 November 1963 DIR 86063 (C/WH/3)

Gilberto ALVARADO Ugarte admits his story a fabrication.
Recipients: FBI, State, White House. [Warren Commission]

3 December 1963 DIR 86496 (C/WH/3)

Information relating to OSWALD's presence in Mexico.
Recipient: FBI.

*4 December 1963 DIR 86702 (C/WH/3)

Travel information regarding OSWALD and his wife, June 1962.
Recipients: FBI, State, White House; Secret Service received copy. [Warren Commission]

5 December 1963 DIR 87189 (C/WH/3)

Known Soviet intelligence officer in New Delhi demanding full probe into assassination.
Recipients: FBI, State, White House.

*6 December 1963 DIR 87520 (C/WH/3)

Correction of DIR 87502.
Recipients: FBI, State, White House; Secret Service received copy. [Warren Commission]

*7 December 1963 DIR 87667 (C/WH/3/)

Reinterrogation of Gilberto ALVARADO concluded.
Recipient: FBI. [Warren Commission)

9 December 1963 DIR 87731 (WH/3/Mexico)

Richard BEYMER, American movie actor, in touch with Cuban Embassy, Mexico City.
Recipient: FBI.

*9 December 1963 DIR 87796 (WH/3)

Letter mailed in Stockholm on 25 November 1963 alleging assassination arranged by Communist Chinese.
Recipients: FBI, State, White House; Secret Service received copy. [Warren Commission]

9 December 1963 Unnumbered Memorandum (CI/SIG)

Telephone contact with S. PAPICH regarding identity of a source who claims plot to assassinate Kennedy prepared and executed jointly by the Communist Chinese and Cubans through intermediaries. (See JMWAVE 8658 IN 75902).
Recipient: FBI.

11 December 1963 TDCSDB 3/658,408

Subject: Comments of Soviet official regarding (a) Moscow views on international situation following death of President Kennedy, and (b) resumption of disarmament talks.
Recipients: General distribution.

12 December 1963 CSCI-3/779,048 (C/WH/3)

Subject: WILSON, Carlos John (also: WILSON-HUDSON, John; WILSON, John Hudson.)
Recipient: FBI.

*12 December 1963 DIR 88643

Subject: Letter Relative to Assassination of President Kennedy Sent to United States Embassy in Costa Rica.
Recipients: FBI, State, White House. [Warren Commision]

12 December 1963 DIR 88682 (C/WH/3)

Cuban Ambassador to France received instructions not to comment upon the assassination.
Recipients: FBI, State, White House.

12 December 1963 DIR 88747 (C/WH/3)

Subject: Second Interrogation of Silvia DURAN.
Recipients: FBI, State, White House.

*13 December 1963 CSCI-3/779,136 (C/WH/3)

Subject: Mexican Interrogation of Gilberto ALVARADO.
Recipient: FBI. [Warren Commission]

16 December 1963 CSCI-3/779,135 (C/WH/3)

Subject: Peter DERYABIN's Comments on Kennedy Assassination.
Recipient: FBI.

*18 December 1963 DIR 89970 (C/WH/3)

Further information on Richard Thomas GIBSON.
Recipients: FBI, State, White House; Secret Service received copy. [Warren Commission]

*18 December 1963 DIR 89980

Subject: Actions of Silvia DURAN after her first interrogation.
Recipients: FBI, State, White House; Secret Service received copy. [Warren Commission]

19 December 1963 CSCI-3/779,225

Subject: Nomenclature of Weapon Possibly Owned by Lee Harvey OSWALD.
Recipient: FBI.

19 December 1963 CSDB-3/658,870 (WH/Reports)

Subject: a. Disagreements between Fidel CASTRO and Rauo ROA y Garcia.

b. Probable Future Plan of Action for Carlos RAFAEL Rodriguez.

Recipients: State (Miami) and others (not identified.

27 December 1963 CSCI-3/779,297

Subject: Assassination of President Kennedy (arranged by the Cuban Government and the Communist Chinese).
Recipient: FBI.

3 January 1964 Unnumbered Memorandum (CI/SIG)

Telephone contact with S. PAPICH on 3 January 1964 regarding newspaper article appearing in El Caribe on 27 November 1963 and possible connection with ALVARADO's interview in the U.S. Embassy on 26 November.
Recipient: FBI.

*10 January 1964 CSCI-3/779,482 (WH/3/Mexico)

Subject: Second Mexican Interrogation of Silvia DURAN.
Recipient: FBI. [Warren Commission]

14 January 1964 CSCI-3/779,510 (CI/SIG)

Subject: Assassination of President John F. Kennedy. (Regarding liaison with FBI and latter's handling of information from CIA.)
Recipient: FBI.

27 January 1964 CSCI-3/779,729 (CI/SIG)

Subject: Possible Relatives of Marina Nikolayevna OSWALD.
Recipient: FBI.

30 January 1964 CSCI-3/779,814 (CI/SIG)

Subject: Jack L. RUBY, Lee Harvey OSWALD.
Recipient: FBI.

4 February 1964 CSCI-3/779,817 (SR/CI/R)

Subject: Lee Harvey OSWALD. (Information on names, addresses, and telephone numbers relating to the Soviet Union.)
Recipient: FBI.

18 February 1964 DDP 4-0860

Memorandum for the Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation. Subject: Assassination of John F. Kennedy.
Recipient: FBI. [Copy to Warren Commission]

18 February 1964 DDP 4-0861

Memorandum for the Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation. Subject: Assassination of President John F. Kennedy.
Recipient: FBI. [Copy to Warren Commission]

18 February 1964 DDP 4-0862

Memorandum for the Chief, United States Secret Service. Subject: Assassination of President

John F. Kennedy. (Verification of entry in "Historic Diary" relating to OSWALD's attempted suicide.)
Recipient: Secret Service. [Copy to Warren Commission]

18 February 1964 DDP 4-0864

Memorandum for Mr. Thomas L. Hughes, The Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of State.
Subject: Assassination of President John F. Kennedy - Verification of Entry in "Historic Diary".
Recipient: State. [Copy to Warren Commission]

20 February 1964 CSCI-3/779,988 (SR/CI/R)

Subject: Lee Harvey OSWALD. (Information regarding SETYAEVA and RAHM.)
Recipient: FBI.

22 February 1964 DIR 03101 (C/WH/3)

Subject: Further Information Provided by Moroccan Student Mohamed REGGAB.
Recipient: White House (attention Secret Service).

11 March 1964 CSCI-3/780,344

Subject: Summary of Findings in Regard to Allegations by Mohamed REGGAB Relative to Marina OSWALD.
Recipient: FBI.

20 March 1964 CSCI-3/780,612 (SR/CI/R)

Subject: Assassination of President John F. Kennedy. (Photograph of an individual closely resembling OSWALD).
Recipient: FBI.

16 April 1964 CSCI-3/780,996 (SR/CI/R)

Subject: Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO.
Recipient: FBI.

20 April 1964 CSDB-3/660,704

Subject: Plans by British and French to Publish BUCHANAN Articles on Assassination.
Recipient: FBI (?)

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22 April 1964 CSCI-3/780,881 (SR/CI/R)

Subject: Assassination of President John F. Kennedy. (Information regarding Lydia DYMITRUK.)
Recipient: FBI.

30 April 1964 Unnumbered Memorandum (CI/SIG)

Telephone Contact with S. PAPICH on 29 November advising PAPICH to contact SOLIE of the Office of Security for information.

8 May 1964 DDP 4-2351

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.
Subject: Marina OSWALD's Notebook.
Recipient: Copy of attachment forwarded to FBI.

11 May 1964 CSCI-3/781,172

Subject: Lee Harvey OSWALD. (Traces on Soviet names, addresses, and telephone numbers from an address book belonging to Marina OSWALD.)
Recipient: FBI.

13 May 1964 CSCI-3/781,282 (SR/CI/R)

Subject: Lee Harvey OSWALD. (Identification of photographs sent to CIA by FBI.)
Recipient: FBI.

15 May 1964

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.
Subject: Role of Cuban Intelligence Service in Processing Visa Applicants; Reaction of that Service to the Assassination of President Kennedy.

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13 May 1964 CSCI-3/781,351

Subject: Lee Harvey OSWALD's Access to Classified Information about the U-2.
Recipient: FBI. [Warren Commission - DDP 4-2444]

19 May 1964 CSCI-3/781,386

Subject: Paul DIMITRIK (aka Pavel DIMITRUK).
Recipient: Navy.

5 June 1964 CSCI-3/781,543 (CI/R&A)

Subject: Lee Harvey OSWALD. (Use of Machine Collation Program to Check Out Cubans Mentioned in Letter of 27 November 1963 from Mario del ROASRIA Milina.

10 June 1964 CSCI-3/781,841 (CI/R&A)

Subject: Information Concerning Jack Ruby.
Recipient: FBI.

29 June 1964 CSCI-3/782,058

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.
Subject: Investigation of Allegation that OSWALD was in Tangier, Morocco.
Recipient: FBI. [Warren Commission]

2 July 1964 DDP 4-3401

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.
Subject: Lee Harvey OSWALD.
Recipient: Copy to FBI.

6 July 1964 DDP 4-3470

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.
Subject: Statements Reportedly Made by George and Jeanne de MOHRENSCHILDT Concerning Lee Harvey OSWALD and the Assassination of John F. Kennedy.
Recipient: Copy to FBI.

27 August 1964 CSCI-316/00856-64

Subject: No Indication of Subject's Defection Having Been Used for Propaganda by the Soviet Union.
Recipient: FBI.

3 September 1964 DDP 4-4600

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.
Subject: OSWALD Documents Supplied by the Cuban Government.
Recipient: Copy to FBI.

1 October 1964 DDP 4-5110

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.
Subject: Joachim JOESTEN.
Recipient: Copy to FBI.

6 October 1964 CSCI-316/01446-64

Subject: [VI]ADUCT Interview on 9 September 1964; His Comments on Seven Photographs Forwarded by the FBI.
Recipient: FBI.

23 October 1964 CSCI-316/01709-64

Subject: Raymond F. FRIESECKE.
Recipient: FBI.

2 November 1964 CSCI-316/01779-64

Subject: Testimony in the Warren Commission Report in the Assassination of President Kennedy.
Recipient: FBI.

23 December 1964 CSCI-316/02545-64

Subject: Allegation of Unidentified Scientist of Cuban Involvement in Assassination.
Recipient: FBI.

2 March 1965 CSCI-316/00925-65

Subject: Marvin KANTOR, Possible Connection with Investigation of Lee Harvy and Marina OSWALD.
Recipient: FBI.

8 April 1965 CSCI-316/01398-65

Subject: Correspondence to the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City.
Recipient: FBI. [Copy to Secret Service]

30 June 1965 CSCI-316/02654-65

Subject: Silvia DURAN.
Recipient: FBI.

2 September 1966 CSCI-316/04482-66

Subject: Rima ZMITROOK, Lee Harvey OSWALD's Intourist Guide in Moscow.
Recipient: FBI.

9 May 1967 CSCI-316/02153-67

Subject: BEAUBOVEFF apparently to be used as a pawn by Jim GARRISON to show that OSWALD was a CIA agent and was to be used to assassinate Fidel CASTRO. GARRISON alleges he has letters signed by CIA representatives or by Senator Robert KENNEDY authorizing certain Americans to work with Cubans for the assassination of CASTRO. This memroandum is intended to record that such letters never existed and therefore could not be in GARRISON's possession.
Recipient: FBI.

14 June 1967 CSCI-316/02669-67

Subject: Allegations of Unidentified Woman Regarding Mario GARCIAS et al.
Recipient: FBI

24 July 1967 CSCI-316/03243-67

Subject: Allegation of Oscar COUNTRERAS, Mexican newsman, that OSWALD visited UNAM Campus shortly after the Cuban Embassy refused him a visa to visit Cuba. CONTRERAS' statement of dubious credibility; information passed to Mexican authorities.
Recipient: FBI.

7 May 1968 CSCI-316/01678-68

Subject: Promotional Literature Concerning the Alleged Assassination Conspiracy of JFK Written and Mailed by Joachim JOESTEN in Support of District Attorney Jim GARRISON's Allegations.
Recipient: FBI.

16 September 1969 CSCI-316/03323-69

Subject: Charles William THOMAS.
Recipient: FBI.

DISSEMINATION OF REPORTS TO CI STAFF

Since CI Staff held the Agency's official file on OSWALD, all cable traffic (theoretically) including disseminations by cable was sent to the Staff for filing in the official file. Additionally, cables disseminations were released by CI/Liaison. Copies were, therefore, available to the Staff.

Since CI Staff released all long-form CSCI's, coordinated on short-form CSCI's, and maintained the CSCI log, the CI Staff received copies of all CSCI's.

DISSEMINATION OF MATERIAL TO THE WARREN COMMISSION

E.2

13 December 1963 [Commission Document No. 100]

Memorandum
Subject: Analysis of World Reaction to President Kennedy's Assassination.
(Supplied by A. W. DULLES.)

21 January 1964 [Commission Document No. 300]

Note from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.
Attachments: a. Recent Soviet Statements on Lee Harvey OSWALD.
b. FBIS-28 on OSWALD case.

21 January 1964

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.
Subject: Draft Questions for Submission to the Government of the Soviet Union.

22 January 1964 [Commission Document No. 691]

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.
Subject: Suggested Questions for Marina OSWALD.

25 January 1964 [Commission Document No. 321]

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.
Subject: Chronology of Lee Harvey OSWALD's Stay in the Soviet Union.
Alphabetical List of Persons in the Soviet Union Who Were Known to or Mentioned by Lee Harvey OSWALD or His Wife.

31 January 1964 [Commission Document No. 347]

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.
Subject: Information Developed by CIA on the Activity of Lee Harvey OSWALD in Mexico City, 28 September - 3 October 1963.

5 February 1964

Note from Thomas H. KARAMESSINES to J. Lee RANKIN.
Fourteen attachments including recent Soviet Statements on Lee Harvey OSWALD (as of 5 February 1964).

5 February 1964 [Commission Document No. 361]

Memorandum from Thomas H. KARAMESSINES, ADDP, to J. Lee RANKIN forwarding three copies of Appendix B, a summary biography of Mrs. OSWALD and her relatives.

8 February 1964 [Commission Docjment No. 1182]

Letter from Thomas H. KARAMESSINES, ADDP, to J. Lee RANKIN regarding Soviet weapon mentioned in one of Lee Harvey OSWALD's documents.
[Information passed to FBI.]

18 February 1964

Memorandum for the Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, attention Mr. S. J. PAPICH. Subject: Assassination of President John F. Kennedy. (Request for information which might be helpful in interpreting available materials relating to OSWALD's activities abroad.)
[Copy to Warren Commission.]

18 February 1964 DDP 4-0860

Memorandum for the Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, attention Mr. S. J. PAPICH. Subject: Assassination of John F. Kennedy. (Request for information relating to OSWALD's attempted suicide.)
[Copy to Warren Commission.]

18 February 1964 DDP 4-0861

Memorandum for the Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, attention Mr. S. J. PAPICH. Subject: Assassination of President John F. Kennedy. (Request for copies of 47 photographs found among the effects of Lee Harvey OSWALD.)
[Copy to Warren Commission.]

18 February 1964 DDP 4-0862

Memorandum for the Chief, United States Secret Service; signed by Richard HELMS, DDP. Subject: Assassination of President John F. Kennedy. (Verification of entry in "Historic Diary" relating to OSWALD's attempted suicide.)
[Copies to Warren Commission and the FBI.]

18 February 1964 DDP 4-0864

Memorandum for Mr. Thomas L. HUGHES, The Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of State. Subject: Assassination of President John F. Kennedy. (Verification of Entry in "Historic Diary".) [Copies to Warren Commission and the FBI.]

19 February 1964 [Commission Document No. 384]

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN. (TS No. 187908.) Subject: Information Developed by CIA on the Activity of Lee Harvey OSWALD in Mexico City, September 28 to October 3, 1963.

19 February 1964 DDP 4-4581

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN. Subject: Cuban Consulate and Embassy in Mexico City.

*21 February 1964 DDP 4-0940 [Commission Document No. 426]

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN. Subject: Translations of Interrogations Reports of Silvia DURAN.
Attachments: OUT Telegram No. 85758, 29 November 1963. Translation of Interrogation of Silvia DIRAN and Horacio DURAN Navarro.
CSCI-3/779,482 of 10 January 1964. Translation of Official Mexican Polic Report on the Second Interrogation of Silvia DURAN.

5 March 1964 DDP 4-1171 [Commission Document No. 448]

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN. Subject: Summary of Findings in Regard to Allegations by Mohammed REGGAB Relative to Marina OSWALD.

*6 March 1964 DDP 4-1224 [Commission Document No. 692]

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN. Subject: Information in CIA's Possession Regarding Lee Harvey OSWALD Prior to November 22, 1963.

18 March 1964 DDP 4-1423 [Commission Document No. 528]

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.
Subject: Article Alleging that OSWALD was Interviewed by CIA in Moscow.

24 March 1964 DDP 4-1555 [Commission Document No. 674]

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.
Subject: Information Disseminated to the Secret Service but not yet made available to the President's Commission.

*24 March 1964 DDP 4-1554 [Commission Document No. 631]

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.
Subject: CIA Dissemination of Information on Lee Harvey OSWALD, Dated 10 October 1963.
Attachments: OUT Message No. 74673, dated 10 October 1963.
OUT Message No. 77978, dated 23 October 1963.

25 March 1964 DDP 4-1576

Note from Richard HELMS to J. Lee RANKIN.
Attachment: Five copies of "Rumors about Lee Harvey OSWALD", dated 23 March 1964.

27 March 1964 DDP 4-1606

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to Thomas L. HUGHES, Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of State. Subject: Verification of Entry in "Historic Diary".
[Copies to Warren Commission and the FBI.]

*31 March 1964 DDP 4-1655 [Commission Document No. 698]

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.
Subject: Reports on Activities and Travel of Lee Harvey OSWALD and Marina Nikolevna OSWALD.
Attachments: OUT Message No. 86702, 4 December 1963,

to the White House, the Department of State, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, with copy to the Secret Service.

OUT Message No. 97520, dated 6 December 1963, to the White House, the Department of State, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, with copy to the Secret Service.

OUT Message No. 85715, dated 29 November 1963, to the White House, the Department of State, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, with copy to the Secret Service.

OUT Message No. 85182, dated 22 November 1963, to the White House, the Department of State, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, with copy to the Secret Service.

OUT Message No. 85665, dated 28 November 1963, to the White House, the Department of State, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, with copy to the Secret Service.

*3 April 1964 DDP 4-1699 [Commission Document No. 710]

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.
Subject: Richard Thomas GIBSON.
Attachment: OUT Message No. 89970, dated 18 December 1963, to White House, Department of State, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, with a copy to the Secret Service.

6 April 1964 DDP 4-1739 [Commission Document No. 708]

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.
Subject: Reply to Questions Contained in Your Memorandum dated 12 March 1964. ("Certain Questions Posed by the State Department Files")

7 April 1964 DDP 4-1787 [Commission Document No. 726]

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.
Subject: Actions of Silvia DURAN After Her First Interrogation.

7 April 1964 DDP 4-1786

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.
Subject: Mohammed REGGAB.

20 April 1964 DDP 4-1997 [Commission Document No. 817]

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, J. Lee RANKIN.
Subject: BND Report Pertaining to Allegations Concerning Anton ERDINGER.

21 April 1964

Letter from Raymond G. ROCCA to Mr. Samuel A. STERN.
Attachment: CSDB 3/660,704 (Plans of British and French Publishing Firms to Publish the Thomas BUCHANAN Articles on Assassination of President Kennedy.)

24 April 1964 DDP 4-2099 [Commission Document No. 844]

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.
Subject: Lydia DIMYTRUK; Acquaintance of Marina OSWALD.

29 April 1964 DDP 4-2160 [Commission Document No. 871]

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.
SUBJECT: Photograph of Lee Harvey OSWALD.

4 May 1964 DDP 4-2256

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.
Subject: Additional Information on Lee Harvey OSWALD.

6 May 1964 DDP 4-2296 [Commission Document No. 902]

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.
Subject: Criteria for Dissemination of Information to the Secret Service; Recommendations of the Central Intelligence Agency Relative to Presidential Protection.

8 May 1964 DDP 4-2351 [Commission Document No. 911]

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.
Subject: Marina OSWALD's Notebook.

13 May 1964 DDP 4-2444 [Commission Document No. 931]

Memorandum for the Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation.
Subject: Lee Harvey OSWALD's Access to Classified Information about the U-2.
[CSCI-3/781,351 - copy to Warren Commission]

15 May 1964 [Commission Document No. 935]

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.
Subject: Role of the Cuban Intelligence Service in Processing Visa Applicants; Reaction of that Service to the Assassination of President Kennedy.
[Copy to FBI]

19 May 1964 DDP 4-2533 [Commission Document No. 944]

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.
Subject: Hours of Work at Cuban and Soviet Consulates; Procedures and Regulations for Issuance of Cuban Visas; Mexican Control of U.S. Citizens' Travel to and from Cuba.

*19 May 1964 DDP 4-2534 [Commission Document No. 943]

Memorandum from Rixhard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.
Subject: Allegations of Pfc. Eugene B. DINKIN, U.S. Army, Relative to Assassination Plot Against President Kennedy.
Attachment: OUT Message No. 85770, dated 29 November 1963, to the White House, State Department, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, with a copy to the Secret Service.

*22 May 1964 DDP 4-2624 [Commission Document No. 971]

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.
Subject: Anonymous Telephone Calls to United States Embassy in Canberra, Australia, Relative to Planned Assassination of President Kennedy.
Attachment: OUT Message No. 85691, dated 29 November 1963, to the White House, Department of State, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, with a copy to the Secret Service.

27 May 1964 DDP 4-2688 [Commission Document No. 985]

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.
Subject: Letter Accusing the Chinese Communists of Plotting the Assassination of President Kennedy.
Attachment: OUT Message No. 87796, dated 9 December 1963, to the White House, Department of State, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, with a copy to the Secret Service.

27 May 1964 DDP 4-2692 [Commission Document No. 990]

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.
Subject: Discussion between Chairman KHRUSHCHEV and Mr. Drew PEARSON Regarding Lee Harvey OSWALD.

1 June 1964 DDP 4-2741 [Commission Document No. 1000]

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.
Subject: Gilberto ALVARADO Ugarte.
Attachments: OUT Message No. 85089, dated 26 November 1963, relative to Gilberto ALVARADO.
OUT Message No. 85199, dated 27 November 1963; subject: Lee Harvey OSWALD.
OUT Message No. 85662, dated 28 November 1963, relative to Gilberto ALVARADO.
OUT Message No. 86063, dated 30 November 1963, relative to Gilberto ALVARADO.
OUT Message No. 85666, dated 28 November 1963, relative to Gilberto ALVARADO.
OUT Message No. 87667, dated 7 December 1963; subject: Lee Harvey OSWALD.
Memorandum, dated 12 December 1963; subject: Mexican Interrogation of Gilberto ALVARADO.

3 June 1964 DDP 4-2764 [Commission Document No. 1001]

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.
Subject: Documents on Lee Harvey OSWALD Furnished by the Soviet Government.

3 June 1964 DDP 4-2770 [Commission Document No. 1012]

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.
Subject. George and Jeanne de MOHRENSCHILDT.

4 June 1964

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.
Subject: Information Developed on the Activity of Lee Harvey OSWALD in Mexico City.

5 June 1964 DDP 4-2844 [Commission Document No. 1041]

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.
Subject: Allegations Regarding Intelligence Training School in Minsk, USSR.

10 June 1964 DDP 4-2922 [Commission Document No. 1054]

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.
Subject: Information Concerning Jack RUBY (aka Jack RUBENSTEIN) and His Associates.

*12 June 1964 DDP 4-2988 [Commission Document No. 1089]

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.
Subject: Letter Relative to Assassination of President Kennedy Sent to United States Embassy in Costa Rica.
Attachment: OUT Message No. 88643, dated 12 December 1963, to the White House, Department of State, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

19 June 1964 DDP 4-3169 [Commission Document No. 1131]

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.
Subject: Soviet Brainwashing Techniques.

26 June 1964 DDP 4-3366

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.
Subject: Soviet Brainwashing Techniques

29 June 1964 DDP 4-3347 [Commission Document No. 1188]

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.
Subject: Investigation of Allegation that OSWALD was in Tangier, Morocco.
[Copy to the FBI.]

1 July 1964 DDP 4-3389 [Commission Document No. 1201]

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.
Subject: Lee Harvey OSWALD's Arrival Time in Helsinki on 10 October 1959.

2 July 1964 DDP 4-3401 [Commission Document No. 1216]

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.
Subject: Lee Harvey OSWALD (Remarks by Soviet Consul Pavel Antonovich YATSKOV).
[Copy to the FBI.]

6 July 1964 DDP 4-3470 [Commission Document No. 1222]

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.
Subject: Statements Reportedly Made by George and Jeanne de MOHRENSCHILDT Concerning Lee Harvey OSWALD and the Assassination of President Kennedy.
[Copy to the FBI.]

22 July 1964 DDP 4-3712 [Commission Document No. 1273]

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.
Subject: Apparent Inconsistencies in Material Furnished the Commission by CIA and the Department of State.

23 July 1964 DDP 4-3769 [Commission Document No. 1287]

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.
Subject: Lee Harvey OSWALD.
Attachment: Affidavit respecting origin and circumstances of a photograph of an unknown individual furnished by this Agency to the FBI on 22 November 1963.

23 July 1964 DDP 4-3770

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.
Subject: Lee Harvey OSWALD.
Attachments: Translation (original documents included.)

31 July 1964 DDP 4-3916 [Commission Document No. 1358]

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.
Subject: Length of Time Required for Obtaining Soviet Tourist Visas in Helsinki and Stockholm, 1964.

7 August 1964 DDP 4-4037 [Commission Document No. 1356]

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.
Subject: Soviet Hunting Societies.

28 August 1964 DDP 4-4479 [Commission Document No. 1443]

Memorandum from Thomas H. KARAMESSINES, ADDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.
Subject: Konstantin Petrovich SERGIEVSKY.

31 August 1964 DDP 4-4581

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.
Subject: Cuban Consulate and Embassy in Mexico City.

3 September 1964 DDP 4-4600 [Document No. 50, List 2]

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.
Subject: OSWALD Documents Supplies by the Cuban Government.
[Copy to the FBI]

14 September 1964 DDP 4-4775 [Commission Document No. 1483]

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.
Subject: Length of Time Required for Obtaining Soviet Tourist Visas in Wester Europe in 1964.

11 September 1964 DDP 4-4793

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.
Subject: Publication of Documents Furnished to the Commission by the Central Intelligence Agency.

11 September 1964 DDP 4-4794 [Commission Document No. 1479]

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.
Subject: Certain Questions Posed by the State Department Files. (Revised) (Attachment to CD No. 1479)

11 September 1964 DDP 4-4795 [Commission Document No. 1479]

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.
Subject: Soviet Hunting Societies. (Revised)
(Attachment to CD No. 1479.)

11 September 1964 DDP 4-4796 [Commission Document No. 1479]

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.
Subject: Length of Time Required for Obtaining Soviet Tourist Visas in Helsinki and Stockholm, 1964.

15 September 1964 DDP 4-4801 [Commission Document No. 1493]

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.
Subject: Information Concerning Jack RUBY (aka Jack RUBENSTEIN) and His Associates.

17 September 1964 DDP 4-4823

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.
Subject: Hours of Work at Cuban and Soviet Consulates; Procedure and Regulations for Issuance of Cuban Visas; Mexican Control of U.S. Citizens' Travel to and from Cuba.

17 September 1964 DDP 4-4838

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.
Subject: State Department Files.

17 September 1964 DDP 4-4893

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.
Subject: Valeriy Vladimirovich KOSTIKOV.

17 September 1964 DDP 4-4841

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.
Subject: Lee Harvey OSWALD. (Regarding Agency approval for the publication of memorandum, dated 2 July 1964, concerning Lee Harvey OSWALD. Not authorized.)

18 September 1964 DDP 4-4847

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.
Subject: COmmunications from the Department of State.

18 September 1964 DDP 4-4848

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.
Subject: Departure from the USSR of Soviet Citizens Married to Foreigners.

18 September 1964 DDP 4-4850

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.
Subject: Passport and Visa Office.

18 September 1964 DDP 4-4873

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.
Subject: Intourist Hotels in Moscow.

18 September 1964 DDP 4-4882

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.
Subject: Technical Examination of Photographs of Lee Harvey OSWALD's Application for a Cuban Visa.

18 September 1964 DDP 4-4886

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.
Subject: Resettlement of U.S. Defectors in the USSR.

22 September 1964 DDP 4-4921

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.
Subject: Silvia Tirado Bazan de DURAN.

17 September 1964 DDP 4-4922

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.
Subject: Eusebio AZQUE [sic - AZCUE] - Former Cuban Consul, Mexico City.

18 September 1964 DDP 4-4952

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.
Subject: Lee Harvey OSWLAD. (Information regarding OSWALD's stay in Helsinki.)

18 September 1964 DDP 4-4953

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.
Subject: Identification of Persons Appearing in FBI Photograph No. D 33-46 (Commission Exhibit No. 2625).

1 October 1964 DDP 4-5110 [Commission Document No. 1532]

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.
Subject: Joachim JOESTEN.
[Copies to FBI, I&NS, State]

13 October 1964 DDP 4-5275

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.
Subject: Publication of Documents Furnished to the Commission by the Central Intelligence Agency.

16 October 1964 DDP 4-5334/1

Memorandum for The President's Committee on the Warren Commission Report.
Subject: CIA's Role in the Support of Presidential Foreign Travel.

20 October 1964 DDP 4-5341 [Commission Document No. 1545]

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.
Subject: Information Developed on the Activity of Lee Harvey OSWALD in Mexico City.

29 October 1964 DDP 4-5558

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.
Subject: Transmittal of OCR Publication: "Foreign Press Reaction to the Warren Report", and Follow-Up Report, dated 22 October 1964.

AGENCY DISSEMINATIONS TO THE FBI ET AL REGARDING RUMORS AND ALLEGATIONS REGARDING PRESIDENT KENNEDY ASSASSINATION.

E.3

10 October 1963 DIR 74673

Lee Harvey OSWALD, Contact with Soviet Embassy, Mexico City, 1 October 1963.
Recipients: FBI, I&NS, State, White House.

23 November 1963 DIR 84915

Information relating to telephone call on 28 September 1963 to Soviet Embassy in Mexico City.
Recipient: FBI.

25 November 1963 DIR 84950

Subject: Silvia T. DURAN, Mexican Employee of the Cuban Embassy [sic - Consulate] in Mexico City; Contact with Lee Harvey OSWALD.
Recipient: FBI.

25 November 1963 DIR 84951

CIA requests information relating to OSWALD's activities in Mexico City (from FBI interrogation of OSWALD).
Recipient: FBI.

26 November 1963

Subject: Reported Anonymous Telephone Message.
Recipient: FBI.

26 November 1963 CSCI-3/778,826

Subject: Lee Harvey OSWALD, Suspected Assassin of President Kennedy. Encloses transcripts of telephone calls made on 27 and 28 September and 1 and 3 October 1963.
Recipient: FBI.

26 November 1963 CSCI-3/778,829

Subject: Same as above.
(Comment: This dissemination may be identical with CSCI-3/778,826. The above CSCI number appears to be the correct one, according to a copy of the document in CI/SIG file no. 568.)
Recipient: FBI.

26 November 1963 DIR 85069

Subject: Travel of Pro-Communist Costa Rican Congressman to Texas on 26 November 1963.
Representatives of this Agency in Costa Rica suspect that Julio SUNOL Leal, pro-Communist, pro-Castro deputy to the Costa Rican National Assembly, will try to gather data in Texas to use in pro-communist-pro-Castro propaganda in connection with the assassination of President Kennedy.
Recipient: FBI.

26 November 1963 DIR 85089

Gilberto ALVARADO, a professed Castroite Nicaraguan, stated to U.S. Embassy in Mexico City on 26 November 1963 [sic - 25 November 1963] that "on 18 September 1963 he saw Lee Harvey OSWALD receive six thousand five hundred dollars in a meeting inside the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City."
Recipients: FBI, State, White House; Secret Service received a copy. [Warren Commission]

26 November 1963 DIR 85176

Subject: Marina Nikolaevna OSWALD (information volunteered on Marina OSWALD by Moroccan student Mohamed REGGAB studying in West Germany).
Recipients: FBI, State, White House; Secret Service received copy.

26 November 1963 DIR 85177

Subject: Telephone Communication between Duban President DORTICOS and Joaquin HERNANDEZ Armas, Cuban Ambassador to Mexico.
Recipients: FBI, State, White House; Secret Service received copy.

26 November 1963 Unnumbered

Subject: HUNTER Report No. 10815.
Recipient: FBI.

26 November 1963 Unnumbered

Subject: HUNTER Report No. 10816.
Recipient: FBI.

26 November 1963 Unnumbered

Subject: Passage of IN 68291 from Mexico City to the White House. (OSWALD's reported presence in Mexico City on 18 September 1963.)
Recipient: FBI.

27 November 1963 CSCI-3/778,881

Subject: Lee Harvey OSWALD, Soviet Activities in Mexico City, 18 - 24 November 1963.
Recipient: FBI.

27 November 1963 DIR 85182

Subject: Lee Harvey OSWALD. On 23 November, Richard Thomas GIBSON, an American living in Switzerland, who was acquainted with OSWALD, made statements regarding latter to a close friend in Bern.
Recipients: FBI, State, White House; Secret Service received copy. [Warren Commission]

27 November 1963 DIR 85196

According to information from Nicaraguan Security Service, Gilberto ALVARADO Ugarte was a Nicaraguan intelligence source from 1962 to August 1963.
Recipients: FBI, State, White House; Secret Service received copy.

27 November 1963 DIR 85199

Information solicited from Gilberto ALVARADO Ugarte.
Recipients: FBI, State, White House; Secret Service received copy. [Warren Commission]

27 November 1963 DIR 85222

Subject: Silvia T. DURAN, Mexican Employee of the Cuban Embassy [sic - Consulate] in Mexico City, contact with Lee Harvey OSWALD.
Recipient: FBI.

26 November 1963 DIR 85246

Dr. Jose GUILLERMO Aguirre of Mexico reports information regarding Lee Harvey OSWALD.
Recipients: FBI, State, White House; Secret Service received copy. (Also relayed to S. PAPICH of the FBI by CI Staff on 27 November 1963.)

27 November 1963 DIR 85471

Subject: Rearrest of Silvia DURAN.
Recipients: FBI, State, White House.

27 November 1963 DIR 85573

Information from U.S. Ambassador MANN for Secretary of State RUSK regarding Ambassador HERNANDEZ, Cuban Ambassador to Mexico, and Gilberto ALVARADO.
Recipients: FBI, State, White House.

27 November 1963 Unnumbered

Information on Arnesto RODRIGUEZ relayed by telephone to S. PAPICH.
Recipient: FBI.

27 November 1963 Unnumbered

Information regarding photographic coverage of Cuban and Soviet Embassies in Mexico City passed to S. PAPICH of the FBI.
Recipient: FBI.

28 November 1963 DIR 85657

on 26 November a British journalist named John WILSON-HUDSON gave information to the American Embassy in

London indicating that an "American gangster type named RUBY" visited Cuba around 1959.
Recipients: FBI, State, White House.

28 November 1963 DIR 85662

Further interrogation of Gilberto ALVARADO Ugarte.
Recipients: FBI, State, White House. [Warren Commission]

28 November 1963 DIR 85665

The Hague Station reports that on 23 November 1963, a local Castroite named Maria SNETHLAGE talked to Third Secretary Ricardo SANTOS of the Cuban Embassy. SNETHLAGE claimed she knew the Mr. Lee [sic] who murdered President Kennedy.
Recipients: FBI, State, White House; Secret Service received copy. [Warren Commission]

29 November 1963 CSCI-3/778,893

Subject: Interrogation of Silvia Tirado de DURAN and Horacio DURAN Navarro.
Recipient: FBI.

29 November 1963 DIR 85666

Acting upon an FBI request, the Agency requests ALVARADO be turned over to Mexican authorities for additional interrogation.
Recipients: FBI, State, White House. [Warren Commission]

29 November 1963 DIR 85668

Highlights from the interrogation of Horacio DURAN Navarro and his wife, Silvia Tirado de DURAN.
Recipients: FBI, State, White House.

29 November 1963 DIR 85670

Sensitive sources . . . have reported that when the 23 November arrest of Silvia DURAN became known to

the personnel of the Cuban Embassy there was a great deal of discussion.
Recipients: FBI, State, White House. [Warren Commission]

29 November 1963 DIR 85691

Series of anonymous telephone calls to the office of the Naval Attache in Canberra, Australia, by a man claiming to have knowledge about a Soviet plot to assassinate President Kennedy.
Recipients: FBI, State, White House; Secret Service received copy.

29 November 1963 DIR 85714

Release of Silvia DURAN for second time on 28 November.
Recipients: FBI, State, White House; Secret Service received copy.

29 November 1963 DIR 85744

Interrogation of Gilberto ALVARADO Ugarte.
Recipients: FBI, State, White House; Secret Service received copy.

29 November 1963 DIR 85758

Translation of interrogation of Silvia DURAN and Horacio DURAN Navarro.
Recipients: FBI, State, White House; Secret Service received copy. [Warren Commission]

29 November 1963 DIR 85770

Series of incidents which have produced a report alleging advance information on assassination.
Recipients: FBI, State, White House; Secret Service received copy. [Warren Commission]

29 November 1963 Unnumbered memorandum

Telephone contact with S. PAPICH concerning rumor that OSWALD had made a bank deposit.
Recipient: FBI.

30 November 1963 CSCI-3/778,894

Subject: Article in 29 November 1963 issue of Washington Post suggesting two men involved in assassination.
Recipient: FBI.

30 November 1963 DIR 86063

Gilberto ALVARADO Ugarte Admits his story a fabrication.
Recipients: FBI, State, White House. [Warren Commission]

3 December 1963 DIR 86496

Information relating to OSWALD's presence in Mexico.
Recipient: FBI.

7 December 1963 DIR 87667

Re-interrogation of Gilberto ALVARADO concluded.
Recipient: FBI. [Warren Commission]

9 December 1963 DIR 87731

Richard BEYMER, American movie actor, in touch with Cuban Embassy, Mexico City.
Recipient: FBI.

9 December 1963 DIR 87796

Letter mailed in Stockholm on 25 November 1963 alleging assassination arranged by Communist Chinese.
Recipients: FBI, State, White House; Secret Service received copy. [Warren Commission]

9 December 1963 Unnumbered Memorandum

Telephone contact with S. PAPICH regarding identity of a source who claims plot to assassinate Kennedy prepared and executed jointly by the Communist Chinese and Cubans through intermediaries. (See JMWAVE 8658, IN 75902.)
Recipient: FBI.

12 December 1963 CSCI-3/779,048

Subject: WILSON, Carlos John (also: WILSON-HUDSON, John; WILSON, John Hudson.)
Recipient: FBI.

13-00000

12 December 1963 DIR 88643

Subject: Letter Relative to Assassination of President Kennedy Sent to United States Embassy in Costa Rica.
Recipients: FBI, State, White House. [Warren Commission]

12 December 1963 DIR 88682

Cuban Ambassador to France received instructions not to comment upon the assassination.
Recipients: FBI, State, White House.

12 December 1963 DIR 88747

Subject: Second Interrogation of Silvia DURAN.
Recipients: FBI, State, White House.

13 December 1963 CSCI-3/779,136

Subject: Mexican Interrogation of Gilberto ALVARADO.
Recipient: FBI. [Warren Commission]

16 December 1963 CSCI-3/779,135

Subject: Peter DERYABIN's Comments on Kennedy Assassination.
Recipient: FBI.

18 December 1963 DIR 89970

Further Information on Richard Thomas GIBSON.
Recipients: FBI, State, White House; Secret Service received copy. [Warren Commission]

18 December 1963 DIR 89980

Subject: Actions of Silvia DURAN after her first interrogation.
Recipients: FBI, State, White House; Secret Service received copy. [Warren Commission]

27 December 1963 CSCI-3/779,297

Subject: Assassination of President Kennedy (arranged by the Cuban Government and the Communist Chinese).
Recipient: FBI.

3 January 1964 Unnumbered Memorandum

Telephone contact with S. PAPICH on 3 January 1964 regarding newspaper article appearing in El Caribe on 27 November 1963 and possible connection with ALVARADO's interview in the U.S. Embassy on 26 November.
Recipient: FBI.

10 January 1964 CSCI-3/779,482

Subject: Second Mexican Interrogation of Silvia DURAN.
Recipient: FBI. [Warren Commission]

27 January 1964 CSCI-3/779,729

Subject: Possible Relatives of Marina Nikolayevna OSWALD.
Recipient: FBI.

30 January 1964 CSCI-3/778,814

Subject: Jack L. RUBY, Lee Harvey OSWALD.
Recipient: FBI.

4 February 1964 CSCI-3/779,817

Subject: Lee Harvey OSWALD. (Information on names, addresses, and telephone numbers relating to the Soviet Union.)
Recipient: FBI.

18 February 1964 DDP 4-0860

Memorandum for the Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation.
Subject: Assassination of John F. Kennedy.
("In connection with our efforts to assist the President's Commission on the Assassination of President Kennedy by providing information which might be helpful in interpreting available materials relating to OSWALD's activities abroad,

we have considered the entry with regard to attempted suicide. We consider this entry as being of considerable importance and one which might be subject to verification.")
Recipient: FBI. [Copy to Warren Commission]

18 February 1964 DDP 4-0861

Memorandum for the Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation.
Subject: Assassination of President John F. Kennedy. (". . . 47 photographs which were among the effects of Lee Harvey OSWALD, ... It appears that most of the photographs were taken in the USSR and depict Soviet contacts of OSWALD or scenes in the Soviet Union.")
Recipient: FBI. [Copy to Warren Commission]

18 February 1964 DDP 4-0862

Memorandum for the Chief, United States Secret Service.
Subject: Assassination of President John F. Kennedy. (Verification of entry in "Historic Diary" relating to OSWALD's attempted suicide.)
Recipient: Secret Service. [Copy to Warren Commission]

18 February 1964 DDP 4-0864

Memorandum for Mr. Thomas L. Hughes, The Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of State.
Subject: Assassination of President John F. Kennedy - Verification of Entry in "Historic Diary".
Recipient: State. [Copy to Warren Commission]

20 February 1964 CSCI-3/779,988

Subject: Lee Harvey OSWALD. (Information regarding Annette SETYAEVNA and Lillie May RAHM.)
Recipient: FBI.

22 February 1964 DIR 03101

Subject: Further Information Provided by Moroccan Student Mohamed REGGAB.
Recipient: White House (attention Secret Service.)

11 March 1964 CSCI-3/780,344

Subject: Summary of Findings in Regard to Allegations by Mohamed REGGAB Relative to Marina OSWALD.
Recipient: FBI.

20 March 1964 CSCI-3/780,612

Subject: Assassination of President John F. Kennedy. (Photograph of an individual closely resembling OSWALD.)
Recipient: FBI.

16 April 1964 CSCI-3/780,881

Subject: Assassination of President John F. Kennedy. (Information regarding Lydia DYMITRUK.)
Recipient: FBI.

8 May 1964 DDP 4-2351

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.
Subject: Marina OSWALD's Notebook.
Recipient: Copy of attachment forwarded to FBI. [Warren Commission]

11 May 1964 CSCI-3/781,172

Subject: Lee Harvey OSWALD. (Traces on Soviet names, addresses, and telephone numbers from an address book belonging to Marina OSWALD.)
Recipient: FBI.

13 May 1964 CSCI-3/781,282

Subject: Lee Harvey OSWALD. (Identification of photographs sent to CIA by FBI.)
Recipient: FBI.

15 May 1964

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.
Subject: Role of Cuban Intelligence Service in Processing Visa Applicants; Reaction of the Service to the Assassination of President Kennedy.
Recipient: FBI. [Warren Commission]

5 June 1964 CSCI-3/781,543

Subject: Lee Harvey OSWALD. (Use of Machine Collation Program to Check Out Cubans Mentioned in Letter of 27 November 1963 from Mario del ROSARIA Milina.)
Recipient: FBI.

10 June 1964 CSCI-3/781,841

Subject: Information Concerning Jack RUBY.
Recipient: FBI.

29 June 1964 CSCI-3/782,085

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.
Subject: Investigation of Allegation that OSWALD was in Tangier, Morocco.
Recipient: FBI. [Warren Commission]

2 July 1964 DDP 4-3401

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.
(Remarks made by Soviet Consul Pavel Antonovich YATSKOV.)
Recipient: FBI. [Warren Commission]

27 August 1964 CSCI-316/00856-64

Subject: No Indication of Subject's Defection Having Been Used for Propaganda by the Cuban Government.
Recipient: FBI. [Warren Commission]

3 September 1964 DDP 4-4600

Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.
Subject: OSWALD Documents Supplied by the Cuban Government.
Recipient: FBI. [Warren Commission]

6 October 1964 CSCI-316/01446-64

Subject: VIADUCT Interview on 9 September 1964; His Comments on Seven Photographs Forwarded by the FBI.
Recipient: FBI.

23 December 1964 CSCI-316/02545-64

Subject: Allegation of Unidentified Scientist of Cuban Involvement in Assassination.
Recipient: FBI.

2 March 1965 CSCI-316/00925-65

Subject: Marvin KANTOR, Possible Connection with Investigation of Lee Harvey and Marina OSWALD.
Recipient: FBI.

30 June 1965 CSCI-316/02654-65

Subject: Silvia DURAN.
Recipient: FBI.

2 September 1966 CSCI-316/04482-66

Subject: Rima ZMITROOK, Lee Harvey OSWALD's Intourist Guide in Moscow.
Recipient: FBI.

14 June 1967 CSCI-316/03243-67

Subject: Allegation of Oscar COUNTRERAS, Mexican Newsman, That OSWALD Visited UNAM Campus Shortly After the Cuban Embassy Refused Him a Visa to Visit Cuba. CONTRERAS' Statement of Dubious Credibility; Information Passed to Mexican authorities.

MEMORANDUM SUBMITTED BY CIA TO THE WARREN COMMISSION ON RUMORS AND ALLEGATIONS RELATING TO THE PRESIDENT'S ASSASSINATION

E.4

31 January 1964

Subject: Information Developed by CIA on the Activity of Lee Harvey OSWALD in Mexico City, 28 September - 3 October 1963.

5 March 1964

Subject: Summary of Findings in Regard to Allegations by Mohammed REGGAB Relative to Marina OSWALD.

18 March 1964

Subject: Article Alleging that OSWALD was interviewed by CIA in Moscow.

31 March 1964 DDP 4-1655

Subject: Reports on Activities and Travel of Lee Harvey OSWALD and Marina Nikolevna OSWALD.
Enclosures include the following:
Teletype Message No. 87515, 29 November 1963 - paragraph g - Marina SNETHLAGE.
Teletype Message No. 85182, 22 November 1963 - Remarks made by Richard Thomas GIBSON.
Teletype Message No. 85665, 28 November 1963 - Remarks Made by Maria SNETHLAGE and Third Secretary Ricardo SANTOS of the Cuban Embassy in The Hague.

3 April 1964 DDP 4-1699

Subject: Richard Thomas GIBSON.

7 April 1964 DDP 4-1784

Subject: Mohammed REGGAB.

4 May 1964 DDP 4-2256

Subject: Additional Information on Lee Harvey OSWALD. "A survey of Agency files indicates that all . . . information known to the Agency on OSWALD's association (with communists or criminals, either in United States or abroad) has been made available to the Commission."

8 May 1964 DDP 4-2351

Subject: Marina OSWALD's Notebook.
(Compilation of traces on what appear to be Soviet names, addresses, and telephone numbers from an address book identified by Marina OSWALD as belonging to her.)

15 May 1964

Subject: Role of the Cuban Intelligence Service in Processing Visa Applicants; Reaction of that Service to the Assassination of President Kennedy.

19 May 1964 DDP 4-2534

Subject: Allegations of PFC Eugene B. DINKIN, U.S. Army, Relative to Assassination Plot Against President Kennedy.

22 May 1964 DDP 4-2624

Subject: Anonymous Telephone Calls to United States Embassy in Canberra, Australia; Relative to Planned Assassination of President Kennedy.

27 May 1964 DDP 4-2688

Subject: Letter Accusing the Chinese Communists of Plotting the Assassination of President Kennedy. (Comment: Letter received at U.S. Embassy, Stockholm.)

1 June 1964 DDP 4-2741

Subject: Gilberto ALVARADO Ugarte.
Enclosures: Out Teletype No. 85089, 26 November 1963.
Out Teletype No. 85199, 27 November 1963.
Out Teletype No. 85662, 28 November 1963.
Out Teletype No. 85666, 28 November 1963.
Out Teletype No. 86063, 30 November 1963.
Out Teletype No. 87667, 7 December 1963.
Memorandum, 12 December 1963, Interrogation of Gilberto ALVARADO.

3 June 1964 DDP 4-2769

Subject: Documents on Lee Harvey OSWALD Furnished by the Soviet Government.

4 June 1964 DDP

Subject: Information Developed on the Activity of Lee Harvey OSWALD in Mexico City.

10 June 1964

Subject: Information Concerning Jack RUBY (aka Jack RUBENSTEIN) and His Associates.

12 June 1964

Subject: Letter Relative to Assassination of President Kennedy sent to United States Embassy in Costa Rica.

29 June 1964 DDP 4-3347

Subject: Investigation of Allegation that OSWALD was in Tangier, Morocco.

2 July 1964 DDP 4-3401

Subject: Lee Harvey OSWALD.

28 August 1964 DDP 4-4479

Subject: Konstantin Petrovich SERGIEVSKY.

15 September 1964 DDP 4-4808

Subject: Information Concerning Jack RUBY (aka Jack RUBENSTEIN) and His Associates.

17 September 1964 DDP 4-4839

Subject: Valeriy Vladimirovich KOSTIKOV.

17 September 1964 DDP 4-4922

Subject: Eusebio AZQUE - Former Cuban Consul, Mexico City.

18 September 1964 DDP 4-4953

Subject: Identification of Persons Appearing in FBI Photograph No. D 33-46 (Commission Exhibit No. 2625).

MEXICO CITY COVERAGE OF OSWALD VISIT

Tab F

~~SECRET SENSITIVE~~

Intelligence Sources on Oswald's Visit
to Mexico City in 1963

1. [Unilateral 24] Coverage:

From the time the Mexico Station was opened [in April 09 1947] until the arrival of Mr. Win Scott as Chief of Station [in 09 1955] the Station had developed a support apparatus to exploit leads from the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City. This umbrella type project (LIPSTICK) consisted of multi-line phone taps, three photographic sites, a mobile surveillance team and a mail intercept operation.

Telephone taps (LIFEAT) were placed by [an employee 24 of the local telephone company who was] handled by a Station case officer. The number of lines tapped was limited only by the availability of a listening post nearby and the availability of language (English, Spanish, Soviet, Polish, Czech, etc.) transcribers. Generally, these were Mexican or Mexican-American recruited agents.

Three photographic sites were handled by a Station case officer assisted by technicians on TDY from Headquarters who advised the Station on the best types of cameras, films, and concealment devices. These operations had sub-crypts under project LIPSTICK (namely: LIMITED, LILYRIC and LICALLA). LIMITED was a fixed site directly opposite the Soviet Embassy (across the street) which had both a vehicle and a pedestrian entrance. The

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gate to the Soviet Embassy was on the northwest corner of the Soviet compound and the LIMITED site was diagonally across a double laned street on the southeast corner of that block (See attached diagram). LIMITED was the first photo base and operated strictly on an experimental basis in the early stages. This base, however, was closed when the Station received word that the photograph of the "unidentified man" was being released by the Warren Commission. LILYRIC was an alternate photographic base. It was located in an upper story of an apartment building on the same side of the street as the LIMITED site but in the middle of the block south. It had a planted view of the front gate of the Soviet Embassy. LICALLA, the third photographic site, was located in one of a row of four houses on the south side of the Soviet Embassy compound. This site overlooked the back garden of the Soviet Embassy compound. The purpose of this operation was to get good identification photographs of Soviet personnel. The three photographic sites were managed by a recruited agent who was a Mexican citizen, the son of an American mother and Mexican father (deceased). This agent collected the film from the LIMITED and LILYRIC sites three times a week. The film was then devleoped and printed into 8 x 10 contact print strips. LICALLA film was originally processed in the Station but in early [1959] due to the resignation of a technician, this film like that of LIMITED and LILYRIC was processed on the outside by a recruited agent.

Mobile surveillance was conducted by two American staff officers. These two officers organized a surveillance team of six recruited agents which used late model cars and a panel truck for surveillance. The team could be activated by radio from the LIMITED site whenever someone of interest left the gate of the Soviet Embassy. These agents were aware of the LIMITED site since they had been issued LIMITED photographs for identification purposes.

The Station also conducted a [unilateral] mail intercept operation, LIBIGHT, which was handled by an American case officer. [A recruited Mexican agent, who had a semi-official status,] obtained selected letters from a sub-agent [employed by the Mexican postal system.]

2. [Liaison] Coverage:

[Liaison] coverage was unreliable and insecure as characterized by the nature of the [Mexican services] at that time. The Mexican Direction of Federal Security (DFS), [with which we conducted liaison,] was a hip-pocket group run out of the Mexican Ministry of Government. This Ministry was principally occupied with political investigations and control of foreigners. Their agents were cruel and corrupt. [A Station officer trained a number of them in name tracing and travel control.]

[In 1958, at the instigation of a Mexican official, a joint telephone tap operation came into existence. The operation,]

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which became known as LIENVOY, was run by a Mexican officer. The listening post had 30 lines connected at one time. The transcription room was staffed by Mexican Army officers. In 1961, because of mismanagement by the Mexican principals, the Station Chief, himself, became the project case officer. A Station officer assisted him in the daily supervision of the listening post and in picking up the transcripts and the tapes. There was also an American technician inside the listening post.

3. Oswald Coverage:

In mid-1962, the Mexican officer in charge of LIENVOY (the joint tap operation) asked the American officer at the LIENVOY listening post for the telephone numbers of the Soviet, Cuban and Satellite Embassies in anticipation of possible coverage. The Station immediately disconnected all of the unilateral telephone taps on these Embassies so that they would not be discovered when the Mexicans hooked up their taps. The Mexicans soon thereafter connected five Cuban lines, five Soviet lines, three Czech lines, two Polish lines, and one Yugoslav line. At the listening post, a live monitor made short summaries of conversations of interest which were then included in a daily resume for the Chief of Station. Later, when a reel was completely recorded, full transcripts were typed and passed to the Station; however, there was usually a time lag of a day or two. Reels which contained Russian or a language other than Spanish or

IM/6

English were taken to another location for translation and typing. Mr. Boris Tarasoff did the Russian translations but because of the volume of Russian conversations, the translations usually ran about a week behind the date of the conversation. All transcripts were made in either Spanish or English since the Chief of Station could read only these two languages and because he personally screened the transcripts for operational leads.

As soon as the Station learned that an American identifying himself as Lee Oswald phoned the Soviet Embassy, Miss Ann Goodpasture of the Station started screening all photographs. However, here again, there was a backlog because the photographs were picked up three times a week, but those picked up were usually for dates a few days before since the technician who was processing the film did so on a night-time basis. Further, photographs were not made initially until a complete roll of film was used. Later this was changed and the operator cleared the camera at the end of each day regardless of amount of unused film remaining. The instructions were to cover the entire work day (office hours) and to photograph all Soviets, their families, all foreigners, and cars with foreign license plates. Human error did occur but generally the agents were conscientious. The Cuban Embassy coverage had more sophisticated equipment using a pulse camera which frequently developed mechanical difficulties.

Oswald came to the attention of the listening post operators from a tap of the Soviet line. It was picked up and taken to Mr. Boris Tarasoff for translation because the caller was trying to speak in Russian. There was some delay because Station personnel waited to review the photographs coincidentally with the typed transcript.

4. Airport Coverage:

This is discussed at Tab B.

SELECTED NEWSPAPER STORIES WITH COMMENTS

Tab G

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In the course of the research effort leading to this general report, there were newspaper stories relating to the assassination of President Kennedy and to CIA. Some of these appear to have been based on specially designed stories emanating from the House Select Committee on Assassinations. At the time of their appearance they were the subject of comments prepared in CIA. These newspaper stories and the comments are attached.

The following newspaper stories and comments are listed below:

Tab G.1 Jack Anderson column on 6 May 1977 alleging CIA activity in Dallas, Texas in 1963.

Tab G.2 Jack Anderson column on 20 January 1977 alleging that CIA is tied to a false Oswald story.

Tab G.3 Norman Kempster story on 1 January 1977 alleging that CIA withheld data on Oswald.

Tab G.4 Clare Booth Luce involvement with Cuban exiles.

Tab G.5 Ronald Kessler story on 26 November 1976 alleging CIA withheld details of Oswald telephone calls, with report on handling of documents.

Tab G.6 John Goshko story on 13 November 1976 alleging that Oswald told the Cubans of his plan to kill Kennedy.

Tab G.7 Tabloid Midnight story on 2 August 1976 regarding CIA and Castro.

Tab G.8 Washington Post story on 1 October 1976 concerning CIA consideration of possibly interviewing Lee Harvey Oswald in 1960.

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77-04989

10 May 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

VIA : Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

FROM : John H. Waller
Inspector General

SUBJECT : Jack Anderson 6 May 1977 Column Entitled "Odd CIA Activity in Dallas in 1963"

REFERENCE : OLC Memorandum for Director of Central Intelligence - OLC 77-1816 (attached)

1. Action Requested: None, for information only.

2. Background: The attached Jack Anderson column is a mixture of some fact and error. At least portions of it seem to have been leaked by someone connected with the House Select Committee on Assassinations.

3. Factual information on matters covered in the article follows:

a. Alpha 66 was an anti-Castro Cuban Exile Organization. Antonio Veciana was one of its founders. Veciana contacted the Agency on three occasions for assistance in an assassination plot against Castro (December 1960; July 1962 and April 1966). On each occasion he was turned down. The Agency had no responsibility for or sponsorship of Alpha 66.

b. Veciana was registered in the Inter-Service Registry by the U.S. Army for the period November 1962 to July 1966 at which time he was terminated without prejudice.

c. Veciana reportedly collaborated with a Cuban Government Intelligence Officer, Guillermo Ruiz, in connection with Alpha 66 activities. Ruiz is married to a cousin of Veciana.

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d. Anderson attempts to connect one Morris Bishop with CIA in Dallas; newspapers in Dallas have tried to identify Bishop with our DCD representative in Dallas, Mr. J. Walton Moore. According to our records, no Agency officers ever used the name of Morris Bishop as an alias. No one named Morris Bishop was ever employed by the Agency.

e. The FBI identified the three men who visited Mrs. Odio. Lee Harvey Oswald was not one of them. The Warren Commission was satisfied that Oswald could not have been in Dallas at the time of the visit.

(signed)
John H. Waller
John H. Waller

Attachment - 1

Distribution:
Original - Director of Central Intelligence w/att.
1 - Deputy Director of Central Intelligence w/att.
1 - Assistant to the Director (Public Affairs) w/att.
1 - Office of Legislative Counsel w/att.
1 - Office of General Counsel w/att.
1 - Executive Registry w/att
1 - IG Subject w/att.
1 - IG Chrono w/att.
1 - J.L.Leader Chrono w/att.

OIG/J.L.Leader:aal

THE WASHINGTON POST Friday, May 6, 1977

Jack Anderson and Les Whitten

Odd CIA Activity in Dallas in 1963

The secret files of the House Assassinations Committee contain reports of strange CIA activities in Dallas on the eve of the John F. Kennedy assassination.

Credible witnesses have confirmed our past reports that the accused assassin, Lee Harvey Oswald, was in touch with anti-Castro Cubans in Dallas. One confidential report states that "in 1963, Oswald was seen leaving the Dallas office of Alpha 66." This was a Cuban commando group trained by the CIA.

A Cuban CIA operative, Antonio Veciana, also told investigators that he had been summoned to Dallas in August 1963, by his CIA contact—a mysterious man who went by the name of Morris Bishop. States a confidential summary: "When (Veciana) arrived, Bishop was accompanied by another man, Lee Harvey Oswald."

Another witness who impressed the investigators, Sylvia Odio, told them that two anti-Castro Cubans had introduced her to an American by the name of Leon Oswald. She was told that Oswald was trying "to convince anti-Castro Cuban groups. . .to kill President Kennedy." After the assassination, she recognized this American as Lee Harvey Oswald.

The House investigators don't really believe that the CIA had any part in the murder of President Kennedy. More likely, they suspect the CIA may have tried to cover up some embarrassing contacts with Oswald in Dallas.

In any case, the CIA took pains to give the impression that Oswald was in Mexico City at the time that witnesses claimed he was dealing with the CIA-guided Cubans in Dallas. Veciana, for example, told of a strange call he received from his CIA contact after Kennedy was killed.

The CIA man, Morris Bishop, asked Veciana to contact his cousin, Guillamo Ruiez, who worked for the Cuban embassy in Mexico City. Relates a confidential report: "Veciana was to relay Bishop's offer to pay Ruiez and his wife to say that they had met with Oswald in Mexico City."

This not only would have placed Oswald out of Dallas but would have thrown suspicion on the Castro government. The ruse was later called off. Instead, the CIA cited secret tapes and photographs as evidence that Oswald had been in touch with both the Cuban and Soviet embassies in Mexico City.

The CIA kept tapes of all phone calls going in and out of the two embassies. Photographs were also taken of everyone entering and leaving these embassies. On Oct. 1, 1963, the CIA notified other U.S. embassies that "an American male, who identified himself as Lee Oswald, contacted the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City."

Oswald was described in the cable as "approximately 35 years old, with an athletic build, about six feet tall, with a receding hairline." The committee files note that this "in no way physically resembles the Lee Harvey Oswald accused of assassinating President Kennedy."

The CIA sought photographs from the navy to compare with its photographs of Oswald at the Soviet embassy. Declares a committee report: "These photographs, though obviously not of the correct Lee Hirvey Oswald, became the Warren Commission's exhibit 237. The CIA admitted that there had been a mix-up but never cleared the matter up."

A CIA witness has told committee investigators, meanwhile, that the CIA's monitoring camera happened to break down on the day that Oswald allegedly visited the Soviet Embassy. But the CIA tap on the Soviet Embassy's phone produced an alleged telephone call from someone who identified himself as "Lee Henry Oswald."

The CIA witness claimed that the actual voice recording of the telephone conversation "was destroyed in routine destruction procedures approximately one week after it was received." Yet more than seven weeks later, the FBI claimed to have heard the telephone conversation that the CIA said had been destroyed. The FBI's judgment was that the voice did not belong to Oswald.

Wrote the late FBI director J. Edgar Hoover on Nov. 23, 1963: "The Central Intelligence Agency advised that on Oct. 1, 1963, an extremely sensitive source had reported that an individual indentified himself as Lee Oswald, who contacted the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City inquiring as to any messages.

"Special agents of this bureau, who have conversed with Oswald in Dallas, Tex., have observed photographs of the individual referred to above and have listened to a recording of his voice. These special agents are of the opinion that the above-referred-to individual was not Lee Harvey Oswald"

The House investigators are beginning to wonder whether the CIA concocted the whole Oswald adventure in Mexico City in an attempt to conceal his real activities in Dallas.

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Antonio Veciana

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21 JAN 1977

LA/COG/021-77

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Operations

FROM : Raymond A. Warren
Chief, Latin America Division

SUBJECTS : A. Jack Anderson 20 January 1977 Column Titled "CIA Tied to False Oswald Story"

B. Identification of the Mr. X in the Anderson Column

1. The attached column, citing the testimony of a Mr. X, alleges that a CIA agent tried to link Oswald to Cuban intelligence officers in Mexico. There is, of course, no substance to the column's allegations. The column identifies the source as Mr. X because of attempts on his life, but subsequently gives enough information on Mr. X to establish his identity.

2. According to the Anderson column, Mr. X was first met by his CIA contact in Havana before relations with U.S./Cuba were severed. Mr. X had helped to organize bank accountants to embezzle Cuban government funds to finance anti-Castro causes. Mr. X was reportedly recruited by a Morris Bishop (CIA contact), to plan an attempt on Castro's life. The plan was to fire a bazooka from a nearby apartment building while Castro was delivering one of his marathon speeches. According to the Anderson column, the plot was discovered by Castro's police and Mr. X escaped to Miami. Mr. X also reportedly tried to assassinate Castro in Chile in 1971 in league with the Venezuelan Luis Posada Carriles, who is now being detained in Caracas for the 6 October Cubana airline bombing. The Anderson column ends with the report that Mr. X worked for CIA until 1973 for expenses, but was paid $253,000 in cash by Morris Bishop when he was terminated.



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SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

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201-312966

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3. From the above description of Mr. X, it is reasonably clear that Mr. X is Antonio Carlos VECIANA Blanch (201-312966). VECIANA, an assistant bank manager and past president of a public accountants association in Havana, first contacted CIA in Havana in December 1960 when he asked the COS, at that time [James A. Noel, 03] to help in an assassination plot against Castro. VECIANA asked for visas for ten relatives of the four men assigned to kill Castro, and also requested four MI rifles with adapters for grenades plus eight grenades. The COS did not encourage VECIANA and subsequently checked with an Embassy officer who reported that VECIANA had made similar "wild-eyed" proposals to him. On 23 November 1961 the Miami News published a report of an unsuccessful attempt by Antonio VECIANA to kill Castro. VECIANA reportedly had arranged to assassinate Castro and Cuban President Osvaldo Dorticos on 5 October in Havana, but the bazooka he was using failed to fire.

4. There has been no Agency relationship with VECIANA. A POA, which was granted for his use in para-military affairs in January 1962, expired in November 1962. VECIANA was born on 4 October 1935 in Havana. He was a member of the People's Revolutionary Movement, an anti-Castro group in Cuba during 1960-61, and was one of the founders of Alpha-66. A certified public accountant by trade, VECIANA was with A.I.D. in La Paz in 1968-72. VECIANA was registered in ISR to the U.S. Army in November 1962 and he was terminated without prejudice in July 1966. On 23 July 1962 VECIANA was interviewed, at his request, by Mr. Harry Real from the DCD New York office. VECIANA asked Real to arrange a meeting with a senior CIA officer to discuss Alpha-66's plans to assassinate Castro and to request CIA's assistance (U.S.$100,000; 10,000 Cuban pesos; 48 hand grenades). There is no indication that this request was ever acted upon by CIA.

5. In April 1966 a LA Division officer, [John R. Lucy, 03] using the alias John Livingston, met VECIANA in New York City. The meeting was arranged by a retired naval officer, James Cogswell, who had informed Chief, WH Division that he had information of value concerning Cuba. When [Lucy, 03] arrived in New York City for the meeting, he was introduced by Cogswell to VECIANA. He immediately launched a discussion of the Cuban political situation and noted his strong feeling that the only solution was the assassination of Castro. [Lucy, 03] advised VECIANA that he was in no position to provide him with assistance or encourage him in an assassination attempt and was only interested in gathering information which he thought was the purpose of the meeting. VECIANA subsequently said that his roommate Felix ZABALA, a Cuban refugee, had excellent contacts in Havana. It was clear to [Lucy, 03] however, VECIANA was attempting to use ZABALA potentially to get Agency financial support for his organization.

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VECIANA suggested that $50,000 would be needed to get his activities off the ground. [Lucy 03] indicated to VECIANA that he would look into the ZABALA matter and would probably arrange for ZABALA to be contacted in Puerto Rico.

6. There is no indication in the file that any Agency officer in contact with VECIANA ever used an alias Morris Bishop. There is no Morris Bishop listed in true name in the DDO rolls. There was never any contractual relationship with VECIANA and he was not paid CIA funds.

7. On 11 January 1977 a sanitized copy of VECIANA's 201 file was made available to staffers from the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence.

signed
Raymond A. Warren

Raymond A. Warren

Attachment

DDO/C/LA/COG/OPS:[WJDevine 03]js (9229) (21 January 1977)
Distribution:
Orig & 1 - Addressee
1 - ADDO
1 - LA/COG/Chrono
2 - C/LAD
(1) - 201-312966
1 - hold
~~1 - LA/OPS~~
1 - ASST. TO DCI

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THE WASHINGTON POST Wednesday, January 19, 1977 B15

Jack Anderson and Les Whitten

Mystery Witness in JFK Inquiry

A mystery witness has sworn to congressional investigators that a Central Intelligence Agency agent introduced him to Lee Harvey Oswald in Dallas three months before Oswald gunned down President John F. Kennedy.

The witness, whom we have agreed to identify only as Mr. X because of attempts of his life, is the founder of a Cuban terrorist group that worked closely with the CIA.

The group held secret meetings at 3126 Hollandale in Dallas before the assassination. Not long after Kennedy was shot, a Dallas deputy sheriff was told by an informant that Oswald had been associating with some Cubans at "3128 Harlendale."

Mr. X's dramatic testimony casts new light on the story Sylvia Odio, daughter of a wealthy opponent of Cuban Premier Fidel Castro, told to the FBI. Two months before the Kennedy killing, she related, she was visited in her Dallas apartment by three men who identified themselves as friends of her father.

One was introduced to her as "Leon Oswald." When she saw the picture in the newspapers of the man who had shot Kennedy, she fainted from shock. It was the same Oswald, she was certain, who had visited her apartment.

Congressional investigators have now learned that the late J. Edgar Hoover deliberately misled the Warren Commission about Odio's mysterious visitors. She was such a persuasive witness that the commission staff was preparing to investigate her story thoroughly.

Staff members even speculated, according to one internal memo, that the anti-Castro forces might have recruited Oswald, a known, pro-Castro activist to kill Kennedy.

"The motive on this," states the memo, "would of course be the expectation that after the President was killed, Oswald would be caught or at least his identity ascertained; the law enforcement authorities and the public would then blame the assassination on the Castro government; and the call for a forceful overthrow would be irresistible."

But Hoover abruptly blocked this line of inquiry by notifying the Warren Commission on Sept. 21, 1964, that the FBI had located and identified Odio's callers. He named them as Loran Hall, Lawrence Howard and William Seymour, all anti-Castroites. Hoover even suggested that Odio could have confused the names "Loran Hall" and "Leon Oswald."

Now the congressional investigators have uncovered evidence that all three denied visiting the Odio apartment and that the FBI had obtained their denials *before* Hoover wrote his letter to the Warren Commission.

The investigators have also obtained the tape of a fascinating conversation, predicting two weeks in advance that Kennedy would be shot "from an office building with a high-powered rifle." The prediction was made by the late Joseph Milteer, a right-wing rabble rouser, who also happened to have close connections with anti-Castro leaders.

The conversation was taped on Nov. 9, 1963, in Miami by an FBI informant named Willie Somersett, who turned the tape over to the FBI the next day. Milteer is heard on the tape describing how Kennedy would die. Then the rabble rouser added knowingly that Kennedy "knows he is a marked man."

Milteer later admitted to the FBI that he had been in Dallas in June, 1963, but denied having any knowledge of the Kennedy assasssination. However, the informant told the FBI that he asked Milteer after the shooting whether he had known about it in advance or had merely been guessing. "I don't do any guessing," replied Milteer.

But the most explosive development is Mr. X's statement that he met Oswald in the company of a CIA agent. Congressional investigators questioned the mystery witness closely on three separate occasions. They finally concluded that "his credibility is strengthened by the details he provides consistent with what he told us before. Significantly, he remains very strong on the Oswald sighting."

The encounter occurred in a downtown Dallas building, where Mr. X had an appointment with his CIA contact. The agent was accompanied by a man whom Mr. X later recognized as Kennedy's killer.

"When he saw it was Oswald that killed Kennedy," the investigators reported in a confidential memo, "he nearly freaked out, but he never said anything."

The investigators tried to pin down Mr. X on how he could be sure that man was Oswald. Mr. X replied, according to the memo, that he had learned "how to retain the characterics of a person; he had trained himself to do that. And if it wasn't Oswald, it was someone who was *exactly* like Oswald, his exact double.

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

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10 January 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Counterintelligence Staff

FROM : Russell B. Holmes
CI Operations Group

SUBJECT : Article by Norman Kempster Appearing in the Los Angeles Times of 1 January 1977 and Entitled "CIA Withheld Data on Oswald" (copy attached)

In light of the inaccurate and misleading statements attributed by Kempster to Sprague, the following comments are offered in rebuttal.

a. "The CIA withheld from the FBI for almost two months in 1963 information that Lee Harvey Oswald had talked with Cuban and Soviet officials about his desire to visit those countries . . ."

Comment: Oswald's name did not surface in Mexico City until 1 October 1963 when a hitherto unknown male telephoned the Soviet Embassy. During this telephone call, the caller identified himself as "Lee Oswald." On 8 October 1963, the Mexico City Station cabled to Headquarters the highlights of the transcript of the conversation.

(1) On 1 October 1963, an American male who spoke broken Russian and said his name was Lee Oswald (phonetic), stated he was at the Soviet Embassy on 28 September when he spoke with a consul whom he believed to be Valeriy Vladimirovich Kostikov. Oswald asked the Soviet guard Ivan Obyedkov, who answered, if there was anything new regarding a telegram to Washington. Obyedkov upon checking said nothing had been received yet, but the request had been sent.

(2) Mexico Station said it had photographs of a male who appeared to be an American entering the Soviet Embassy at 1216 hours, leaving at 1222 on 1 October. His apparent age was 35, athletic build, about six feet, receding hairline, balding top. Wore khakis and sport shirt.

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(3) No local dissemination was being made by the Station. [MEXI 6453 (IN 36017), 8 October.]

(Note: Cablese has been rendered here into readable English, without substantive changes or omissions. Cryptonyms and pseudonyms have been omitted or put into clear text.)

The above information was received in Headquarters on 9 October; the following day Headquarters incorporated this information in an electrical dissemination to the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Department of State, the Department of the Navy, and the Immigration and Naturalization Service.

(1) On 1 October 1963 a reliable and sensitive source in Mexico reported that an American male who identified himself as Lee Oswald, contacted the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City inquiring whether the Embassy had received any news concerning a telegram which had been sent to Washington. The American was described as approximately 35 years old, with an athletic build, about six feet tall, with a "receding" hairline.

(2) It is believed that Oswald may be identical to Lee Henry [sic] Oswald, born on 18 October 1939 in New Orleans, Louisiana, a former U.S. Marine who defected to the Soviet Union in October 1959 and later made arrangements through the United States Embassy in Moscow to return to the United States with his Russian-born wife, Marina Nikolaevna Pusakova [sic] and their child.

(3) The information in paragraph (1) is being disseminated to your representatives in Mexico City. Any further information received on this subject will be furnished you. This information is being made available to the Immigration and Naturalization Service. [DIRECTOR 74673, 10 October 1963.]

(Note: It should be pointed out that for some unknown reason the Headquarters desk responsible for making the dissemination neglected to include the information that Oswald had visited the Soviet Embassy on 28 September 1963.)

It was not until 22 November 1963, when the Station initiated a review of all transcripts of telephone calls to the Soviet Embassy

that the Station learned that Oswald's call to the Soviet Embassy on 1 October 1963 was in connection with his request for a visa to the USSR. Because he wanted to travel to the USSR by way of Cuba, Oswald had also visited the Cuban Embassy in an attempt to obtain a visa allowing him to transit Cuba.

Inasmuch as Oswald was not an investigative responsibility of the CIA and because the Agency had not received an official request from those agencies having investigative responsibility requesting the Agency to obtain further information, the Station did nothing other than ask Headquarters on 15 October 1963 for a photograph of Oswald. [MEXI 6534 (IN 40357), 15 October 1963.] On 25 October 1963, Headquarters sent a request to the Department of the Navy for a photograph of Oswald. [DIRECTOR 77978, 24 October 1963.] It was not until 26 November 1963, however, that the Navy Department apparently responded to this request by sending directly to the Mexico City Station a photograph of Oswald.

In response to a question from the Warren Commission, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, on 6 April 1963 stated that:

> "The investigation of Oswald in 1963 prior to receipt of the Central Intelligence Agency communication dated 10 October 1963 was directed toward the primary objective of ascertaining the nature of Oswald's sympathies for, and connection with, the FPCC (Fair Play for Cuba Committee) or subversive elements. The Central Intelligence Agency communication which reported that a man, tentatively identified as Oswald, had inquired at the Soviet Embassy concerning a telegram which had been sent to Washington did not specify the nature of the telegram. This contact with the Soviet Embassy interjected a new aspect into the investigation and raised the obvious questions of why he was in Mexico and exactly what were his relations with the Soviets. However, the information available was not such that any additional conclusions could be drawn as to Oswald's sympathies, intentions or activities at that time. Thus, one of the objectives of the continuing investigation was to ascertain the nature of his relations with the Soviets considering the possibility that he could have been recruited by the Soviet Intelligence Services. The Central Intelligence Agency communication, dated 10 October 1963, stated that any further information received concerning Oswald would be furnished and that our liaison representatives in Mexico City were being advised. On

18 October 1963, one of our FBI liaison representatives in Mexico City was furnished this information by Central Intelligence Agency and he arranged follow-up with Central Intelligence Agency in Mexico City for further information and started a check to establish Oswald's entry into Mexico. Subsequent to the assassination, Central Intelligence Agency also advised us of Oswald's contact with the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City at the time of his visit there."

[Commission Exhibit No. 833 (FBI Letter to J. Lee Rankin, dated 6 April 1964).]

b. "Chief Counsel Richard A. Sprague said that the committee staff had learned that a CIA message describing Oswald's activities in Mexico to federal agencies such as the FBI had been rewritten to eliminate any mention of his request for Cuban and Soviet visas. The message was sent in October, more than a month before the November 22,1963 assassination."

Comment: It is not CIA practice to disseminate raw information in the form it is received from the field. Field reports are received in Headquarters where they are first reviewed by the action desk. The information is then written in a form suitable for dissemination to the intelligence community, including additional information, if available, from the Agency's central counterintelligence files to make the report more meaningful to the recipient(s).

Upon learning that on 1 October 1963 an American identifying himself as Lee Oswald had telephoned the Soviet Embassy, the Mexico City Station cabled to Headquarters on 8 October 1963 the highlights of Oswald's conversation with the Embassy. Because the Station at that time did not know that Oswald was Lee Harvey Oswald and that he had come to Mexico to apply for visas to the Soviet Union and Cuba, the Station reported only that information obtained through telephone tap operation against the Soviet Embassy.

On 10 October 1963, the day after it received the information relating to Lee Oswald and his contact with the Soviet Embassy, Headquarters incorporated this information in an electrical dissemination to the community and included a brief summary of biographic information obtained from central counterintelligence files on the possible identity of Lee Oswald. Since Headquarters had no indication before 22 November that Oswald had gone to Mexico to apply for Cuban and Soviet visas, there was no question of eliminating any

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mention of Oswald's request for such visas.

Within its limitations and capabilities, Mexico Station had complied with the Agency regulations pertaining to reporting on Americans abroad. The Station had informed Headquarters which in turn had alerted those agencies with an investigative or policy interest in Oswald as an American in the United States. Headquarters also instructed the field station to inform the local representatives of those agencies.

As mentioned above, the action desk in Headquarters neglected, for unknown reasons, to include the fact that Oswald had visited the Soviet Embassy on 28 September 1963. Had this information been included it would have indicated to recipients of the report that Oswald had more than a fleeting reason to be in contact with the Embassy; however, as already stated, the reason for the 28 September contact and the subject of the telegram to Washington were, at that time, unknown.

c. "The CIA's decision to withhold information was reversed shortly after Kennedy was killed."

Comment: This statement is patently false and misleading. It is totally incompatible with Sprague's remarks to Agency representatives in Headquarters on 24 November 1976, i.e., "he will not prejudge the Agency for any sins of 'omission or commission'."

d. "Sprague told a press conference that it was impossible without more information to know why the CIA had censored its own message."

Comment: If Sprague needed more information, why did he not ask the Agency for an explanation, instead of making it appear to the public that the Agency has been dishonest in its dealings with the intelligence community?

e. "But he said the incident raised two interesting questions: what might the other agencies have done differently if they had been more fully informed, and why did the CIA decide to remove 'information that was considered pertinent enough to be put in an initial draft of the message?' "

Comment: As already mentioned, the Agency did not know initially why Oswald was in contact with the Soviet Embassy in October 1963.

It was only after the news of the assassination had reached the Station that the Station initiated a review of its holdings. As a result of this review, the Station learned that Oswald had also visited the Cuban Embassy and that Oswald's contacts with the two embassies were in connection with his desire to travel to the Soviet Union by way of Cuba.

As to what "other agencies" might have done had they had more information, attention is drawn to the FBI's comment in response to the Warren Commission's question. According to the FBI's response, some investigation had been initiated on or about 18 October in Mexico. By the 25th of October, FBI headquarters had informed its field office in New Orleans "that another Agency had determined that Lee Oswald was in contact with the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City in the early part of October 1963." The New Orleans field office in turn informed the Dallas office which had jurisdiction over Oswald's place of residence. (For further detail, see IV H 447 and 459.) There was, however, no request, official or otherwise, from any of the responsible departments and agencies in Washington for further details as to Oswald's presence in Mexico and his reasons for contacting the Soviet Embassy.

f. "The committee said its staff investigators had recently questioned a former CIA agent who had 'personal knowledge' of Oswald's visits to the Soviet and Cuban embassies in Mexico. As a result of that interview, the report said, staff members were sent to Mexico, where they found and questioned additional witnesses."

Comment: Sprague's characterization "a former CIA agent" is probably in reference to David Phillips. The latter's "revelations" to staff investigators (and also to Ronald Kessler) were unfortunate to say the least, in that they were inaccurate, so far as we know. There is no indication in the Oswald files that Oswald wanted to make a deal with the Soviets in return for a free trip to the USSR. The "additional witnesses" in Mexico, it is believed, are Boris Tarasov and his wife, both of whom had been under contract with the Agency in 1963. We have not been informed, officially or otherwise, by Sprague what Phillips and the Tarasovs told the staff investigators.

g. " 'These witnesses had never been sought out before by any investigative body, notwithstanding the fact that they had important information concerning statements by Lee Harvey Oswald in Mexico within 60 days of the assassination of President Kennedy,' the report said."

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Comment: If "these witnesses" include people other than the Tarasovs it would be impossible, at this time, to make an appropriate comment. The fact remains, however, that if Sprague had obtained additional details, he should hold such information and not make it public until the Agency has had a chance to review it and comment. There are many examples in the Oswald files of statements made by people claiming to have knowledge of Lee Harvey Oswald which have been proven to be fabrications. One such person was Gilberto Nolasco A l v a r a d o Ugarte who, on 26 November 1963, came to the U.S. Embassy in Mexico City. He claimed he had been in the Cuban Consulate in Mexico City on 18 September 1963 when a man he later recognized to be Lee Harvey Oswald received $6,500 in cash to kill an important person in the United States. After thorough investigation by Mexican authorities, the Mexico City Station, and the FBI, it was concluded that Alvarado had completely fabricated his story about Oswald.

Russell B. Holmes

Attachment

THE LOS ANGELES TIMES
1 January 1977

CIA Withheld Data on Oswald

Assassinations Panel Issues Report to House

BY NORMAN KEMPSTER
Times Staff Writer

WASHINGTON—The CIA withheld from the FBI for almost two months in 1963 information that Lee Harvey Oswald had talked with Cuban and Soviet officials about his desire to visit those countries, a House committee reported Friday.

The Select Committee on Assassinations indicated in a report to the full House that its investigation of the murder of President John F. Kennedy would focus early in 1977 on a trip Oswald had made to Mexico City in October, 1963.

Chief Counsel Richard A. Sprague said that the committee staff had learned that a CIA message describing Oswald's activities in Mexico to federal agencies such as the FBI had been rewritten to eliminate any mention of his request for Cuban and Soviet visas. The message was sent in October, more than a month before the Nov. 22, 1963, assassination.

The CIA discovered Oswald's presence at the embassies through its routine surveillance of those facilities. Because Oswald had once defected to the Soviet Union, the CIA and FBI had been interested in his activities even before the Kennedy assassination.

The CIA's decision to withhold information was reversed shortly after Kennedy was killed. The agency reported Oswald's efforts to visit Cuba and the Soviet Union both to the FBI and to the Warren Commission, which concluded that Oswald was the assassin and had acted alone.

Sprague told a press conference that it was impossible without more information o know why the CIA had censored its own nessage.

But he said the incident raised two interesting questions: what might the other igencies have done differently if they had been more fully informed and why did the CIA decide to remove "information that was considered pertinent enough to be put in an initial draft of the message?"

There were no firm conclusions in the report, which the 12-member committee prepared after the first three months of its investigation into the murders of Kennedy and civil rights leader Dr. Martin Luther King.

Technically, the committee goes out of business Tuesday with the end of the session of Congress in which it was formed. The purpose of the year-end report was to urge the new Congress to reestablish the committee and to give it $6.5 million to pay for the first year of what could be a two-year investigation.

"In the three months since its establishment, the committee has initiated preliminary investigations into new and previously unpursued leads in both assassinations," the report said.

The committee said its staff investigators had recently questioned a former CIA agent who had "personal knowledge" of Oswald's visits to the Soviet and Cuban embassies in Mexico. As a result of that interview, the report said, staff members were sent to Mexico, where they found and questioned additional witnesses.

"These witnesses had never been sought out before by any investigative body, notwithstanding the fact that they had important information concerning statements by Lee Harvey Oswald in Mexico within 60 days of the assassination of President Kennedy," the report said.

The report said also that the committee staff had interviewed a person who asserted that he had discussed the King murder with James Earl Ray, who pleaded guilty to the crime. The unidentified witness said that Ray had told him about contacting an associate in Europe to receive further instructions. The story, which was told to reporters by a committee member several weeks ago, has not been verified.

In a letter to New York Times columnist Anthony Lewis, Ray offered this week to testify under oath at a committee hearing. But Sprague and Walter F. Fauntroy, the District of Columbia's congressional delegate and the chairman of the King subcommittee' said that no decision had been made on accepting Ray's offer.

However, Sprague indicated that it probably would be accepted.

"Any and all people who have relevant information will be interrogated," Sprague said.

In a personal statement issued in conjunction with the report, Rep. Henry B. Gonzalez (D-Tex.), who is to become committee chairman in the new year, said a thorough investigation was needed to answer hundreds of pressing questions.

Gonzalez said that the committee hoped to discover whether former FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover's now well-known animosity toward King had affected the FBI's investigation of the assassination.

However, Gonzalez said, the committee's work could go well beyond the killings of Kennedy and King.

"The committee can shed light on the larger issue of political murder and violence," Gonzalez said. "We should not forget that President Ford had his own narrow escapes; no member of the House should forget that the Capitol Building was bombed. . . ."

He said the committee's ultimate task was "to find out not just what happened but why."

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INSPECTOR GENERAL
77-0701

7 APR 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

VIA : Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

FROM : John H. Waller
Inspector General

SUBJECT : President Kennedy Assassination - Mrs. Luce Story

1. Action Required: None; for information only.

2. Background: In 1975, Mrs. Clare Boothe Luce telephonically informed Director William Colby of support she had rendered to certain Cubans who were conducting their own independent operations against the Castro Government in 1961 and 1962. Mrs. Luce stated that she and Mr. William Pawley, an American financier long associated with the Dominican Republic, helped finance a motorboat for three Cubans. The three Cubans, concurrently, were members of a CIA supported Cuban exile organization. After the 1962 missile crisis, all resistance groups against Castro were ordered to cease operations. At this time, Mrs. Luce and Mr. Pawley also ceased their financial support. In 1963, very shortly after the assassination of President Kennedy, the Cuban captain of the motorboat, which Mrs. Luce helped to subsidize, phoned Mrs. Luce to inform her that "Oswald was a hired gun". She, in turn, informed him to tell all to the FBI. At the behest of Director Colby, Mrs. Luce passed the story on to Senator Richard Schweiker, chairman of the subcommittee investigating the Warren Commission Report.

A version of the information was given to columnist Betty Beale and was published in the Washington Star on 16 November 1975 (attached). A staff member of the Senate Select Committee, on 10 December 1975, inquired as to what the Agency thought of the story. The Agency oral response was that it had nothing to add to the newspaper story and that since this query involved U.S. resident Cuban refugees, the FBI would be the proper agency to contact.

The transcripts were received by CIA's Inspector General on 22 December 1976 from Mr. Colby's secretary. At the suggestion of the Inspector General, the Office of Security sent copies of the transcripts and a background note to the Federal Bureau of Investigation in January 1977. We do not know whether the FBI passed this information to the House Select Committee on Assassinations.

This story is summarized here for your background in the event that it should be replayed by the press as a result of releases which may be made by the House Assassination Subcommittee. While it is not a new story, the actual CIA transcript of Mrs. Luce's conversation with Mr. Colby could be considered newsworthy and could be presented in a manner detrimental to CIA.

John H. Waller

Attachment: a/s

cc: Asst. for Public Affairs w/att
Mr. H. Hetu

Distribution:
Original - Addressee w/att.
1 - DDCI w/att.
1 - Asst. for PA/Mr. Hetu w/att.
1 - ER w/att.
1 - IG Subject (Task Force) w/att.
1 - IG Chrono w/o att.
1 - J.L.Leader Chrono w/o att.

OIG/J.L.Leader:aal

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Clare Boothe Luce Weav[e]
a Fascinating Tale

Betty Beale

One day in the latter part of October, Clare Luce received a call from Sen. Richard Schweiker, R.-Pa., chairman of the subcommittee investigating the Warren Commission Report. He wanted her to persuade some Cubans she had known — Cubans who had known Lee Harvey Oswald — to testify before his committee. Mrs. Luce's efforts to locate the Cubans led to a somewhat bloodcurdling warning. But let her tell the story from the beginning.

"The year is 1961, a year of great American trauma," she began her narration to recent dinner guests in her aqua-colored Watergate apartment. "I had a friend named Bill Pawley who was brought up in Cuba and who was Truman's ambassador to Peru and Brazil. I got to know Bill very well in India and China where he had built up a voluntary outfit called The Flying Tigers. Bill was also called in by the CIA to recruit Cubans for the Bay of Pigs operation. Afterwards he was a very unhappy man.

"One day he called me up and said, 'How would you like to get in on the Cuban Flying Tiger operation?' He had in mind a fleet of motorboats subsidized by Americans and manned by Cubans who had been in the Bay of Pigs operation — all these young kids who had been stranded after the Bay of Pigs.

"I said, 'Fine.' So I helped to finance a motorboat. The three lads who manned mine came up to see me several times. They would leave the coast of Florida and land in Cuba and come out with information. The information they came out with was remarkably accurate — that the Russians were building missile sites in Cuba. I was told that the information was eventually fed to Sen. Ken Keating and was passed on to the White House. You remember what an impression it made and how accurate it was.

"THEN CAME THE MISSILE showdown. Soon after the showdown I got a telephone call from Allen Dulles saying the Neutrality Act had been invoked and all Americans must cease and desist in any further efforts towards the liberation of Cuba. Of course, we desisted."

Two years later she and her husband Harry (Henry) Luce were sitting in their New York apartment listening to the televised reports of President Kennedy's assassination when around midnight she received a phone call from New Orleans. "It was the captain of my motorboat," said Clare, "A young man not more than 25, a young student lawyer. He said, 'Mrs. Luce, I want to tell you about Oswald.'

"He said that immediately after the 1961 missile showdown, FBI men had come to Miami and told the Cubans to break up all resistance groups and disperse. He and the other two members of his crew had moved to New Orleans where they started another "Free Cuba" group. They had been there a year and a half when who made contact with them but Oswald!

"The Cubans all thought he was a kook. Oswald bragged about having been in Russia and said he was an ex-Marine. He said he could shoot anybody and he would be happy to shoot Castro. He had no money, he was living with his wife in New Orleans and it looked like he was presenting himself as a hired gun. They didn't like the cut of his jib so they turned him off. But they followed him and found he was in a Fair Play for Cuba Communist cell to whose members he was giving the same line.

"And I remember this from the telephone conversation — Oswald was telling the cell that he could shoot anyone, including the secretary of the Navy. The Free Cubans continued to tail him and found that suddenly he had money, and he started going to Mexico City. He made several trips. They continued their penetration of the Cuban Communist cell. He said they made tape recordings of some of Oswald's meetings and they had taken photographs of him distributing handbills for the Fair Play unit. The next thing they knew President Kennedy was shot.

"THE YOUNG CUBAN WHO called me," continued former Ambassador Luce, "said that there was a Cuban Communist assassination team working somewhere — in Dallas, New Orleans or wherever — I don't remember, and that Oswald was their hired gun. Oswald, he said, had tried to report the Communist plans to the FBI some time before the assassination. But because he was out for the dough they didn't believe him.

continued

I suppose that the FBI must hear from a thousand ... 'crackpots' a week.

In any event, on the telephone my young friend told me that they had these tape recordings of Oswald and photographs and what should they do? I said, 'Go to the FBI and tell them everything you know.' That having been said I put the whole thing out of my mind. Comes the Warren Commission and says Oswald alone was responsible and I forgot the whole matter.

"Then, in 1967, a fellow named Jim Garrison, district attorney in New Orleans, hit the headlines charging that the assassination was a conspiracy. At that moment I was reminded of the information I had received and I began to wonder whether or not the Warren Commission had got all the facts. I couldn't remember the names of the Cubans but I finally located one crewman who was living in Miami again and I asked him what happened after he went to the FBI.

"He said, 'We turned over copies of everything. We were then told to keep our traps shut and that we would be deported if we said anything publicly.' He said one of the crew was deported to Guatemala, and one was murdered — stabbed in front of a store.

"THEIR INFORMATION, HE SAID, never appeared in the Warren Commission report. He said, 'I am married now, I live in Miami and I don't want to get involved in it ever again.' "

When Sen. Schweiker made his request of Clare Luce less than three weeks ago, she telephoned another Cuban friend to see if he could locate and persuade the young man to testify behind closed doors. Replied the older Cuban, if the testimony was behind 13 closed doors it would still become public.

"Americans think they are playing games," he told her. "They don't know they are involved in a life or death business. No, I won't tell you where he can be found. The people working for a free Cuba would lose their lives. A lot of them have already. They are not interested in making political headlines for politicians. You think the Bay of Pigs, the nuclear missiles, the assassination of the president was the end of the story? I tell you it is just the beginning. What you Americans don't understand is, there are trained Communist terrorists, assassination, kidnapping, bombing and sabotage teams all over the country and the world."

— Wide World Photos

Clare Boothe Luce
. . . "A year of great American trauma."

The very day after that conversation, observed Clare gravely, bombs went off at the State Department here, at the U.S.-U.N. mission and four banks in New York and at three places in Chicago. And close to the same hour she was recounting the whole fascinating story to her guests, a Cuban, anti-Communist leader was exploded into bits in his car in Miami.

13-00000

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM:	EXTENSION	NO.
Inspector General 2 E 24 Hqs.	6565 R-1252	DATE 6 January 1977

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. OLC ATTN: Lyle Miller 7049	1/6	1/6	OLC	SUBJECT: Attached Transcripts The OLC and the IG concur that the attached transcripts should be provided to the FBI. A blind memo is also attached. It is requested that the O/S pass the package to the FBI. /s/ D. Buchanan for John H. Waller
2.				
3.				
4. Director of Security				
5.				
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				

Left.

The Office of Security will forward the entire package to the FBI - on 6 Jan 1977 - via OS-70000

/s/

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

13-00000

6 January 1977

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Transcripts of October 1975 Telephone Conversations Between Director Colby, Mrs. Clare Boothe Luce and Mr. Justin McCarthy

1. Attached herewith are transcripts of two telephone conversations between Director William Colby and Mrs. Clare Boothe Luce, and one between Director William Colby and Mr. Justin McCarthy. The conversations took place in October 1975 and discuss Mrs. Luce's concern that certain information, from a former boat captain, a Cuban refugee, regarding the President Kennedy assassination, reached the proper authorities. While the information in these transcripts have been provided to investigating authorities, they may be of some assistance to the House Select Committee on Assassinations as it investigates various allegations.

2. The transcripts were received by the Agency Inspector General on 22 December 1976. The transcript of the 25 October 1975 conversation was typed by Ms. Barbara Pindar on the same day. The other two transcripts were typed by Ms. Pindar on 21 December 1976 from her stenographic records while clearing out the remainder of Director Colby's files. Ms. Pindar was Mr. Colby's secretary during his Directorship.

3. A version of the telephone conversation transcript was published in the Washington Star on 16 November 1975 (attached). A staff member of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, on 10 December 1975, inquired as to what the Agency thought of the story. The Agency oral response was that it had nothing to add to the newspaper story and that since this query involved U.S. resident Cuban refugees, the FBI would be the proper agency to contact.

4. The attached transcripts indicate that the matter was brought to the attention of Senator Schweiker and The Federal Bureau of Investigation. (Telephone conversation between Director Colby and Mrs. Clare Boothe Luce on 25 October 1975, pages 2 and 3).

Attachments: a/s

13-00000

Review Staff: 75/3637

Date 10 December 1975

TO : CIA Task Force

FROM : The Review Staff, Walter Elder

SUBJECT : SSC/HSC Request

RECEIVED: Date _____ Time _____

Paul Wallach, SSC staff, asks what we think of the attached. He is not writing a formal request and will be satisfied with an oral reply.

Comments:

	Action	Info
SC/DCI		X
A/DDA		
A/DDI		
A/DDO	X	
A/DDS&T		
OGC		
OLC		
IG		
B.Evans		

MEMORANDUM FOR:

BLP

File with Mrs CBC
talk — She passed
the story on —
CI advised her
to do so to Sen Schweiker

Date 12/15/75

FORM 5-75 101 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

Telephone Conversation Between Mr. Colby and Mrs. Clare Boothe Luce at 12:40 on Saturday, 25 October 1975 (from steno notes of Barbara Pindar transcribed the same day)

Mrs. Luce: I have a big problem, a case in conscience. I got rather deeply involved during and after the Bay of Pigs, and up to the time of the missile crisis, with a group called the (Directorate Revolutionario Estudiante; Note: the spelling of that is just a guess), the DRE. Whether you know this or not, it was me who fed the missile stuff to Keating. I knew a number of these leaders well; they were going in and out of Cuba, and I paid for one of the motor boats. Bill Pawley did too. We thought we were doing another Flying Tiger. The missile crisis came, and I got a telephone call from Allen telling me that the Secrets Act had gone into effect and that henceforth there would be no voluntary American efforts. That ended that, and I don't know what I was doing -- maybe I went back to Arizona, or whatever. Then came the assassination. The night of the assassination, right after Oswald was caught, one of my boys telephoned me from New Orleans. Didn't I ever tell you this?

Mr. Colby: No.

Mrs. Luce: It was the captain of my boat. It seems that after the missile crisis -- a period of about a year had gone by -- he said that all the young Cubans involved profoundly in all of this had been told to scatter and scram, that he and two of my other lads --

Mr. Colby: When, after the crisis?

Mrs. Luce: (Yes.) (were told) to leave Miami.

Mr. Colby: In 1962?

Mrs. Luce: Yes. They were to stop their efforts to free Cuba; and if they did not, they would be deported. It has a very interesting end involving you. In any event, this one had been told to leave Miami after the missile crisis was over, and he had opened a cell in New Orleans. He telephoned me to tell me that Oswald was -- I am telling you what his view was -- was a hired gun; Oswald had tried to penetrate their little cell; that they turned around and did a counterpenetration job on Oswald; all of this was done several months before the assassination. He said,--telling me on the phone, he was terribly excited -- he said "you see he had no money, all of a sudden he began to get money, so we checked him and he had a little "Communists be Free" or "Be Fair to Cuba" group going in New Orleans." He said "We

had tape recordings of what he was telling his group." It was a counter-penetration they went on. He said, "We have photographs of Oswald, passing out handbills on the street, 'Be Fair to Cuba.'" He said, "We are absolutely certain that Oswald was simply one of three assassination teams, that they were working out of Mexico City (or funded in Mexico City) by Castro." He said there were three assassination teams. Then he said, "We have these recordings, these tapes, and we have these photos, what should we do?" These fellows always trusted me. I said, "The first thing you do, the minute you hang up this phone, you telephone to the FBI, give them everything you have got." Working in New York with these Cubans is an extraordinary fellow, one of the most puzzling characters I have every met; he is a devout Catholic -- Justin McCarthy. Justin is the American patron -- although he has no money, never had money -- of all these free Cubans in America. He never worked at CIA, although CIA tried to pick his brains. He tried to help the FBI. I knew Justin McCarthy, and he used to send me bulletins; he said he had been sending them to me for the past six months, and I had never received one of them. Out comes the Warren Report. I have many other things to do, and I assume my lads had reported what they knew, and maybe it had been discounted, but I had taken the Warren Report at face value without poring over it -- and I forgot the whole darn thing. Then, this must be nine years ago, up turns a guy named Lloyd Garrison* -- what was he, a sheriff or something? (* she means Jim Garrison)

Mr. Colby: District Attorney.

Mrs. Luce: And he hit the headlines that the assassination had been a conspiracy. Then it all flooded back into my mind that I had never been quite satisfied with what the Warren Report had brought out. Basically, I was troubled by the whole thing, so I said I thought I would call Garrison. In order to call him, I had to have the names of the Cubans, which had gone out of my bean. So I called Justin McCarthy. He said one of them was now, my lad, was in Miami. I got him on the phone, my fellow, and I said, "You remember your midnight call to me about the assassination of the President, I want to know what happened after that." He said, "We went at once to the FBI, they took all the tapes and photos and all our information and told us to keep our mouths shut, and shortly after that they informed us that if any of us talked to the press or anyone, dire things would happen." He said one of the fellows on the boat was deported to Guatemala or Chile, and one of them was murdered. He said, "I am a lawyer, have two children, I am making my way in Miami, and I never want to hear a damn word about the assassination of Kennedy because you Americans really do not want to know the truth." He said, "We waited, expecting the Warren Committee would want to have us, and we never heard a word." He said, "I want no part of it." Then the Garrison thing died

13-00000

down, and I am a busy woman, and I forgot about it. Three days ago, a reporter was in here -- a gal* -- asking about my life style and said, in passing, "What do you think of the investigation of the assassination of the President?" I am afraid I hit the roof. I said, "I think everyone must be absolutely off their rockers. What possible motive would the CIA have for murdering their own President?" I said, "Even to assume such a thing is beyond belief because where there is a murder or assassination, there is a motive, and there could be no motive." I said, "Who had the motive was Castro; but perhaps not even Castro, possibly just a bunch of Communist Cubans or plain Communists." I said, "They always had a motive for that sort of thing." Schweiker called me up yesterday -- when the reporter said to me, "What is the name of the young Cuban?", I said, "Well, let's call him Julio Fernandez." The Senator said to me "that is a fascinating story." (* I missed the fact that the girl reporter was with Knight Newspapers)

Mr. Colby: You told the story to Schweiker?

Mrs. Luce: He read it in the Knight paper.

Mr. Colby: You told the story to the Knight people?

Mrs. Luce: Not in the detail I told you. Schweiker asked if I could locate any of these men involved for him, and I said I would try. That was yesterday. I used that opportunity to say, "I do not know what you are doing on the Hill." I said, "You are in the (process?) for headlines and destroying this country's security." He said, "If you have this information and you can get your hands on it, it would be a good thing to lay this story to rest." He said, "If you can find me these people, I assure you they will be listened to in closed session." Now comes the big thing. Justin McCarthy runs an animal farm in Nyack: telephone number is 914; 647-8596. I have known him to be a man of complete integrity. He is a devout Catholic. He may or may not be a fanatic. What makes one think he is is what he tells you is just so terribly alarming; as he was the one, along with Bill Pawley, who involved me with these Cubans, I tracked him down and had a two-hour conversation on the phone with him this morning that was really staggering. When I said to him, "Would you tell these things in the closed session in the Senate?", he said, "I would find it more expedient and to shorten the process to hire loud speakers and put them on top of the Empire State Building." He said, "You don't know, Clare, the Cubans have not lost their desire to free their country, and there are plenty of them working

at it, and they trust me, and I trust them, and they all trust me." He said, "All these fellows on the Hill give a damn about is a big headline and political attention, and if this should involve my testifying and some of my fellows got bumped off, or their apparat shut down, I could not live with myself, no I will not testify." I said, "You know, Justin, if they send for you, you might have to." He said, "They are not likely to send for me unless you tell them." He said, "They do not know who to ask for anyway." (It doesn't appear in my notes, but my memory is that he added that the reason the Hill doesn't get to the truth is that they never know who to ask for.) He told me a story about working once with CIA. He said, "We did this -- DRE did one operation with CIA, as a result of which all the Cubans involved were caught and killed, and I do not want any part with the CIA." He said, "It too can be a sieve." I said, "You have me really over a barrel." I said, "Justin, I have to tell someone, is there anyone you trust?" He said, "There is only one man in this whole country whose word at this point I would take." I said, "Who is that?" and he said, "Bill Colby." He said, "He is a daily communicant" --

Mr. Colby: No, no.

Mrs. Luce: I did not disillusion him. In any event, if only to put my own mind at rest since -- he always says, which is fascinating if true, that my lads in New Orleans, yes, they did turn over the tapes to the FBI but they kept copies.

Mr. Colby: Really?

Mrs. Luce: So he says. If so, you are possibly, if -- I think you should get hold of Justin and give him a couple of hours because he has plenty to say. If what he says is true -- he also told me, which I had forgotten -- that during the time of the missile crisis, and I was the one he came to, and naturally the one I went to was Harry (note: this is first mention of a "Harry"' maybe I misunderstood; could she have said "Allen"?*) because I could trust him. In a way, Justin McCarthy supplied a lot of background material on the Cubans to (note: could not hear what she said). He said a few days ago -- Time is planning to do a (take-out) issue on the assassination of Kennedy. He said that, going back through their files, they came across my name as an informant, and he said "they tracked me down too." He said, then he told me -- I mentioned in passing that there

no this is her husband Henry Luce

* or maybe she was referring to her husband, Henry Luce? That may explain Time having her name listed as an informant.

was a wonderful girl on Time that knows more about the Cubans almost than anyone in CIA, Priscilla Badger. He said the Time people are now trying to get information. He said, "I will talk to no one because there are lives at stake" -- except you. For my own sake, if you have a go at him, I would be very happy to know how serious it is.

Mr. Colby: I will report back to you by all means. Let me do a little homework on just where this (looks). You do not remember the name of the Cubans in Miami?

Mrs. Luce: There are so many names; he talked to me so fast. He kept saying "Chilo." I asked who "Chilo" is, and he said that was his code name.

Jose Antonio La Nuza (Note: That last name may be all one word; she said it means "the nut.")

Luis Fernandez Rocha

One of those fellows was the Director of the DRE. Then he also reminded me of a guy who used to come to see me -- Cardona. (He had been told by the American Government to get out of Miami) and he died, having become the President of a university in Puerto Rico. These fellows were scattered all over the place. As I mentioned that to Justin, he said, "I know where they all are." The thing that alarmed me is that -- he does not talk in an excited voice, but the statements are -- he said "People think of the Bay of Pigs and the nuclear showdown and the assassination of Kennedy as the end of the story, it is only the beginning." He said, "If you knew what is being laid on for the U. S.," and he talks like that. I asked him, "What do you think happened?" He said, "Oswald went to the FBI." He said, "I know that, he was selling them information, and they did not believe him." I said, "That is incredible." He said, "I do not know how much you know about the FBI, but no day goes by without desks being loaded with letters saying something will be blown up." (Note: I missed a little bit here due to something else happening in the office.) I said, "What happened?" and he said, "The FBI got the word from on top 'Destroy the letters.'"

Mr. Colby: From on top?

Mrs. Luce: From the President, who was Johnson. I contended that if at that point the FBI had proven that Castro had in mind assassinating the President, we would have been in war with Cuba. It might have been

an act of State to shut up about it. If I had been the President, I would have had (Note: missed more due to outside interference). What is hideous about this is that the CIA is being accused or Kennedy is being accused -- anyone except the people who probably were involved. If putting it at rest in a secret session will work, if such evidence does exist, you are the man to present it.

Mr. Colby: Schweiker does not know about McCarthy?

Mrs. Luce: He only knows this -- I said there is one man I know who might be able to tell you where these Cubans are, and that is a fellow named Justin McCarthy. He said, "Where is he?", and I said, "I do not know, I have lost track of him." He said, "If you find him, let me know." After talking with Justin McCarthy, I do not want him to talk to Schweiker. I do not know what to say if he calls again. Knowing the Senator, I may never hear from him. I leave it with you.

[illegible]

NOTE: Mrs. Luce closed the conversation by referring to a CIA paper entitled "Restless Youth" and asked if it had been declassified. Mr. Colby said he would check on it, and Mrs. Luce said she would like to have a copy if it has been declassified.

Telephone Conversation Between Mr. Colby and Justin McCarthy at 3:45 on Tuesday, 28 October 1975 (this transcript was typed on 21 December 1976 from steno notes of Barbara Pindar)

Mr. McCarthy: I am glad to know you, even if it is over the phone.

Mr. Colby: Mrs. Luce talked to me yesterday (sic). She gave me a capsule version of some of her chat with you. It puts me in a bit of a jam, obviously, because there are some things that really hold some potential for being very important in these days (of) post-mortems of everything. I wondered if maybe we should chat about it sometime, or, quite frankly, one of the main things I would suggest is that you might want to go to this Senate Committee looking into this.

Mr. McCarthy: No. There are several reasons why not. I am sure we do not need to discuss them, but there are many reasons. Over the period of time there have been so many things. We were the only ones who had the information about the missiles in Cuba for many months, and we beat our brains out trying to get someone to do something (or believe?) and regrettably (in) Washington there are too many political (opportunists?), but there are too many lives at stake. We risked our neck for all these years. We are interested in doing the right thing.

Mr. Colby: I wondered if you could (slice?) off that New Orleans thing (and not go any further than that?)

Mr. McCarthy: As I said to her -- (can't read the next few words). For me to be seen in Washington, it is (can't read the next few words). We do not trust anyone. We did so many operations for so long, and we were entirely successful and never lost a man, and then one day we did an operation for the Government and lost 22 men. Lives depend on it. Someone sent a Top Secret memo, and the one he sent it to left it on his desk and someone came in and read (it) and the men were arrested. She asked, "Would you talk to Bill?" I said I would. We think it would be a good idea -- for me to go down -- I do not want to blow my cover, but I would like very much to chat with you and tell you.

Mr. Colby: My problem is then I get information, and then what are my obligations.

Mr. McCarthy: From the point of view of (seeing?) how to do it through persons other than me -- to get the end result.

Mr. Colby: It might be that one of your fellows aware of some of the things (would not mind telling Schweiker?) under some protection and assurances of anonymity. That would be enough of a (can't read the next word) to get started.

Mr. McCarthy: There is plenty to get started on.

Mr. Colby: Then (he?) could cut your people out as a source.

Mr. McCarthy: She said it would be a closed-door hearing. I said there (would?) still be someone come out of the meeting and (can't read next word) their names in the press. You see Jack Anderson's column on Monday. It is vitally important, and it is true evidence. It is not conjecture. I am concerned about what it ties into -- it is all the same ball of wax. We sat on the information about the missiles. This has been going on for a good twenty years, and we have accumulated an awful lot of information. We are more concerned today than when we had the missile information. It is appalling, and it is frightening, and people do not want to believe it. Last night I enlightened people about some of the things that are going to happen. We feel the time has come that some of this should come to light. It is necessary and essential to go back and bring out some of these things that need to be brought out, but not at the expense of (next word missing). We have done this on our own and at our own expense. One of the reasons my people trust me is -- I am thinking of a book -- we did not want to do a book before. The American public wants to know. It is all part of what went on then. I think it should be clarified and straightened out what went on then. But I am so terribly wary. I went to everyone, including the President, about the missiles. We had evidence -- what ships they were on, where they (docked?), and a few days later they came back and said there is no credibility of what you say.

Mr. Colby: The only thing that bothers me is the story about the existence of some records (you?) still hold. The important part of that is that indicates some (part?) of a failure, or possibly even worse -- that is the kind of thing that does need investigation or (correction?) -- protecting your people that are in on it. The other possibility would be to ask Schweiker or one of his men to go and talk to you or one of your people who would have factual knowledge of it.

Mr. McCarthy: When (Dorothy) told me about you over a period of time -- (Dorothy) said we have been through this so many times -- I took this to editors of Life. That was the time when the guy sent the

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Note: I am not positive about the "Dorothy" above, but don't know what else it could be. I had written in long-hand, "Doroth." My only guess at this point is Dorothy Farmer, Mrs. Luce's secretary.

Top Secret memo and it got left on a desk in Miami and we lost a lot of people on that. Inadvertently so many things happen. We work so carefully. We have information now that no one else has because it has come to the point where so many of the people I work with find they cannot trust people because of the opportunists. I have never met such overbearing and obnoxious (can't read next word). We sat on this year in and year out -- we never know when we might get calls. I was up all night long the night before last. Time is doing a big cover story on the thing -- the next issue -- the Today Show is bugging me. Washington is a funny place. If I -- by and large, when your life is on the line -- one of (our?) guys hung himself after one of the escapades we went through. He committed suicide because he felt guilty about it. Up here it is terrific because I am an animal nut. A lot of the guys divulging some of this stuff that they would not normally do.

Mr. Colby: Let me talk with Clare again as to how we handle this. The main thing is not so much the overall stuff about Cuba -- the main thing is the story about records, about Oswald. That comes at a time when that is a serious subject of study here by the Congress. If we could in some way shake that information loose without putting the finger on any of your friends, I think we are sort of obliged to do this in terms of clarifying the record against the (facts?) -- this is a very key aspect of it and a very serious problem that if it was suppressed at the time.

Mr. McCarthy: That is not all that was suppressed.

Mr. Colby: That is the thing. They are looking into it. Let me talk to Clare again and see if I can figure out some way in which we could talk to you (maybe?) and if you could in the meantime think of a way of (can't read the next word) out or (can't read the next word) out this (feature?) of it so that you give the (final result?) but not the sourcing, and let the investigators (find their own source later on?), we would have done our duty. My problem is that I really cannot sit on it with my obligations. I can be reasonable about protecting other people, and I have to be, but I also have to have the responsibility for responding to proper investigations of things that really should be looked into.

Mr. McCarthy: Let me (can't read next word) this in. Some of our guys (can't read next several words).

Mr. Colby: That is what she said.

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Mr. McCarthy: They and I are scared to death. I was Executive Producer of TV programs for years -- I cannot make -- I have earned the respect and confidence of these people over the years. The other night I talked all night long. If I try to push my guys -- Clare said it needs to be laid to rest, and it does. I would like to see it get laid to rest, but my people --

Mr. Colby: I can assure you I am as interested (as) you in protecting that part of it if there were some way of having part of the cake and eating part of it, so that you do not lose the one or the other but to work out some vehicle -- a way in getting the substantive information loose but protecting people involved. There may be ways to do that if we put our minds to it. Let me talk to Clare and see what really -- I will not do anything except with her without your permission.

NOTE: Mr. Colby tried to call Mrs. Luce on 29 October, but could not reach her. He contacted her on 31 October (see separate notes)

Telephone Conversation Between Mr. Colby and Clare Boothe Luce at 4:07 on Friday, 31 October 1975 (this transcript was typed on 22 December 1976 from steno notes of Barbara Pindar)

Mr. Colby: I got the Restless Youth for you. And I called Justin McCarthy. We had a long chat. He does not want me to do anything about it, but I said you put me in an awful position. (Note: The "you" there refers, I believe, to McCarthy.) I understand what you mean about his strong manner of talking. I think both of us are (hung?) with a rather tantalizing story.

Mrs. Luce: If I had not known the guy for 25 years, I would take him much less seriously.

Mr. Colby: The only real point is the thing about the tapes and the photos and the allegation about the FBI. I tried to (argue?) him into figuring out some way in getting rid of those but keeping himself out of the act.

Mrs. Luce: He called me back and said he talked with you and that you left him in a box, and I think he feels now that there is some kind of a question of conscience involved. He said, "I am going to let you and Bill Colby decide what is best to do."

Mr. Colby: I said I would be in touch with you and try to figure out something sensible.

Mrs. Luce: Why don't we suggest that he bring you or me -- perhaps he feels safer with me -- the tapes and photos if he has copies of them.

Mr. Colby: And then you pass them over to Schweiker.

Mrs. Luce: And let them decide, and I will maintain his cover -- he keeps saying it is not worth it to him after all these years to blowthat -- the paradox, he tells me he is going to have to write a book (and whether he is indeed going to?) so that he is not altogether a crackpot. On the other hand, what he is doing is sufficiently crackpot. He is taking care of broken-down animals from his entire area. However, --

Mr. Colby: I think that is a good idea. You say that you and I have talked, and we are all in a kind of box at this point, and we really in conscience cannot sit on this stuff -- all these charges that there is remaining evidence that (can't read next word) was held backand disappeared

13-00000

into the FBI, and maybe the way to do it is for him to provide it to you, and you to Schweiker, and then I would just as soon drop out -- it does not really have much to do with me -- and in that way you would protect him from Schweiker, and you would say you got it from a friend -- and the source is whatever he and you agree on.

Mrs. Luce: I will do that.

Mr. Colby: I think that is the best thing to do. If he does not buy that, I do not know what we do about Schweiker.

Mrs. Luce: (I am going to ignore it if Schweiker comes to me.)

NOTE: The conversation continued, but it did not pertain to this subject.

13-00000

~~S E C R E T~~

28 OCT 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Operations

SUBJECT : Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Request to the Deputy Director for Operations

Not proper title. This was in response to letter DCI-Clare Boothe Luce

Attached, in response to the Senate Select Committee request of 27 October 1975, are separate memoranda on the DRE and several Cuban exiles.

03

[R. S. Sampson]

Richard S. Sampson
Chief
Latin America Division

Attachments

DCI Briefed by DDO 10/28/75

~~S E C R E T~~

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 025231

1/BR

SUBJECT: Directorio Revolucionario Estudiantil (DRE, Students' Revolutionary Directorate)

The DRE was founded by a group of students at Habana University in 1954 as an instrument of opposition to the regime of President Fulgencio BATISTA. The original members of this group were also members of the Habana University Student Federation (FEU). Several leading members of the DRE were killed by Cuban authorities during and following the attack on the Presidential Palace, Habana, in March 1957. The remaining DRE leaders, as of 1958, were in exile. The DRE worked as a secret underground organization in Cuba, generally in Habana, laying plans and making preparations. The theory of the DRE was that success of the revolution depended on quick and efficient elimination of BATISTA which Fidel CASTRO's forces at that time could not achieve alone. The DRE finally turned against CASTRO on the issue of communism.

As of March 1962 the DRE was receiving $9,000 a month from the Agency for salaries of 55 assets in Miami, Florida, and $2,000 a month for overhead costs. The DRE's overseas program (AMBARB's) at that time received $12,400 a month from the Agency. Agency support to the DRE was terminated by mid-1967.

13-00000

~~SECRET~~

Julio FERNANDEZ Molino
(No crypt)
DPOB: 23 March 1934, Havana
201-752511

Subject was of interest to AMWORLD program as a radio operator in 1964. A PRQ Part I was submitted to Headquarters by JMWAVE, but there was no follow-up, and Subject was not hired. He had previously been associated clandestinely with RESCATE (anti-CASTRO) group in Cuba. He came to U.S. as exile in May 1964. In 1966, he lived at 430 SW 11th Ave., Miami.

Julio FERNANDEZ Bencomo
(No crypt)
DPOB: 10 April 1917, Havana
201-742497

Received POA 14 January 1964, which cancelled 24 February 1964, because he was not interested in employment with CIA since salary was insufficient. He signed secrecy agreement and was terminated without prejudice. He took SGSWIRL 10 January 1964. No derog, but he had told his wife and one Carlos MARQUEZ that he would be working for CIA. He was originally recruited for AMWORLD by one Pedro BLANCO, and was to be used as PM asset on a CIA vessel.

Julio FERNANDEZ Gonzalez
(AMOT-99)
DPOB: 10 May 1935, Havana
201-299222

He was employed by the Intelligence and Security Commission of the Frente Revolucionario Democratico (AMIRON/AMBRUSH) for about two months in 1961. He was brought into it by Julio PASCUAL Abril. He stated in a letter to Hernan HENRIQUEZ Lorca, anti-CASTRO Cuban in Madrid who informed the FBI (who told us in memo dated 2 November 1961) that he "was about to take a trip to Cuba to take material to anti-CASTRO elements, trip being financed by CIA." He received POA 10 May 1961 for use as member of AMOT Admin Staff. File does not say who dropped from it, but when last contacted was working for Dixie Lily Products Company (a wholesale grocery outfit) as an accountant at $50 weekly in December 1961. POA cancelled 24 July 1962.

~~SECRET~~

13-00000

Luis FERNANDEZ-ROCHA Rodriguez
(Formerly AMTOPIC-2, AMHINT-53)
DPOB: 3 May 1939, Havana
201-316766

POA granted 18 April 1962. According to file, he quit his job as Secretary General of the Directorio Revolucionario Estudiantel (DRE) in July 1964 to pursue his medical studies. He was paid his final salary payment of $425 on 1 September 1964 under the DRE project. He was to do some unwitting work for JMHOPE, Swan Island propaganda broadcasting, and WIBALDA.

There is no further indication in file that he was terminated, no quit claim, no OA or POA cancellation. However, there is no information on his use since 1964. Per document dated 7 June 1965, he was studying at University of Miami and working as switchboard operator for Cuban Catholic Children's program in Miami. According to Cuban Families Yearbook of 1974, Dr. Luis FERNANDEZ Rocha living at 6021 W. 14th Lane, Hialeah, Florida, 33012 with wife and four children. He became naturalized U.S. citizen on 15 September 1967.

Julio FERNANDEZ Travejo
(No crypt)
DPOB: 10 August 1934, Havana
201-297828

POA requested for use as PM trainee 21 March 1961. POA cancelled 4 April 1962. FBI memo dated 14 December 1961 notes that he told FBI of CIA financial support to Frente Revolucionario Democratico (FRD) and to Antonio VARONA, one of its leaders, to the tune of "Six million dollars." Subject told FBI he himself belonged to group led by Rolando MASFERRER which NOT getting CIA support. Subject visited FBI 21 November 1960 after incident in which some paramilitary trainees of MASFERRER's group on No Name Key in Florida had come to FBI's attention. That group was called "Ejercito Nacional Cubano."

~~SECRET~~

Jose Antonio LANUZA

One Jose LANUSA was a leader of the DRE, residing in Miami, Florida, in November 1963. At that time, he was providing information (does not say to whom) on the "Commandos L," an anti-CASTRO organization. Not clear whether he is identified with the following LANUZA.

Jose Antonio LANUZA
(on microfiche)
201-339258

Only information in file is that Subject is a Cuban citizen who in 1962 was living at 1705 SW 3rd Ave., Miami. He is the Subject of Inter-Source Registry No. 9518. According to a document dated 1 November 1968, "SD 10658 is terminated without prejudice by the Department of the Army, and any additional information should be referred to the Army Source Registry." A note in the file also said that there was no present contact with Subject, dated 29 October 1962.

No traces Justin MacCarthy

~~SECRET~~

13-00000

30 November 1976

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Comments on Ronald KESSLER's Article: "CIA Withheld Details of OSWALD Call," which Appeared in the Washington Post of 26 November 1976

The following comments are keyed to the attached Washington Post article, i.e., the paragraph numbers below correspond to the paragraphs as numbered in the margin of the xerox of the article:

1. COMMENT: While CIA knew that a man identifying himself as Lee OSWALD had been in touch with the Soviet Embassy by telephone on 1 October 1963, this information had no unusual significance until 22 November 1963 when President Kennedy's assassination occurred. At that time an intensive review was made by the Mexico City Station of conversation transcripts prepared on the basis of the 1 October telephone intercept. These transcripts had been reported to Headquarters and disseminated to the interested members of the intelligence community (as a former Marine, OSWALD was a Navy and FBI case, and potentially of interest to the Department of State). This review turned up "matches", i.e., similar materials intercepted on 27 and 28 September 1963. These were reported by cable to Headquarters on 23 November 1963. There is no indication in the transcripts that Lee Harvey OSWALD tried to make any "deal" with the Soviet Embassy as claimed in the Washington Post article.

Analysis based upon actual voice comparison could not be made because the tapes, in accordance with the normal practice, had been erased for re-use. The monitor was able to recall something of the voice characteristics from memory, however. He could recall the very poor Russian spoken by OSWALD, for example.

2. COMMENT: This statement is not substantiated by our files.

3. COMMENT: The information regarding the 1 October 1963 contact with the Soviet Embassy -- received in Headquarters on 9 October -- was disseminated on 10 October 1963 to the Department

of State, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Department of the Navy, and the Immigration and Naturalization Service. A copy of the 10 October 1963 dissemination was made available to the Warren Commission on 24 March 1964. (See Memorandum for J. Lee RANKIN, dated 24 March 1964, from Richard HELMS, Deputy Director for Plans; Subject: CIA Dissemination of Information on Lee Harvey OSWALD, dated 10 October 1963.) On 16 October 1963, our Chief of Station sent a memorandum to the American ambassador on the subject of Lee OSWALD's contact with the Soviet Embassy. The original of this memorandum was routed to the ambassador, the minister, the counselor for political affairs, the regional security officer. A copy was sent to the legal attache, naval attache, and the I&NS.

In April 1964, Messrs. COLEMAN, SLAWSON and WILLENS, staff representatives of the Warren Commission, visited the U.S. Embassy in Mexico City. Our Station then indicated that the three men already knew "all about" the telephone conversations OSWALD had. According to the Memorandum for the Record of 11 April 1964, the three men reviewed the product from the telephone tap operation for the days 27, 28 September and 1 October 1963 when Lee OSWALD contacted and visited the Cuban and Soviet Embassies. They made a "schedule" of OSWALD's activities as far as possible for these days from this source. Note: They were shown English translations of the product, or "take", as it was called. (HMMA 23249, 14 April 1964. This document, in a sanitized and declassified version was made available to the public under provisions of the FOIA in March 1964 as Document Number 274 and in September 1976 as Document Number 658) See following:

a. Memorandum for J. Lee RANKIN, dated 31 January 1964, from Richard HELMS, Deputy Director for Plans; Subject: Information Developed by CIA on the Activity of Lee Harvey OSWALD in Mexico City, 28 September - 3 October 1963.

b. Letter to Richard HELMS, Deputy Director for Plans, dated 10 February 1964, from J. Lee RANKIN, General Counsel.

c. Memorandum for J. Lee RANKIN, dated 19 February 1964, from Richard HELMS, Deputy Director for Plans; Subject: Information Developed by CIA on the Activity of Lee Harvey OSWALD in Mexico City, September 28 to October 3, 1963.

4. COMMENT: See comments in Paragraph 3, above.

5. COMMENT: The Agency disseminated the information concerning OSWALD's contact with the Soviet Embassy on 1 October to the Department of State, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Department of the Navy, and the Immigration and Naturalization Service on 10 October 1963. On 23 November 1963 the Agency disseminated to the FBI the transcripts of the telephone calls made on 27, 28 September, 1 October, and 3 October 1963. (The latter call, it was determined, did not pertain to OSWALD.) (See CSCI-3/778,829, dated 26 November 1963.) On 23 November 1963, the Agency disseminated to the FBI information relating to OSWALD's contacts with the Cuban and Soviet Embassies in Mexico City.

6. COMMENT: OSWALD's alleged offer of information and suggestion that the Russians pay his way to the Soviet Union does not appear in Agency transcripts of OSWALD's telephone conversations with the Cuban and Soviet Embassies.

7. COMMENT: OSWALD was in no sense "under investigation" (before 22 November 1963). None of the facts of his trip to and stay in the USSR and return to the United States, 1959-1962, were known to the Mexico Station before 10 October 1963, when the bare bones of his biography were forwarded by Headquarters to it in response to a Station cabled report of 8 October 1963 which forwarded, on a routine basis, what appeared to be a contact by an American for a visa to Cuba in transit to the USSR. It should be pointed out that the voice intercept coverage was not processed in "real time". The means of acquisition and the volume of the information precluded anything but the spot reporting of items judged by the monitor to be of more than ordinary interest. Full texts of selected items required a full transcription and full translation. One of the "triggers" that normally operated to focus and accelerate more speedy review and reporting of this kind of raw intelligence was the mention of a name. This was what occurred in the second of two conversations on 1 October with the Soviet Embassy, during which the speaker said he was "Lee OSWALD". This was the first time that the name OSWALD appeared in the intercepts and was reported by the Station to Headquarters (8 October 1963).

Had, at any time, a person telephoned the Soviet Embassy, identified himself, and offered information in exchange for a trip to the Soviet Union, it would have triggered

an immediate reaction by the monitor and the Station -- first, to identify the speaker; second, to report the information to Headquarters; and third, to step up technical and photographic surveillance.

8. COMMENT: No comment.

9. COMMENT: Tapes were not "routinely destroyed". Tapes were erased after transcription had been made and reused.

Full transcripts of calls made on 28 September 1963 and 1 October 1963 were forwarded to Headquarters on 23 November. The person who processed the transcripts was identified in the cable. There is no indication in the transcripts that OSWALD offered information or that any omissions were made which might have contained that information.

10. COMMENT: No comment.

11. COMMENT: Files do not support this statement.

12. COMMENT: Files do not support this statement.

13. COMMENT: The information "given by DURAN" is supported by her interrogations.

14. COMMENT: "OSWALD later referred in a letter to 'meetings' he had in the Soviet Embassy." Although KESSLER chooses not to give details, this statement is in reference to a letter OSWALD wrote on 9 November 1963 to the Consular Division of the Soviet Embassy in Washington. (Commission Exhibit No. 15, Vol. XVI of the Hearings before the President's Commission on the Assassination of President Kennedy.)

15. COMMENT: No additional comment.

16. COMMENT: With regard to the press statement that "CIA claimed it did not know of most of OSWALD's activities in Mexico City until after the assassination": this is true, CIA did not know of his activities, other than those revealed in the intercepts. It should be noted that after the dissemination on 10 October 1963 of the 1 October 1963 contact, no requests were received from the dissemination customers for further information or follow-up. Without some customer interest being expressed, particularly from the Navy, the FBI or the Department

of State, who had the greatest interest in OSWALD at the time, there would have been little motivation for the Station to independently pursue such a tenuous CE lead.

17. COMMENT: The discussion in this paragraph of the article rests on assumptions and allegations developed earlier in the article, followed by comments by Messrs. BELIN and SCHWEIKER, apparently based in turn on information provided them by reporters. No further comment seems relevant, beyond those comments made earlier.

18. COMMENT: Is BELIN here referring to Gilberto ALVARADO Urgate? If so, information regarding OSWALD provided by ALVARADO was passed to the Warren Commission as attachments to a memorandum for J. Lee RANKIN, dated 1 June 1964, from Richard HELMS, Deputy Director for Plans.

(See also Memorandum for J. Lee RANKIN, dated 4 June 1964, from Richard HELMS; Subject: Information Developed on the Activity of Lee Harvey OSWALD in Mexico City. This memorandum became Commission Exhibit No. 3152 contained in Vol. XXVI of Warren Commission report.)

19. COMMENT: We do not know what BELIN actually said to the reporters, when, or in response to what. We believe, however, this may be referring to BELIN's letter of 15 April 1975 to E. Henry KNOCHE of CIA. BELIN at that time was Executive Director of the Commission on CIA Activities within the United States (Rockefeller Commission). In his letter, BELIN refers to the photograph of an American male and the question whether or not this male was Lee Harvey OSWALD. He continues:

> "The CIA and the Warren Commission both determined that the picture was not of Lee Harvey OSWALD and that the picture was taken after OSWALD left Mexico City.
>
> "Although portions of this record have been released to the public, other portions have remained classified because of concerns by the CIA at the time that a release of the full picture might disclose sources and methods which the CIA felt were not in the national interest to disclose at that time. In light of the false allegations about the assassination of President Kennedy and the

false allegations of CIA involvement, I feel that it would be appropriate to reconsider whether or not the entire matter can be fully disclosed at this time."

An interim reply was forwarded on 23 April 1975 by E. Henry KNOCHE, Assistant to the Director, CIA. On 2 May 1975 a review was completed of Agency holdings regarding the photograph of the unidentified individual in Mexico City published by the Warren Commission. This review also included knowledge of OSWALD's contacts with the Cuban and Soviet Embassies obtained from telephone tap information and interrogations of Silvia DURAN, a Mexican employee of the Cuban Embassy. On 13 May 1975 two summaries of the above review, one classified and one unclassified, were forwarded to BELIN by the Agency.

Attachment:
Article

13-00000

CIA Withheld Details on Oswald Call

By Ronald Kessler
Washington Post Staff Writer

In late September, 1963—eight weeks before the assassination of President Kennedy—Lee Harvey Oswald telephoned the Soviet embassy in Mexico City and tried to make a deal.

In exchange for unspecified information, he wanted a free trip to Russia.

This conversation was intercepted and recorded by the Central Intelligence Agency at the time. But it was not then turned over to the FBI, which has responsibility for investigating possible spies, and it was not later turned over to the Warren Commission during its investigation of the assassination.

The unanswered question is why not?

The existence of the CIA telephone intercept of Oswald's conversation in Mexico City and the contents of the still-secret transcript have been verified by The Washington Post. The Post has also verified that the CIA failed to turn over the complete transcript to either the FBI or the Warren Commission.

Instead, the CIA gave the FBI in October, 1963, only a brief report saying Oswald had made contact with the Russians. It gave the Warren Commission a transcript of the taped conversation but for unexplained reasons failed to include in the transcript Oswald's offer of information and his suggestion that the Russians would want to pay his way to the Soviet Union.

The Post has also determined that the CIA, for unexplained reasons, told the Warren Commission that it learned of most of Oswald's activities in Mexico City only after the assassination. The fact is, however, that the CIA monitored and tape-recorded his conversation with both the Russian and Cuban embassies in Mexico City in the fall of 1963, before Kennedy's death.

It was the CIA's belief that the two embassies were heavily involved in the spy business and that, specifically, they were operational bases for intelligence activities directed at the United States.

So, with the full cooperation of the Mexican government, CIA wiretaps were installed on telephone lines going into both embassies.

The CIA was especially interested in U.S. citizens who made contact with the embassies.

Thus, when Oswald showed up in Mexico City in late September and telephoned the Russian embassy, his conversation was picked up from the wiretap. A transcript was made and circulated in the CIA offices in the American embassy in Mexico City.

The station chief at that time was the late Winston M. Scott, who personally reviewed all transcripts emanating from wiretaps on Soviet bloc installations.

The Oswald transcript, according to a CIA translator who worked with Scott, aroused a lot of interest.

"They usually picked up the transcripts the next day," he said. "This they wanted right away."

What that transcript contained is a matter of some dispute, and the CIA says it routinely destroyed the tape before the assassination. But some

See OSWALD, A7, Col. 1



LEE HARVEY OSWALD
... telephoned Soviet embassy

THE WASHINGTON POST
26 November 1975.

13-00000

OSWALD, From A1

people who saw the transcript or heard the tape before the assassination recall that Oswald was trying to make a deal.

One of them is David A. Phillips, a former CIA officer, who now heads the Association of Retired Intelligence Officers and is a leading defender of CIA activities. Phillips was stationed in Mexico City at the time.

The transcript revealed, Phillips recalled, that Oswald told the Soviet embassy: "I have information you would be interested in, and I know you can pay my way" to Russia.

The stenographer who typed up the transcript and the translator who prepared it had similar recollections.

"He said he had some information to tell them," the typist said in an interview in Mexico. "His main concern was getting to one of the two countries [Russia or Cuba] and he wanted them to pay for it. He said he had to meet them."

The Warren Commission later concluded the Russians and Cubans were not much impressed by Oswald. This view is supported by Sylvia Duran, a Mexican citizen who worked in the Cuban embassy at the time of Oswald's visit. She talked to Oswald on Sept. 27, 1963, and recalls the meeting in some detail.

In a joint interview in Mexico City with this reporter and Post special correspondent Marlise Simons, Duran said Oswald told her that he wanted to travel to Cuba and Russia and displayed documents to show he was a "friend" of the Cuban revolution. Among other things, he claimed to be a member of the American Communist Party.

Duran said she informed Oswald that in order to travel to Russia he would have to obtain permission from the Soviets. Oswald went off and returned later in the day to inform Duran that he had obtained the necessary permission. Duran said she called the Soviet embassy and was told Oswald's application for a visa would take three to four months to process. Informed of this, Duran said, Oswald "got really angry and red. He was gesticulating." Duran said she had to call for help from the Cuban consul who got into a shouting match with Oswald and told him to get out. Duran said she never saw him again.



SYLVIA DURAN
... recalls talk with Oswald

However, Duran's story covered only the first day of Oswald's five-day stay in Mexico City. Oswald later referred in a letter to "meetings" he had in the Soviet Embassy.

How interested the CIA was in Oswald's dealings with the two embassies is uncertain.

The translator and typist who handled the transcript of the intercepted conversation recalled that the level of interest was high. But the CIA's own actions lead to a different conclusion.

The agency waited until Oct. 10, 1963, to notify the FBI of Oswald's activities. And its teletyped report made no mention of Oswald's offer of information in exchange for a free trip to Russia or of his attempts to travel to Cuba and Russia. "On October 1, 1963," the teletype message said, "a reliable and sensitive source in Mexico reported that an American male, who identified himself as Lee Oswald, contacted the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City inquiring whether the embassy had received any news concerning a telegram which had been sent to Washington."

That was strictly a routine handling of the matter, and similar to the standard reports made to the FBI at that time on other contacts with the communists by American citizens in Mexico.

Even after Kennedy's assassination, the CIA failed to turn over to the Warren Commission the full transcript of the telephone intercept it had made in Mexico City. Oswald's offer of information to the Russians in exchange for passage was omitted from the transcript, and the CIA claimed it did not know of most of Oswald's activities in Mexico City until after the assassination.

The significance of the CIA actions is difficult to assess. The FBI in the fall of 1963 was already showing intermittent interest in Oswald and might or might not have intensified that interest if it had been told of Oswald's conversations.

Whether the new information would have affected the Warren Commission's deliberations is also an open question. The commission investigated the possibility of a foreign conspiracy and concluded there was no evidence to show Oswald acted on behalf of a foreign power.

Nevertheless, there is yet no explanation for the CIA's handling of Oswald's conversations. The CIA today refuses to comment, saying it would not be appropriate in the light of an impending investigation by the House Select Committee on Assassinations.

When asked if they could explain the agency's actions, some CIA officers stationed at the time in Mexico City said the CIA may have had a relationship with Oswald that it sought to conceal. The CIA has denied this.

David W. Belin, who was an assistant counsel to the Warren Commission and later executive director of the Rockefeller commission's probe of the CIA, said that if the Warren Commission had known of Oswald's conversations and other new information, it would have been less sure that the assassination was not part of a foreign conspiracy.

Sen. Richard S. Schweiker (R-Pa.), who led the Senate intelligence committee's probe of the assassination, said that investigation would have taken on an "entirely different direction and perspective" if the committee had been aware of Oswald's conversations.

In interviews with The Post, Belin, who documented the CIA plots against Castro in his capacity as executive director of the Rockefeller commission, revealed the CIA also did not tell the Warren Commission of a report from an alleged witness to a meeting in Mexico City between Oswald and Cuban intelligence agents.

At the time, Cuban agents coordinated their more important activities with agents of the KGB, the Soviet intelligence service.

Belin called on the CIA to make full disclosure of its knowledge of Oswald and his contacts with Cubans and Russians.

Belin, a staunch defender of the Warren Commission's conclusion that Oswald was the lone assassin who killed Kennedy, said he recognizes the CIA's concern about disclosing secret sources and intelligence techniques. But he said a greater national interest would be served by disclosing the truth.

A CIA spokesman specifically denied that the agency has a report of a meeting between Oswald and Cuban agents. "The agency is aware of only one such specific allegation, and it was debunked," the spokesman said.

THE LOS ANGELES TIMES
1 January 1977

CIA Withheld Data on Oswald

Assassinations Panel Issues Report to House

BY NORMAN KEMPSTER
Times Staff Writer

WASHINGTON—The CIA withheld from the FBI for almost two months in 1963 information that Lee Harvey Oswald had talked with Cuban and Soviet officials about his desire to visit those countries, a House committee reported Friday.

The Select Committee on Assassinations indicated in a report to the full House that its investigation of the murder of President John F. Kennedy would focus early in 1977 on a trip Oswald had made to Mexico City in October, 1963.

Chief Counsel Richard A. Sprague said that the committee staff had learned that a CIA message describing Oswald's activities in Mexico to federal agencies such as the FBI had been rewritten to eliminate any mention of his request for Cuban and Soviet visas. The message was sent in October, more than a month before the Nov. 22, 1963, assassination.

The CIA discovered Oswald's presence at the embassies through its routine surveillance of those facilities. Because Oswald had once defected to the Soviet Union, the CIA and FBI had been interested in his activities even before the Kennedy assassination.

The CIA's decision to withhold information was reversed shortly after Kennedy was killed. The agency reported Oswald's efforts to visit Cuba and the Soviet Union both to the FBI and to the Warren Commission, which concluded that Oswald was the assassin and had acted alone.

Sprague told a press conference that it was impossible without more information to know why the CIA had censored its own message.

But he said the incident raised two interesting questions: what might the other agencies have done differently if they had been more fully informed and why did the CIA decide to remove "information that was considered pertinent enough to be put in an initial draft of the message?"

There were no firm conclusions in the report, which the 12-member committee prepared after the first three months of its investigation into the murders of Kennedy and civil rights leader Dr. Martin Luther King.

Technically, the committee goes out of business Tuesday with the end of the session of Congress in which it was formed. The purpose of the year-end report was to urge the new Congress to reestablish the committee and to give it $6.5 million to pay for the first year of what could be a two-year investigation.

"In the three months since its establishment, the committee has initiated preliminary investigations into new and previously unpursued leads in both assassinations," the report said.

The committee said its staff investigators had recently questioned a former CIA agent who had "personal knowledge" of Oswald's visits to the Soviet and Cuban embassies in Mexico. As a result of that interview, the report said, staff members were sent to Mexico, where they found and questioned additional witnesses.

"These witnesses had never been sought out before by any investigative body, notwithstanding the fact that they had important information concerning statements by Lee Harvey Oswald in Mexico within 60 days of the assassination of President Kennedy," the report said.

The report said also that the committee staff had interviewed a person who asserted that he had discussed the King murder with James Earl Ray, who pleaded guilty to the crime. The unidentified witness said that Ray had told him about contacting an associate in Europe to receive further instructions. The story, which was told to reporters by a committee member several weeks ago, has not been verified.

In a letter to New York Times columnist Anthony Lewis, Ray offered this week to testify under oath at a committee hearing. But Sprague and Walter F. Fauntroy, the District of Columbia's congressional delegate and the chairman of the King subcommittee' said that no decision had been made on accepting Ray's offer.

However, Sprague indicated that it probably would be accepted.

"Any and all people who have relevant information will be interrogated," Sprague said.

In a personal statement issued in conjunction with the report, Rep. Henry B. Gonzalez (D-Tex.), who is to become committee chairman in the new year, said a thorough investigation was needed to answer hundreds of pressing questions.

Gonzalez said that the committee hoped to discover whether former FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover's now well-known animosity toward King had affected the FBI's investigation of the assassination.

However, Gonzalez said, the committee's work could go well beyond the killings of Kennedy and King.

"The committee can shed light on the larger issue of political murder and violence," Gonzalez said. "We should not forget that President Ford had his own narrow escapes; no member of the House should forget that the Capitol Building was bombed. . . ."

He said the committee's ultimate task was "to find out not just what happened but why."

13-00000

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

INSPECTOR GENERAL
76-3320

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

FROM : John H. Waller
Inspector General

SUBJECT : Washington Post Story of 13 November 1976 "Oswald Reportedly Told Cubans of Plan to Kill JFK"

1. The Post story on Saturday states that a J. Edgar Hoover memorandum reported that Lee Harvey Oswald told Cubans in advance of his plan to kill President Kennedy. The attached package was prepared by Russ Holmes of CI Staff. It is forwarded for your information.

2. A copy of the Washington Post story has been added to the package.

John H. Waller

Attachments: a/s

SDBreckinridge:js (16 Nov '76)
Distribution:
Original - Addressee w/atts
1 - IG Chrono
1 - IG Subject (Task Force File) w/atts in above file
1 - SDB Chrono
1 - Seymour Bolten w/atts
1 - John Waller w/atts
1 - Andrew Falkiewicz w/atts
1 - Dave Grinwis w/atts

1 - [illegible] 11-17-76

SECRET

13 November 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, CI Staff

FROM : Russell B. Holmes

SUBJECT : "Oswald Reportedly Told Cubans of Plan to Kill JFK" by John M. Goshko, Washington Post, 13 November 1976.

1. The memorandum "...by the late FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover saying that Lee Harvey Oswald reportedly told Cuban officials in advance of President Kennedy's assassination that he intended to kill the President" is cited in Commission Exhibit No. 3152, Volume XXVI, of the Hearings Before the President's Commission on the Assassination of President Kennedy pp. 154-157 (See Tab A). CE No. 3152 is cited in support of statements made by the Warren Commission in it's Report on pages 307-308 (see Tab B). This memorandum is based upon information which the Agency had passed to FBI Headquarters and it's representative in Mexico City.

2. On 26 November 1963, the Mexico City Station reported to Headquarters that a Nicaraguan named Gilberto ALVARADO Ugarte (referred to as "D" in the Warren Report) came to the U.S. Embassy in Mexico City. He claimed he had been in the Cuban Consulate in Mexico City on 18 September 1963 when a man he later recognized to be Lee Harvey Oswald received $6,500 in cash to kill an important person in the United States. (See Tab A for complete memorandum.)

3. The information obtained from ALVARADO was passed in Mexico City to the Legal Attache, Mr. Clark D. Anderson, by our Chief of Station on 29 November 1963 (See Tab C).

SECRET

A short dissemination (DIR 85744) alerting customs agencies to ALVARADO's allegation, was made on 29 November 1963 to the White House, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Department of State (see Tab D). A second dissemination (DIR 87667) was made on 7 December 1963 (see Tab E). (NB: In the latter dissemination, mention was made that a representative of the FBI participated in the interrogation of ALVARADO.)

4. On 13 December 1963, the Agency forwarded under CSCI 3/779, 136 a translation of the Mexican police interrogation report on Gilbarto ALVARADO Ugarte (see Tab F).

5. In summary, the Agency and the FBI knew of ALVARADO's allegations concerning Oswald, which were subsequently retracted by ALVARADO himself as being false. In addition, the FBI was able to prove that Oswald was still in New Orleans at the time ALVARADO claimed he saw Oswald in the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City. The information was forwarded to the Warren Commission by the Agency and the FBI as evidenced by its inclusion in the Warren Commission Report and accompanying exhibits.

Russell B. Holmes

13-00000

WASHINGTON POST
13 NOV '76

Oswald Reportedly Told Cubans of Plan to Kill JFK

By John M. Goshko
Washington Post Staff Writer

The Justice Department has discovered a 1964 memorandum by the late FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover saying that Lee Harvey Oswald reportedly told Cuban officials in advance of President Kennedy's assassination that he intended to kill the President.

Informed sources said yesterday that Hoover, in the memo, attributed this information to a highly reliable informant who claimed to have been told it personally by Cuban Prime Minister Fidel Castro.

Castro, according to the memo, reportedly said he had been advised by officials of the Cuban embassy in Mexico City that they had met with Oswald before the Nov. 22, 1963, assassination of Kennedy in Dallas and that Oswald informed them of his intentions.

LEE HARVEY OSWALD
...Hoover memo found

The assertions reported in the Hoover memo go further than any information currently on the record concerning alleged statements made by Oswald in a previously disclosed visit to the Cuban embassy in Mexico City prior to the murder of Kennedy.

There has been persistent surmise about a possible involvement of the Castro government in the murder of Kennedy, possibly as a counter stroke against CIA efforts to assassinate the Cuban leader.

There has also been speculation that the assassination may have been the work of Cuban-exile terrorists. However, all of these reports have been fourth-or fifth-hand accounts originating with informants of doubtful reliability.

The Hoover memo was described by the sources as having been addressed to the Warren Commission, appointed by former President Johnson to investigate the assassination. But former commission staffers said yesterday that they had no recollection of ever having

See OSWALD, A9, Col. 1

Memo Cites Informant On Oswald-Cuban Link

OSWALD, From A1

received such a memo or having been told by Hoover or other FBI officials of the information in it.

Officials of the Justice Department and the FBI refused any comment on the memo's existence or its contents, and other sources familiar with the assassination investigation said they had no knowledge of whether it actually was sent to the Warren Commission.

Those sources who told The Washington Post about the document said its existence apparently had been unknown until recently. It was discovered, the sources said, as the result of information that came to the attention of the Justice Department and that prompted Attorney General Edward H. Levi to order a search of FBI files.

After the memo was found, the sources added, Levi put a tight clamp of secrecy on the matter, and only a small number of persons in the Justice Department and FBI know about the document's existence.

As a result, the sources said, they are unable to answer such questions as why the memo apparently never reached the Warren Commission, whether the information was accurate and, if so, whether Castro was informed about Oswald's intentions before or after Kennedy was killed.

Documents released recently by the CIA under the Freedom of Information Act establish that Oswald visited Mexico City less than two months before the assassination and met there with officials of the Cuban embassy.

One of these CIA documents, dated May 5, 1964, states that prior to October, 1963, Oswald visited the Cuban embassy on two or three occasions and was in contact with three alleged Cuban intelligence agents identified as Luisa Calderon, Manuel Vegas Perez and Rogelio Rodriguez Lopez.

He also is known to have talked with an embassy official named Siliva Duran. She reportedly has said that she dealt with Oswald only about his unsuccessful attempts to obtain a visa to visit Cuba.

The sources were unable to identify the informant described in the Hoover memo as having obtained the information from Castro. Some of the sources said though that they believed "as an educated guess" that it was Rolando Cubela, a high Cuban official and Castro intimate whom the CIA recruited in 1961 and who later figured in CIA plans to kill Castro.

In the Senate intelligence committee investigation last year it was disclosed that the CIA employed a highly placed Castro government official with the cryptonym AMLASH in efforts to assassinate the Cuban leader. Cubela and AMLASH were publicly reported to have been the same man.

The sources also were unable to say how Hoover came into possession of information from an informant inside Cuba, since foreign intelligence is a CIA rather than an FBI function. Some said they thought the information had first been given to the CIA, which then turned it over to Hoover.

However, John McCone, who was CIA director at the time, said in a telephone interview yesterday that the information reportedly in the Hoover memo was "unknown to me."

"It's the first I've ever heard of it," McCone said. "It's hard for me to believe that such a memorandum existed without it being known to me and to the staff of the Warren Commission."

The same point was made by David W. Belin, who served as one of the Warren Commission's legal counsels. He said, in a telephone interview, "I have absolutely no recollection of such a memo. If such a document did exist, I'm sure that we never saw it."

Other documents that have been made public recently indicate that Hoover and top FBI officials knew—while the bureau was investigating the Kennedy assassination — that the CIA was exploring the possibility of having Castro killed. However, Hoover never informed the Warren Commission of the CIA's plotting against Castro.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date 7/17/64

Mr. ISRAEL HORWITZ was telephonically contacted in an effort to make an appointment for an interview. He was contacted at telephone number EX 4-7250. Mr. HORWITZ acknowledged that about three weeks ago he moved his business from 1108 West Lawrence, Chicago, Illinois, to 0344 North Broadway, Chicago, Illinois. He stated that his current business operates under the name Show Time.

Mr. HORWITZ acknowledged that he has been known in the music business in Chicago under the name of JACK HOWARD for many years.

Mr. HORWITZ stated that he would not discuss the matter involving JACK RUDENSTEIN as he wanted no part whatsoever of this individual. Mr. HORWITZ refused to make himself available for an interview and stated he wished he had never acknowledged having known RUDENSTEIN many years ago when RUDENSTEIN lived in Chicago. Mr. HORWITZ stated RUDENSTEIN was only a passing acquaintance of his and he knew nothing concerning him.

On 7/17/64 at Chicago, Illinois File # 44-641

by SA WILLIAM R. BRODERICK/cbw Date dictated 7/17/64

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

COMMISSION EXHIBIT No. 3151—Continued

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

4 June 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. J. Lee Rankin
General Counsel
President's Commission on the
Assassination of President Kennedy

SUBJECT: Information Developed on the Activity of Lee Harvey OSWALD in Mexico City

1. On 26 November 1963 a young Latin American, referred to herein as "D", came to the U.S. Embassy in Mexico City. He claimed he had been in the Cuban Consulate in Mexico City on 18 September 1963 when a man he later recognized to be Lee Harvey OSWALD received $6,500 in cash to kill an important person in the United States.

2. "D" described the circumstances as follows: While standing by a bathroom door about noon he saw a group of three persons conversing on a patio a few feet away. One was a tall, thin Negro with reddish hair, obviously dyed, who spoke rapidly in both Spanish and English. He had prominent cheek bones and a noticeable scar on the lower right side of his chin. The second was a white person whom the subject had seen previously in a waiting room carrying a Canadian passport. The white person had green eyes, blondish hair, with a pompadour hairdo, and dark eyeglasses. The third person allegedly was Lee Harvey OSWALD. "D" was completely convinced of this from published photos of OSWALD following the assassination. OSWALD was wearing a black sport coat, buttoned-up white shirt with short collar tabs, no tie, dark gray pants, and clear eyeglasses.

COMMISSION EXHIBIT No. 3152

He had a green passport in his pocket, wore a wrist watch with a yellow band, and appeared to have a pistol in a shoulder holster. A tall Cuban joined the group momentarily and passed American currency to the Negro. The Negro then allegedly said to OSWALD in English, "I want to kill the man." OSWALD replied, "You're not man enough, I can do it." The Negro then said in Spanish, "I can't go with you, I have a lot to do." OSWALD replied, "The people are waiting for me back there." The Negro then gave OSWALD $6,500 in large denomination U.S. bills, saying, "This isn't much." After hearing this conversation, "D" said that he telephoned the U.S. Embassy in Mexico City several times on 20 September before the assassination in an attempt to report his belief that someone important in the United States was to be killed, but was finally told by someone at the Embassy to stop wasting his time.

3. "D" was known to this Agency as a former informant of a Latin American security service. His reliability was considered questionable by U.S. authorities although he had not been wholly discredited. "D" claimed he was in Mexico City working against the Cuban Communists for his service. The service, however, has denied that he was acting on its behalf. While investigation in the United States showed that OSWALD could not possibly have been in Mexico City on 18 September (he was known to have been in New Orleans on both 17 and 19 September), intensive interrogation failed to shake "D's" story.

4. On 28 November 1963 the Mexican police interviewed him. At first "D" persisted in his story but on 30 November he admitted in a signed statement that his whole account about OSWALD was false. He admitted he had not seen Lee OSWALD at all and that he had not seen anybody paid money in the Cuban Embassy. He also admitted he had not tried repeatedly to phone a warning to the U.S. Embassy in Mexico City on 20 September as he had previously claimed. Instead he had first contacted the U.S. Embassy after the assassination. "D" said that his motive in telling this false story was to help get himself admitted into the United States so that he could participate in action against Fidel Castro. He said that he hated Castro and thought that his story about OSWALD, if believed, would help cause the United States to take action against Castro.

3. Following the above interrogation, "D" promptly retracted the confession he had made to the Mexican authorities asserting that it had been extorted from him under pressure. He was then questioned by U.S. authorities using a polygraph machine. "D" voluntarily consented to the use of this equipment. During the questioning it was pointed out to him that he was not being truthful, according to the polygraph, in identifying photographs of OSWALD as the person he saw in the Cuban Consulate. He replied that he had full faith in the polygraph, that he would not attempt to refute the results, and that he "must have been mistaken." In addition he changed his story regarding the day he visited the Cuban Consulate, finally deciding it took place on Tuesday, 17 September. It was concluded from the results of the polygraph test that "D" had fabricated his story about OSWALD in toto. "D" has since been deported by the Mexican authorities to his native country.

Richard Helms
Deputy Director for Plans

IX. ALLEGATION BY T-32

On November 25, 1963, T-32 made contact with the United States Embassy at Mexico, D. F., and advised the following:

T-32 entered Mexico illegally from Guatemala on August 29, 1963, traveled to Mexico, D. F., and subsequently made contact with a Nicaraguan communist residing in Mexico City. From this contact a plan was developed for T-32 to travel to Cuba to study guerrilla warfare tactics. He had occasion to visit the Cuban Consulate in Mexico, D. F., several different times for the purpose of obtaining travel documentation for Cuba by furnishing false identification papers as a Mexican citizen.

He stated that on September 18, 1963, he went to the Cuban Consulate, and while sitting in the waiting room saw a group of approximately eight persons enter the Consulate and the office of Cuban Consul EUSEBIO AZCUE. A person unknown to him was sitting at AZCUE's desk. A short time later, while source was standing near the door to the man's room at the Cuban Consulate, he noticed three men conversing a few feet away from him. One of them was a tall, thin Negro with reddish hair; the second was a man whom T-32 had seen previously holding a Canadian passport in the waiting room of the Cuban Consulate; and the third person was LEE HARVEY OSWALD.

Source stated that a tall Cuban joined the above group momentarily and passed some United States currency to the Negro.

The following conversation between the Negro and OSWALD was overheard by source:

Negro (in English): I want to kill the man.

OSWALD: You're not man enough. I can do it.

Negro (in Spanish): I can't go with you. I have a lot to do.

OSWALD: The people are waiting for me back there.

T-32 stated that the Negro then gave OSWALD $6,500 in United States currency of large denominations, saying: "This isn't much." Of this sum, $1,000 was for extra expenses. The Negro also gave OSWALD about 200 Mexican pesos.

In a later interview, source stated that the United States bank notes were in a small pack about one fourth of an inch thick, bound with a paper band, which the Negro broke before counting out $1,500 extra for expenses and $5,000 as "advance payment."

T-32 stated that Oswald had carried a green passport in his pocket, and he believed he saw OSWALD wearing a pistol in a shoulder holster, but he was not sure of this point. He stated that OSWALD had long shoes and a wrist watch with a yellow-metal band. According to source, OSWALD appeared to be completely at home at the Consulate and to know and to be known by Cuban Consulate personnel.

T-32 was arrested and interrogated by Mexican authorities on November 22, 1963, and a copy of the interrogation report by the Mexican authorities revealed the following:

At the outset source's story generally resembled that recorded above. He repeated to the Mexican authorities the details of the scene in which he saw the Negro, the Canadian and the American conversing together, the delivery of the money to the American by the Negro, and the conversation he overheard.

T-32 advised the interviewing Mexican officials that upon seeing the photograph of OSWALD in the newspapers following the assassination of President JOHN F. KENNEDY, he recognized OSWALD as the American he had seen at the Cuban Consulate.

An excerpt from source's statement to Mexican authorities, as translated from Spanish, is as follows:

".....spontaneously and after reconsidering he desires to state that the American to whom he referred in the body of his statement and whom he saw the 18th of September of this year in the Cuban Consulate had a certain resemblance, about sixty per cent, to LEE HARVEY OSWALD (assassin of the President of the United States). That after the assassination of President KENNEDY the witness took advantage of this fact in his favor to exploit it, furnishing versions such as those initially set forth, for the purpose of provoking an energetic reaction from the political point of view on the part of the United States of America against the government of FIDEL CASTRO RUZ and that he had no motive other than the profound hatred he feels for communism. That all his life the witness had dedicated himself to combating communism and he regrets at this moment not having accomplished his objective in the sense of causing a reaction on the part of the American Government against FIDEL CASTRO."

Because of the fact that subsequent to making the above-mentioned statement to Mexican authorities, source claimed that he had changed his statement because of fear, he was interviewed at considerable length on December 5 and 6, 1963, in Mexico, D. F.

After reiterating his story, T-32 was afforded a polygraph examination on December 6, 1963. During the course of the examination he was asked, "Is this the American you saw in the Cuban Consulate?" At the time he was shown photographs of OSWALD.

Each time he was asked this question, he definitely responded, "Yes," but it was noted that the polygraph indicated a "deception response" on these answers. These responses and those with respect to other questions led to the conclusion that T-32 was a fabricator. It was specifically pointed out to him that the polygraph indicated that he was not being truthful in identifying photographs of OSWALD as being of a person he saw in the Cuban Consulate, and he was asked for his explanation thereof.

He replied that he had full faith in the polygraph and would not attempt to refute its results. He went on to say that the only explanation he could offer was that he had seen an American in the Cuban Consulate on September 18, 1963, who resembled OSWALD, and that upon seeing the photograph of OSWALD in the newspaper, he built up within himself, either consciously or subconsciously, a complete belief that the person he had seen in the Cuban Consulate was OSWALD.

Mexico City in early September to receive money and orders for the assassination,[567] that he had been flown to a secret airfield somewhere in or near the Yucatan Peninsula,[568] that he might have made contacts in Mexico City with a Communist from the United States shortly before the assassination,[569] and that Oswald assassinated the President at the direction of a particular Cuban agent who met with him in the United States and paid him $7,000.[570] A letter was received from someone in Cuba alleging the writer had attended a meeting where the assassination had been discussed as part of a plan which would soon include the death of other non-Communist leaders in the Americas.[571] The charge was made in a Cuban expatriate publication that in a speech he delivered 5 days after the assassination, while he was under the influence of liquor, Fidel Castro made a slip of the tongue and said, "The first time Oswald was in Cuba," thereby giving away the fact that Oswald had made one or more surreptitious trips to that country.[572]

Some stories linked the assassination to anti-Castro groups who allegedly were engaged in obtaining illicit firearms in the United States, one such claim being that these groups killed the President as part of a bargain with some illicit organizations who would then supply them with firearms as payment.[573] Other rumors placed Oswald in Miami, Fla., at various times, allegedly in pro-Cuban activities there.[574] The assassination was claimed to have been carried out by Chinese Communists operating jointly with the Cubans.[575] Oswald was also alleged to have met with the Cuban Ambassador in a Mexico City restaurant and to have driven off in the Ambassador's car for a private talk.[576] Castro himself, it was alleged, 2 days after the assassination called for the files relating to Oswald's dealings with two members of the Cuban diplomatic mission in the Soviet Union; the inference drawn was that the "dealings" had occurred and had established a secret subversive relationship which continued through Oswald's life.[577] Without exception, the rumors and allegations of a conspiratorial contact were shown to be without any factual basis, in some cases the product of mistaken identification.

Illustrative of the attention given to the most serious allegations is the case of "D," a young Latin American secret agent who approached U.S. authorities in Mexico shortly after the assassination and declared that he saw Lee Harvey Oswald receiving $6,500 to kill the President. Among other details, "D" said that at about noon on September 18, waiting to conduct some business at the Cuban consulate, he saw a group of three persons conversing in a patio a few feet away. One was a tall, thin Negro with reddish hair, obviously dyed, who spoke rapidly in both Spanish and English, and another was a man he said was Lee Harvey Oswald. A tall Cuban joined the group momentarily and passed some currency to the Negro. The Negro then allegedly said to Oswald in English, "I want to kill the man." Oswald replied, "You're not man enough, I can do it." The Negro then said in Spanish, "I can't go with you, I have a lot to do." Oswald replied, "The people are waiting for me back there." The

Negro then gave Oswald $6,500 in large-denomination American bills, saying, "This isn't much." After hearing this conversation, "D" said that he telephoned the American Embassy in Mexico City several times prior to the assassination in an attempt to report his belief that someone important in the United States was to be killed, but was finally told by someone at the Embassy to stop wasting his time.

"D" and his allegations were immediately subjected to intensive investigation. His former employment as an agent for a Latin American country was confirmed, although his superiors had no knowledge of his presence in Mexico or the assignment described by "D." Four days after "D" first appeared the U.S. Government was informed by the Mexican authorities that "D" had admitted in writing that his whole narrative about Oswald was false. He said that he had never seen Oswald anyplace, and that he had not seen anybody paid money in the Cuban Embassy. He also admitted that he never tried to telephone the American Embassy in September and that his first call to the Embassy was after the assassination. "D" said that his motive in fabricating the story was to help get himself admitted into the United States so that he could there participate in action against Fidel Castro. He said that he hated Castro and hoped that the story he made up would be believed and would cause the United States to "take action" against him.

Still later, when questioned by American authorities, "D" claimed that he had been pressured into retracting his statement by the Mexican police and that the retraction, rather than his first statement, was false. A portion of the American questioning was carried on with the use of a polygraph machine, with the consent of "D." When told that the machine indicated that he was probably lying, "D" said words to the effect that he "must be mistaken." Investigation in the meantime had disclosed that the Embassy extension number "D" said he had called would not have given him the person he said he spoke to, and that no one at the Embassy—clerks, secretaries, or officers—had any recollection of his calls. In addition, Oswald spoke little, if any, Spanish. That he could have carried on the alleged conversation with the red-headed Negro in the Cuban Embassy, part of which was supposed to have been in Spanish, was therefore doubtful. "D" now said that he was uncertain as to the date when he saw "someone who looked like Oswald" at the Cuban Embassy, and upon reconsideration, he now thought it was on a Tuesday, September 17, rather than September 18. On September 17, however, Oswald visited the Louisiana State Unemployment Commission in New Orleans and also cashed a check from the Texas Employment Commission at the Winn-Dixie Store No. 1425 in New Orleans. On the basis of the retractions made by "D" when he heard the results of the polygraph examination, and on the basis of discrepancies which appeared in his story, it was concluded that "D" was lying.[578]

The investigation of the Commission has thus produced no evidence that Oswald's trip to Mexico was in any way connected with the assassination of President Kennedy, nor has it uncovered evidence that the

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29 November 1963

MEMO FROM COS MEXICO TO

MEMORANDUM TO: Mr. Clark D. Anderson, Legal Attache RE!

FROM : Winston M. Scott

SUBJECT : Gilberto Nolasco ALVARADO Ugarte

1. On the morning of 26 November an officer of this Section, accompanied by Mr. Plambeck of the Security Office, interviewed Subject in a parked car on the south edge of the city. The following statements, unless otherwise noted, are those of the Subject:

Subject was born 31 January 1940 in Ciudad Rama, Departamento Zelaya, Nicaragua. He entered Mexico by bus on 29 August 1963 on his way to Cuba to study guerrilla warfare tactics. He was to wait in Mexico until false documentation as a Mexican citizen could be arranged through the Cuban Consulate in Mexico. The real purpose behind his travel involved a penetration mission for the Nicaraguan Secret Service. His superior in Mexico City is Major Roger JEREZ, Nicaraguan Military Attache, whose office is located at Pasaje Latino, Interior 513, telephone 46-33-87, Mexico City.

On 2 September Subject reported in Mexico City to Professor Edelberto TORRES, who lives at General Zuazua, Number 37, Interior 7. TORRES is a Nicaraguan and is in charge of Nicaraguan Communist travellers to Cuba. He is a well-known Communist and has a daughter in Moscow who travelled there on false Mexican papers.

On 2 September Subject discussed anti-Somoza guerrilla activities in Departamento Atlantico, Nicaragua, with TORRES and the brothers Gustavo and Humberto Jerez Talavera. Humberto is a teacher in a Mexican female normal school. TORRES told Subject that he would receive 500 Mexican pesos monthly subsistence allowance pending the arrangement

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of his travel papers.

On 18 September Subject went to the Cuban Consulate to turn over passport photos to Consul AZCUE. While sitting in the waiting room, he saw a group of approximately 3 persons enter the Consulate and go into AZCUE's office, but he noticed that an unknown person was sitting at AZCUE's desk.

A Cuban employee of the Consulate known to Subject in alias as Juan Jose, about 40 years old, mustache, normal build, straight hair, emerged from the office and asked Subject to turn over his photographs. At this point, Subject asked to be shown the location of the men's room and was directed through a door to a passageway leading to a patio. The door of the patio opens off this passageway.

While standing by the bathroom door, Subject saw a group of 3 persons conversing on the patio a few feet away. One was a tall, thin Negro with reddish hair which appeared to be dyed. He had prominent cheekbones and a noticeable scar on his lower right side of his chin. He spoke repeatedly with a Cuban accent and also spoke some English. Another one was a white man whom Subject had previously seen holding a Canadian passport in the waiting room. This person had green eyes and dark blond hair which was arranged in a "existentialist" hairdo with a pompadour. He wore glasses of the type with a mirror-like outer surface. The third person was Lee Harvey OSWALD (Subject was completely convinced from published photos that this was OSWALD). He said there was not a shadow of doubt in his mind.

OSWALD was wearing a black sport coat, buttoned up white shirt with short collar tabs, no tie, dark gray pants and clear eyeglasses. (Subject stuck to this story that he was wearing eyeglasses despite the fact that they were not present in published photos of OSWALD.)

Subject saw a tall Cuban join the group momentarily and pass some American currency to the Negro. This unidentified Cuban man had apparently come out of AZCUE's office into the

pasio. He is described as tall, solidly built, a mulatto with curly hair, wearing a brown suit and red-striped tie. Subject estimated his age as approximately 37. Subject never saw this man after 13 September.

Subject overheard the following conversation between the Negro and OSWALD:

Negro: (in English) I want to kill the man.

OSWALD: You're not man enough. I can do it.

Negro: (in Spanish) I can't go with you. I have a lot to do.

OSWALD: The people are waiting for me back there.

The Negro then gave OSWALD 6,500 dollars in large denomination U.S. bills saying "this isn't much". Of this sum, 1,500 dollars was for extra expenses. The Negro also gave OSWALD about 200 Mexican pesos. Later the Subject saw a pretty girl believed to be a Cuban employee of the Consulate give OSWALD an "abrazo" and tell him that she was living at Calle Juarez #407 in case he wished to find her. The girl appeared to be about 20 years old and her manner reminded Subject of a prostitute. OSWALD, the Negro and the Canadian then went upstairs.

Subject left the Consulate building momentarily to buy a popsicle at the corner and saw these three persons leave by the Embassy gate near the corner of Tacubaya where they entered a parked black car, probably a Chevrolet. Subject reentered the Consulate waiting room and later was approached by the tall unidentified Cuban who came out of AZCUE's office and told Subject to return the next day at which time his fingerprints would be taken and he would complete a form for obtaining travel documents.

Subject returned to the Consulate on 19 September at about 0845 and filled out the form. He was told at this time that he would be approached by an Embassy officer to make up a story for his false Mexican papers. Many people were in the waiting room on the morning of 19 September and the door

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was finally closed to keep others from entering.

Subject was then told to contact TORRES, whereupon he went to TORRES' home but TORRES' wife, a Guatemalan, told Subject that he was at the Soviet Embassy. Subject went to the Soviet Embassy about 1130 but was not allowed to enter although he had been there on earlier occasions with TORRES. At this point, Dr. Noel JARQUIN Toledo, Nicaraguan Communist, who has been in Moscow, approached and saw Subject standing at the gate. He asked Subject why he was there and Subject said he was looking for TORRES. JARQUIN informed him that TORRES was inside. TORRES soon came out and accompanied Subject to the Cuban Consulate. TORRES entered AZCUE's office alone and later emerged telling Subject "you have nothing further to do here until I contact you." At this point, an unidentified girl entered the Consulate and greeted TORRES. TORRES replied "not now, come back tomorrow."

On the night of 19 September TORRES presided over a meeting of about 18 Nicaraguan Communists held at his home to discuss a recent guerrilla attack in the Segovia Region of Nicaragua. TORRES announced that 6 guerrillas had been killed and said that the next year would be a tough one because the U.S. policy might change and the Communist might find themselves isolated. TORRES asked Subject if he knew the Laguna de Perlas area of Nicaragua where the U.S. is training Cubans. He referred to it as "zona gringa". Subject replied that he was not acquainted with the area.

On 26 September TORRES sent Enrique CUADRA Collado, an employee of Carton Envases de Mexico, Lago de Capala 18, to tell Subject that he should go to the Cuban Consulate. Subject went to the Consulate but was told to wait because the Consul was very busy.

While waiting for the Consul, Subject saw the Canadian again. The Canadian was smoking a cigarette and wearing a Rolex wristwatch which a Consulate employee was trying to buy from him for 1,000 pesos. The Canadian refused to sell, saying

that he had purchased the watch in Mexico and was taking it home as a souvenir. The Canadian carried a camera strapped across his chest and also carried a batch of obscene photographs which he was showing to Consulate employees. The red haired Negro mentioned earlier then came in and took the Canadian upstairs. As he was leaving the waiting room, the Canadian flashed a large wad of U.S. dollars and said "I'm going. The skies are clouding up and they're waiting for me at home."

At the end of September Subject phoned the American Embassy several times to report his belief that someone important in the U.S. was to be killed. In making these calls, he used the name Jorge KYNAUT (phonetic) to protect his identity. He was asked if the call related to visa matters and he replied "no, it involved a political matter, he wished to speak with a person of confidence." His first call was screened by two females and he finally spoke to a man who took Subject's phone number (30-19-52) and said he would call back. The man never called. Subject tried repeatedly to contact the Embassy by phone but was finally told "quit wasting our time; we are working here and not playing."

When Subject saw the photograph of OSWALD in a local newspaper, he contacted the Embassy Security Office on 25 November.

2. The officers interviewed Subject on 26 November and agreed that he was a young, quite serious person who spoke with conviction. He showed that he knew enough English to understand rudimentary conversation in that language.

Subject said that he had taken training in the Panama Canal Zone when he was with the Nicaraguan Army and admitted that he was still a member of the Nicaraguan Communist Party, having originally been a convinced Marxist. Later he became disillusioned and for the past four years has worked as a penetration agent for the Nicaraguan Government. He said he expected to enter Cuba within 2 months.

Subject explained that he was outraged by the assassination of President Kennedy which he was "80 percent sure" was a

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Communist plot. He said he did not wish to become involved in any big publicity splash and hoped that his name would be kept secret, but that he would be willing to do "whatever necessary." At this time, Subject was living at Pino 173, Col. Santa Maria de la Ribera, telephone 41-07-31.

Contact arrangements were made so that he could be picked up and interrogated further.

3. On the night of 26 November he was interrogated by two officers of this Section. His story remains substantially the same as set forth above. He recognized photographs of the following Cuban Embassy personnel: Silvia DURAN, Francisco LLAGOSTERA, Orestes RUIZ, Samuel PEREZ, Rogelio RODRIGUEZ, Raul APARICIO, Rolando ESTEVA, Heberto JORRIN, Oscar CONCEPCION, Antonio GARCIA, Jose Fernandez ROA, Andres ARMONA, Joaquin HERNANDEZ Armas, "Raul", Pereguina ALONSO, Luisa CALDERON, and Alfredo MIRABAL. He did not know any of these persons by name, but was able to give partial descriptions such as duties, height, skin coloring, condition of teeth, disposition, accent, etc. He identified the photograph of Oscar CONCEPCION as the tall Cuban mentioned above and a photograph of Luisa CALDERON as the pretty girl mentioned above. He also identified Francisco LLAGOSTERA as the mustached Cuban whom he had known under alias of Juan Jose. This was the same person incidentally who was trying to buy the watch from the Canadian. Subject quickly identified the New Orleans mug shot of OSWALD which had been supplied by your office. He said that he was positive of these identifications.

4. At this interrogation, Subject said

OSWALD had carried a green passport in his pocket and Subject believes he saw OSWALD wearing a shoulder holster pistol. He did not seem to be too sure of this point. He said OSWALD wore long shoes and had a wrist watch with a yellow metal band. He illustrated OSWALD's manner of slouching in a chair at the Consulate while in the waiting room at about noon on 18 September. He said that OSWALD seemed to be completely at home and appeared to know and be known by Consulate personnel. At one point he heard OSWALD use the Mexican slang expression "Cabron",

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badly pronounced.

Subject reenacted the conversation and money passing scene described above. His account of the conversation was essentially the same as reported, except at this time he had OSWALD use the word kill in his first reply to the Negro; hence, "You're not the man. I can kill him."

He said that the U.S. bank notes were in a small pack about 1/4 inch thick bound with a paper band which the Negro broke before counting out 1,500 dollars for extra expenses and 5,000 dollars as "advance payment."

Subject said that he is still a sargeant in the Nicaraguan Civil Guard and that he entered Mexico illegally on 29 August without travel documents, paying a bribe at the border and having transited Honduras, Guatemala and El Salvador en route. He said that he had been to Mexico in 1961 on a mission for the Nicaraguan Secret Service after a contrived escape from false arrest in Nicaragua, followed by aperiod of asylum in the Mexican Embassy. He said that his training received in the Canal Zone took place in Fort Glick in March 1956 (note Subject would have only been 16 years old at that time).

Subject said that he had been to the Cuban Consulate on 2 ar 3 September, 15 or 16 September, 18 September, 19 September, 26 September and 25 November.

He admits to having visited the Soviet Embassy approximately 6 or 7 times; about 4 times with TORRES. He was somewhat fuzzy on reasons for these visits and was not pressed for detail at this session.

5. In order to keep Subject available for further interrogation, he was instructed to find other living quarters where he should register in an alias. On the following morning, 27 November, he reported that he had registered as Alberto SANCHEZ, Room 208, Hotel Necaxa. On 28 November he was arrested by Mexican police at the hotel. This office has no further contact with Subject.

DISSEMINATION OF THIS INFORMATION OUTSIDE YOUR OFFICE SHOULD BE CLEARED WITH OUR HEADQUARTERS IN WASHINGTON.

Goldman
1-P.POS
1-201-2-4-1-P.

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13 DEC 1963

TO: Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Attention: Mr. [illegible] J. Hoover

FROM: Deputy Director (Plans)

SUBJECT: Mexican Interrogation of Gilberto ALVARADO

1. Attached is a translation of the Mexican police interrogation report on Gilberto ALVARADO, Nicaraguan who claimed to have seen Lee OSWALD accept $6500 in the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City to assassinate President Kennedy. The report states that ALVARADO retracted these assertions and admitted that he made them to induce the U.S. to take stronger action against Cuba.

2. The two persons whom ALVARADO met and to whom he first told his story are undoubtedly officers of this Agency. His claim that they used FBI credentials is, of course, absolutely false. Our officers use no credentials in Mexico City.

3. As you know, ALVARADO retracted the confession of fabrication which he made to the Mexican police and had to be re-interrogated by representatives of this Agency and your Bureau. This later interrogation showed that he was probably lying.

C/CI 3/779,135

Attachment:
Translation

CH/3/[illegible] 26 Written jz
Distribution:
O&1 - Addressee, w/att
1 - RI, w/att
1 - CI/Lia w/att
1 - CI/WA w/att
1 - CI/SIG w/att
1 - CH/R w/att
1 - WH/3/MEX w/att
1 - CH/3 w/att

12 December 1963

BASIC: None

NO PROJECT

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STATEMENT OF Alberto Velasco ALVARADO Ramos

1. This person (ALVARADO) said that he was 24 years old, unmarried, a Catholic, a chauffeur, who came from Ciudad Dario, Department of Colaya, Republic of Nicaragua, and who lives at Calle Pino No. 173 in this capital (Mexico City).

2. He indicated that on August 29 of this year he entered Mexico illegally, bribing an employee of the Migration Office in Ciudad Cuauhtemoc, Chiapas, Mexico, for 250 pesos. He added that he was repudiating communism and for that reason the object of his coming to Mexico was to try to infiltrate the groups of that affiliation, for the most part Cuban groups, with the ultimate purpose of passing information to Mayor Roger [redacted] Alfaro, Military Attache of the Nicaraguan Embassy in Mexico with whom he has been collaborating for three years and who pays him 400 pesos a month for his expenses. The information that he gathers he passes to said Military Attache or he sends it directly to General Gustavo [redacted], Chief of the Intelligence Service of the Nicaraguan Army, with residence in Managua.

3. ALVARADO said that by pretending to be a communist, and through Professor Edelberto [redacted], well-known Nicaraguan communist, he met an individual by the name of Carlos Jose, an important employee of the Cuban Embassy. The meeting occurred last September 3 or 4. The pretext of the meeting was that ALVARADO wanted to go to Cuba, and for that reason he told Carlos Jose that he was a good communist. On the 10th or 12th of the same month, an employee of the Cuban Embassy had him fill out a questionnaire and asked him for three photographs, which he has not given her as yet.

4. In the same manner he indicated that using various pretexts he continued to frequent the Cuban Embassy trying to obtain information to send to Mayor [redacted] or to General [redacted]. On one occasion they told him in the Embassy that in order to enable him to remain in the country (Cuba), they were going to have a lawyer get for him a passport, birth certificate, and certificate of military service as a Mexican and in that way he would travel to Cuba.

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5. He added that on 13 September at about 11:00 a.m. he was in the waiting room of the lobby of the Cuban Consulate (sic) and he observed a North American of 1 meter 75 centimeters in height, medium build, but rather thin, wearing gray trousers, black sport coat, white shirt, a Texas-style cord tie and brown shoes. He noticed the individual because he was very fair skinned, and looking, and had very dark sunken eyes. The man looked to him like a drug addict. He also noticed that this man's hair was, for the most part, dark, but was streaked with blond. He estimated that the man was about 25 years old. ALVARADO said that from the lobby one can see the street and he saw that opposite the Consulate a taxi pulled up carrying two people: one a negro, tall, of about 1 meter 82 centimeters tall, a thin man, but strong, with bulging eyes, high cheek bones, thick lips, reddish, kinky hair, and wearing a brown suit. The other was white, a young man of about 20, rather beatnik-looking, arrogant-looking, and wearing dark trousers and a light blue coat. He was about 1 meter 70 centimeters in height, of rather robust build. ALVARADO noticed that he carried in his hand a red passport, a passport which from the color he judged to be Canadian. When these two individuals arrived, the North American got up from his seat and greeted them and the three of them went into the Consulate together.

6. After 15 minutes, ALVARADO crossed the waiting room of the Consulate to go to the rest room, and on descending the stairs, he saw a very powerful looking individual, dark in color, tall, wearing white rimmed glasses. The man worked in the Cuban Embassy, because ALVARADO had seen him there before. He saw him give the red haired Negro a package which appeared to contain money. Upon coming out of the rest room, he saw that in a hall the Negro, the Canadian and the North American were having a heated conversation. He noticed that the Negro had a very visible scar on the right side of his chin and that he was counting money and giving it to the North American. ALVARADO heard them counting to the sum of $6500. ALVARADO went back toward the rest room and noticed that the North American and the Canadian were shoulder holsters like gangsters use, and he heard the Negro say to the North American, "I can go with you." The North American answered, "You are not a man," and added, "I can do it. I can kill him." ALVARADO left, and on returning to the lobby, noticed that the North American and the Canadian were again entering the office of the Consul but they stopped a few moments to talk with an employee of the Consulate who looked like a prostitute and whose name was Maria Luisa.

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7. ALVARADO said after that he went out to buy an ice cream stick, and while doing this he saw the Negro, the North American and the Canadian leave the offices and get into a black, late-model automobile, which appeared to be a Chevrolet. ALVARADO said he thought that a crime was in the making and it occurred to him to inform the United States Embassy but it did not occur to him to go to the Mexican officials. On 20 September he telephoned the American Embassy, but because he did not present himself in person, they paid no attention to him in spite of the fact that he said that the matter was confidential and that he wanted to talk to a high official. He did not go to the American Embassy for fear of being seen by the G-2 or Cuban spies, and so for the present he forgot the incident. ALVARADO said that he read in the newspapers about the death of the President of the United States and that on seeing the photograph of the assassin he recognized him as the North American whom he had seen in the Cuban Consulate. He therefore again called the American Embassy and succeeded in speaking to a high official with whom he made an appointment for that same day at 5:30 p.m. near the Hotel Maria Isabel. This occurred on 25 September.

8. Two individuals appeared for the appointment. They identified themselves and had the credentials of FBI agents. He told them about the above facts and they made another appointment for 9:15 the next morning in the restaurant, Jena, located on the Avenida Morelos and the Paseo de la Reforma. The two men he met the day before, arrived for the second appointment along with another man whose name was Rodolfo CAVALLOS. With these three men he went to the cafeteria of the Hotel Francis after which they drove up and down a few streets in an automobile. He again told them what he had observed in the Cuban Consulate and they gave him a 100 peso bill and told him they would call him at the number 41-07-31, which is the number of the place where ALVARADO lives. They called him that same day at 8:45 p.m. and told him to meet them 30 minutes later in front of the Monument to Juarez. They met him there at the appointed time.

9. CAVALLOS and ALVARADO went in a peso cab to the corner of the Hotel Maria Isabel where another American was waiting for them, and together they crossed the street and went to an apartment in a building located on the corner of Oxford and Reforma. Once there, he again related the incidents and in an album of photographs identified the person who gave money to the Negro, to the

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Consul MIRANDA, to Maria Luisa, an another employee of the Cuban Embassy as well as to other persons who have been seen in the diplomatic mission.

10. After this, the man gave ALVARADO 500 pesos, told him to move to a hotel, and to tell them to which hotel he was moving. This ALVARADO did the following day, 27 September. He gave ~~ALVARADO~~ a card with the information they wanted, but to date these men have not recontacted him. After making the above statements, ALVARADO indicated the following:

a. That spontaneously, and after reconsideration, he desires to state that the North American to whom he had referred in the body of his statement and whom he saw on 18 September of this year in the Cuban Consulate looked like, and he was 60% sure that he looked like, Lee Harvey OSWALD, the assassin of the President of the United States.

b. That after the assassination of President Kennedy, ALVARADO took advantage of these occurrences, giving versions such as the above one, for the purpose of provoking a strong reaction in favor of the United States against the government of Fidel CASTRO Ruz.

c. That he had no other motive than the deep hatred which he feels for communism, and has throughout his life dedicated himself to combatting communism.

d. That he regrets not having achieved his objective of causing a reaction on the part of the United States government against that of CASTRO.

e. That the telephone conversation which he referred to above in his statement, was not made on 12 September as he said, but rather after the death of President Kennedy, on 25 September. This call was made to the number ~~56-36-30~~, which is the number of the American Embassy. From this number he was connected with extension 181 in order to relate the incidents already mentioned.

~~SECRET~~
SECURITY

13-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ORIG : John M. Whitten
UNIT : C/WH/3
EXT : 5613
D. : 29 Nov 1963

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

12-62 ROUTING

1		4	
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3		6	

TO : WHITE HOUSE ATTN: MR. MCGEORGE BUNDY
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
DEPARTMENT OF STATE ATTN: MR. U. ALEXIS JOHNSON
FROM: DIRECTOR

29 Nov 63 19 15 z

CONF: C/WH 4

DCI, D/DCI, DDP, C/CI 2, VR

SIG CEN
DEFERRED
ROUTINE
IMMEDIATE

TO INFO CITE DIR 85744

THE FIRST VERY SKETCHY REPORT ON THE PROGRESS OF THE MEXICAN OFFICIAL INTERROGATION OF GILBERTO ALVARADO, NICARAGUAN WHOM HAS CLAIMED HE SAW LEE OSWALD RECEIVE 6500 DOLLARS IN THE CUBAN EMBASSY IN MEXICO CITY ON 18 SEPTEMBER 1963, SHOWS HE IS TELLING ESSENTIALLY THE SAME STORY. ONE DIFFERENCE IS THAT HE FAILED TO RECOGNIZE A PHOTOGRAPH OF SILVIA DURAN AS AN EMPLOYEE OF THE CUBAN EMBASSY, WHEREAS HE DID SO RECOGNIZE HER WHEN INTERROGATED PREVIOUSLY BY CIA PERSONNEL. THE MEXICAN OFFICIAL DOING THE INTERROGATION OF ALVARADO SAYS HE "DOUBTS" ALVARADO'S STORY AND WILL BEGIN WORK TO "BREAK" HIM. THIS INFORMATION WAS RECEIVED IN MEXICO CITY AT 1330 HOURS WASHINGTON TIME 29 NOVEMBER 1963.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: * DISSEMINATION APPLICABLE TO RYBAT GPFLOOR CABLES.

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW
CONDUCTED ON 24 MAY 1976
E IMPDET CL BY 012208

Document Number 221-645
for FOIA Review on APR 1976

CS COPY

201-289248

John M. Whitten
by authority of
RICHARD HELMS
DDP

D: 200-5-41

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

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AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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C/WH 3

5623

7 DECEMBER 1963

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

~~SECRET~~

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DISSEM TO
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION RE: OSWALD

7 DEC 63 17:15Z

FROM: ~~DIRECTOR~~ CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

INFO: C/WH 4

SIG CEN

☐ DEFERRED
☐ ROUTINE
☐ PRIORITY

TO: DCI, DD/DCI, DDP, C/CI, C/CI/SI, VR

INFO

CITE DIR 87657

SUBJECT: LEE HARVEY OSWALD CASE

THE RE-INTERROGATION OF GILBERTO ALVARADO, NICARAGUAN INFORMANT WHO CLAIMED TO HAVE SEEN LEE OSWALD RECEIVE MONEY TO ASSASSINATE KENNEDY, HAS BEEN CONCLUDED. OUR MEXICO CITY STATION ADVISES US THAT ALVARADO ADMITTED HE MUST HAVE BEEN MISTAKEN IN SAYING THAT HE SAW OSWALD IN THE CUBAN EMBASSY. ALSO, HE WAS UNCERTAIN OF THE DATE ON WHICH HE MIGHT HAVE SEEN SOMEONE LIKE OSWALD AND THOUGHT IT MUST HAVE BEEN ON A TUESDAY, WHICH WOULD HAVE MADE IT 17 SEPTEMBER 1963. ALTHOUGH THE FINAL REPORT OF THE POLYGRAPH INTERVIEW IS NOT YET AVAILABLE, THE PRELIMINARY FINDING IS THAT ALVARADO EVIDENCED DECEPTION REACTIONS WHEN TALKING ABOUT OSWALD.

IT IS EXPECTED THAT ALVARADO WILL BE DEPORTED TO NICARAGUA ON 9 DECEMBER 1963.

A REPRESENTATIVE OF YOUR BUREAU PARTICIPATED IN THE INTERROGATION OF ENRIQUE ALVARADO.

END OF MESSAGE

Document Number 349-717
for FOIA Review on MAY 1976

C/S COMMENT: *DISSEMINATION APPLICABLE TO RYBAT GPFLOOR CABLES

26

by authority of
RICHARD HELMS
DDP
RELEASING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW
CONDUCTED ON 24 MAY 1976
E IMPDET CL BY 012208

COORDINATING OFFICERS

~~SECRET~~

241-289248
ABSTRACT X INDEX
DATE 7 Dec 63

Group 1
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AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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Copy No.

1 of 2

13-00000

~~SECRET~~

INSPECTOR GENERAL
76-2682

9 AUG 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

FROM : Raymond A. Warren
Chief, Latin America Division

VIA : Deputy Director for Operations

SUBJECT : Citations from Robert Dietz Morrow's Book, "Betrayal" in "Midnight," a Weekly Tabloid, entitled, "How CIA Plot to Kill Castro Backfired"

REFERENCE : Memorandum for DCI from C/LA, Subject: "Possible Accusations Against the CIA," Dated 31 July 1976

1. Attached is a copy of Subject article from the 2 August 1976 edition of the tabloid "Midnight."

2. Also attached is a copy of a 24 March 1976 memorandum for the Deputy Director for Administration from the Director of Security relative to Robert Dietz Morrow. This memo indicates that Mr. Morrow was granted a Secret contract clearance in September 1962 for use by the Office of Communications which contracted with Morrow Products, Baltimore, Maryland, to produce an adapter which would greatly reduce interference on radio receivers. The adapter was delivered in February 1963 and found to be worthless and the contract was terminated. Subsequently, Morrow became involved with Mario GARCIA Kohly and made the plates from which Kohly produced counterfeit Cuban pesos. Morrow and his wife, Cecily, were arrested along with Kohly by the Secret Service on 1 October 1963. At that time Morrow told the Secret Service that he had become associated with a "certain agent" after building a device which he demonstrated to CIA.

WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES
AND METHODS INVOLVED

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 9560

~~SECRET~~

3. To our knowledge the allegations in Subject article have no basis in fact nor did we have any relationship with Jack Ruby, Clay Shaw or Lee Harvey Oswald.

Signed
Raymond A. Warren

Raymond A. Warren

2 Attachments, a/s

cc: DDCI

CONCUR:

George T. Kalaris

Chief, Counterintelligence Staff

2 AUG 1976

Date

Theodore G. Shackley
for

Deputy Director for Operations

3 AUG 1976

Date

13-00000

Approved For Release 2001/08/27 : CIA-RDP80B01676R003100020001-3

2 4 MAR 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Administration

FROM : Robert W. Gambino
Director of Security

SUBJECT : Morrow, Robert Dietz

1. This memorandum is for your information only.

2. Mr. Angus M. Thuermer, Assistant to the DCI, has advised that Mr. Fred Blumenthal of Parade magazine had telephonically contacted him and said that a Robert D. Morrow had written a book entitled Betrayed, which was due for publication in May 1976. Mr. Blumenthal advised that he is currently reviewing this book, and that it contains some critical comments concerning the Agency, e.g. the Agency was responsible for the assassination of President John F. Kennedy. Mr. Blumenthal also stated that Mr. Morrow claims to have been a CIA contract man. Mr. Blumenthal desired to verify Mr. Morrow's claimed association with the Agency, and Mr. Thuermer requested that this Office review its files to ascertain whether Mr. Morrow was in fact associated with the Agency, and if so, what information could be passed to Mr. Blumenthal.

3. The Office of Security does have a file on Robert Dietz Morrow, born 20 January 1928 at Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. Mr. Morrow, as of June 1962, was President of Morrow Products, Inc., located in Baltimore, Maryland, and the Security Staff of the Office of Logistics was granted a Secret contract clearance for use by the Office of Communications on 10 September 1962. The Agency then entered into a contract with Morrow Products, Inc., to produce a prototype of an adapter to be used with a radio receiver which purportedly would greatly reduce interference. A model of the adapter was delivered to the Office of Communications in February 1963, but the device was found to be worthless and the contract was terminated.

OS 6 1232

Approved For Release 2001/08/27 : CIA-RDP80B01676R003100020001-3

4. Subsequently, on 1 October 1963, the U. S. Secret Service arrested a Cuban exile leader, Mario Garcia Kohly, Sr., Mr. Morrow and his wife, Cecily, in connection with a plot to flood Cuba with $50,000,000 in counterfeit pesos to depress the Castro economy. Mr. Kohly was the leader of this scheme, while Mr. Morrow and his wife were charged with making the plates for the counterfeit bills. Mr. Morrow, when interrogated by the U. S. Secret Service, advised that Mr. Kohly supplied him with a counterfeit 20 pesos bill which Mr. Kohly said was offered for sale to him from agents of the CIA in Miami. Mr. Morrow also stated that he had become associated with a "certain agent" after building a device which he demonstrated to this agency. The Secret Service was advised in 1963 that the Agency did not have any interest in Mr. Kohly.

5. There is no information in this file verifying Mr. Kohly's allegation that he had obtained the counterfeit bill from agents of the CIA.

6. Mr. Thuermer has been advised that he may tell Mr. Blumenthal that the Agency entered into a contract with Morrow Products, Inc., in September 1962 whereby Mr. Morrow was to develop a piece of equipment, but that the contract was terminated in April 1963 after the prototype of the equipment had been tested and found to be unsatisfactory.

Robert W. Gambino

Distribution:
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13-00000

31 JUL 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

FROM : Raymond A. Warren
Chief, Latin America Division

VIA : Deputy Director for Operations

SUBJECT : Possible Accusations Against the CIA

1. On 30 July 1976 at 1630 hours, Latin America Division was advised by Mr. Tom White of the Office of Legislative Counsel that he had just talked on the phone to a staff aide of Representative Thomas Downing, Democrat of Virginia. The staff aide told White that Representative Downing had just received information from a Mr. Robert Morrow, author of a recent book (Betrayal) on the John F. Kennedy assassination. Morrow provided this alleged information to the Los Angeles Times, New York Times, a Richmond newspaper (Times or Newsleader, perhaps), and others. According to this information, which the staff aide said is to appear in the New York Times on Sunday, 1 August:

a. President Richard Nixon promised a Mr. Mario GARCIA Kohly that if an invasion of Cuba were successful; Nixon would arrange that all Cuban leftists outside Cuba would be killed. The implication was that these killings would be carried out by the CIA.

b. British overflights from the Bahamas showed that there were Soviet missiles in Cuba as early as 1960, and they were not removed until 1964. President Kennedy knew of this information, but withheld it from the public.

2. The staff aide said that Representative Downing plans to call a press conference on Monday, 2 August, to disclose the above information, but not necessarily to attest to its accuracy.

E2 IMPDET
CL BY [illegible]

WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES
AND METHODS INVOLVED

3. According to CIA records, Mario GARCIA Kohly was born on 10 July 1911 in Havana. He is a former Cuban businessman and the son of a former Cuban Ambassador to Spain. Since 1960 he has attempted to gain official U.S. Government support, and the support of foreign governments, for various grandiose schemes to overthrow Fidel Castro. In pursuit of this goal, he has used numerous high-level government contacts in an effort to associate himself with the CIA. In April 1964 Garcia was sentenced to one year in prison for forging Cuban currency to introduce into Cuba to depress the economy. He claimed he did this with the knowledge of the CIA and the U.S. Government. CIA denied any knowledge of Garcia. This Agency has had no operational relationship with Garcia.

/s/ George V. Lauder
for
Raymond A. Warren

cc: DDCI

CONCUR:

William E. Colby
Deputy Director for Operations

30 JUL 1973
Date

How CIA Plot To Kill Castro Backfired

By HARRY ALTSHULER
MIDNIGHT Staff Writer

The CIA and Fidel Castro were both betting on the same agent — and Castro won.

The CIA plotted to murder Castro by using a Cuban agent code-named Am/Lash, who agreed to lead a coup to overturn the Castro government.

But Am/Lash was a double agent. A longtime faithful pal of Castro, named Rolando Cubelo, he took the CIA's money — and spilled its plans into Castro's ear.

In angry retaliation, Castro set up the assassination of President John F. Kennedy.

That is the story — already long-known in some Washington circles — behind the reopening of the file on JFK's murder.

But the truth may be even more complex. Now a former CIA operative, Robert D. Morrow, has spilled a dozen years of secrets into a confessional book, "Betrayal," published by the Henry Regnery Co., Chicago.

Lee Harvey Oswald was not the assassin, Morrow asserts.

Oswald was just the chump set up to take the blame, while the real killers escaped.

According to Morrow, Oswald was a small-time CIA employee, working under orders. He had no idea what it was all about or where his own actions fitted into the picture.

CIA blamed Kennedy for Bay Of Pigs failure.

JOHNSON refused to spill any details.

'Kennedy Was Trying To Get Castro, But Castro Got To Him First' —LBJ



ROLANDO CUBELO, almost a Castro lookalike with the beard and cigar, wore his arm in a sling as a result of wounds he received in the Presidential Palace takeover in Havana on Castro's behalf.

ROBERT MORROW, former CIA man, holds Mannlicher rifle he was ordered to buy before the assassination. Three men fired at JFK he claims.

A group inside the CIA itself, working closely with disgruntled Cuban exiles, plotted the assassination, says Morrow.

Oswald's boss was another CIA employee, Jack Ruby. Ruby knew the scope of the plot and wanted no part of it. But Ruby had a racket of his own on the side, drug-running from Cuba. It made him vulnerable to blackmail.

Ruby was the Dallas nightclub operator who walked up to Oswald and, as the nation watched on TV, shot him at close range. Ruby too is now dead, but his claim was he performed the act out of love for the dead President. Morrow says this is the truth about Ruby:

He was ordered to liquidate Oswald, to keep his mouth shut, and threatened with a jail sentence on a drug charge if he hesitated.

What did the CIA cabal have against JFK? Morrow explains the CIA group and its Cuban exile friends blamed Kennedy for the Bay of Pigs invasion failure. And they charged him with playing politics in the Cuban missile crisis.

"If our President and his brother sit on the missile information, he won't live through his first term," Morrow heard from an insider.

The CIA-Cuban exile plotters regarded JFK as a traitor. They felt he wasn't ready enough to battle Castro, whom they saw as a deadly menace to the U.S.

Their first plan was to ruin Castro by counterfeiting Cuban currency to smash the economy. They were running their counterfeiting operation with U.S. government funds and salaries, but naturally they had to keep it dark from the White House.

Their secrecy succeeded too well — for the Secret Service broke in and arrested them as ordinary counterfeiters. Morow himself was handed a two-year sentence, suspended, in connection with the scheme.

The insiders felt the White House had interfered with their last hope — short of violence — of breaking Castro.

"If we can't get Castro because of the President, we'll get the President first, so we can get at Castro," one of them warned Morrow.

The kingpin of the group, his book says, was Clay Shaw, now dead, a New Orleans businessman who was a power in the CIA. Morrow quotes him as declaring: **"The assassination of a President may seem a monstrous act, but not if the alternative is an America under communist rule..."**

Long afterward, Shaw was indicted on a conspiracy charge, and acquitted as innocent.

But meanwhile, as Morrow tells it, the plot went ahead. Oswald was picked as the fall guy, to be fed to the police while the men who actually fired the shots in Dallas that Nov. 22 got away.

This part of the story fits in with recent Senate Intelligence Committee revelations of two Cuba-connected fugitives following the assassination. One fled Texas for Mexico the same day, and a Cuba-bound airliner was held back till he scrambled aboard.

The other reached Mexico the following day, and was immediately flown out to Cuba on an airliner with no other passengers.

According to Morrow, these were the men with Mannlicher rifles similar to the one Oswald owned, who fired at the President from hidden vantage points. The explanation that there was more than one man firing accounts for the puzzling profusion of wounds.

If the truth was known or suspected in Washington, why has it been so long coming into the open?

Current talk in the nation's capital is that the first ones to realize Castro's involvement had a terrible fear that if he were openly accused, it would lead to a confrontation with his backer, Russia — possibly the nuclear holocaust the whole world dreaded.

So they kept quiet — even the man in the White House, Lyndon B. Johnson.

News commentator Howard K. Smith has now revealed a confidential conversation with Johnson, long ago.

"I'll tell you something about Kennedy's murder that will rock you," Johnson confided. **"Kennedy was trying to get Castro, but Castro got to him first."**

Smith admits, "I was rocked all right. I begged for details, but he refused, saying it will all come out some day."

True enough, there have been rumors for years, in MIDNIGHT and elsewhere, despite the massive efforts to bury investigation under the Warren Report.

The CIA and the FBI were naturally reluctant to let the world find out they had been booby-trapped by a double agent.

They didn't even want to think about the truth — that it was the CIA plotting against Castro that led to the death of the American President.

That was why the CIA and the FBI kept secrets from the Warren Commission and even failed to follow up leads for fear of what they might learn.



ROLANDO CUBELO, left; Cuban Police Chief, Efigenio Amejeiras; Fidel Castro; and Havana University President Juan Marinello, in the early days of the Castro victory.

13-00000

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 2

Document Contradicts Testimony

CIA Viewed Oswald As Information Source

Associated Press

Contrary to sworn testimony, the CIA once considered using presidential assassin Lee Harvey Oswald as a source of intelligence information about the Soviet Union, according to a newly released CIA document.

In sworn testimony before the Warren Commission, former CIA Director Richard Helms said the agency never had "or even contemplated" any contacts with Oswald.

The newly released document, written by an unidentified CIA officer three days after President John F. Kennedy was killed in Dallas on Nov. 22, 1963, says that "we showed intelligence interest" in Oswald and "discussed . . . the laying on of interviews."

The unidentified officer added that "I do not know what action developed thereafter."

THE MEMO WAS AMONG hundreds of pages of documents from the CIA's file on Lee Harvey Oswald. The material was released to The Associated Press yesterday under the Freedom of Information Act.

A second document reveals that former CIA Director Allen Dulles, while serving as a member of the Warren Commission, privately counseled CIA officials on the best way to answer questions from the commission about allegations that Oswald was a CIA agent.

Dulles "thought language which made it clear that Lee Harvey Oswald was never an employe or agent of CIA would suffice," an unidentified CIA officer wrote Helms in April 1964.

"I agree with him that a carefully phrased denial of the charges of involvement with Oswald seemed most appropriate," the unidentified officer added.

When he appeared before the commission in May 1964, Helms, then head of the agency's clandestine services, testified under oath that "there's no material in the Central Intelligence Agency, either in the records or in the mind of any of the individuals that there was any contact had or even comtemplated with" Oswald.

THE NOV. 25, 1963, memo explains that the agency's interest in Oswald as a potential intelligence source was due to his "unusual behavior in the USSR," to which he had defected in 1959.

"We were particularly interested in the (deleted) Oswald might provide on the Minsk factory in which he had been employed, on certain sections of the city itself, and of course we thought the usual (deleted) that might help develop (deleted) personality dossiers," the memo states.

The memo indicates that Oswald was also of interest to the CIA because of concern that his Russian-born wife, Marina, might have been part of a trend for Soviet women to marry foreigners, leave the country and settle overseas where they could serve as spies.

THE MEMO ABOUT the agency's interest in Oswald said the discussions about Oswald occurred "sometime in summer 1960." The author continued: "I don't recall if this was discussed while Oswald and his family were en route to our country or if it was after their arrival."

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MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR	DATE-TIME GROUP	CITE	MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER
STAFF	020046Z	DIRECTOR	922297

CONF: C/SS3 INFO: FILE DCI, D/DCI, ODO3, CS/RF, C/NE6, DDO/DO, C/PS/EG2

☐ INDEX DISSEM BY: 45
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TO: IMMEDIATE TEHRAN. Y 17

UNINTEL RYBAT

1. AP WIRE STORY IN WASHINGTON STAR ON FOIA RELEASE OF OSWALD'S MATERIAL MAKES FOLLOWING STATEMENT OF WHICH YOU SHOULD BE AWARE. [redacted] 45

[redacted]

QUOTE: IN SWORN TESTIMONY BEFORE THE WARREN COMMISSION, RICHARD HELMS, THEN A BRANCH CHIEF AND LATER CIA'S DIRECTOR, SAID THE AGENCY NEVER HAD OR EVEN CONTEMPLATED ANY CONTACTS WITH OSWALD... NEWLY RELEASED DOCUMENT, SAYS WE SHOWED INTELLIGENCE INTEREST IN OSWALD AND DISCUSSES... THE LAYING ON OF INTERVIEWS. END QUOTE. Y

2. ABOVE MISCONSTRUED FROM SANITIZED MATERIAL [redacted] RELEASED UNDER FOIA, WRITTEN BY FORMER OFFICER WHO WAS INTERESTED IN POSSIBLE USEFUL INFORMATION OSWALD MIGHT HAVE IN CONTEXT OF SOVIET REALITIES. IN RESPONSE TO DCI CALL TO ALL HANDS TO RECORD WHATEVER THEY THOUGHT MIGHT BE RELEVANT TO WARREN COMMISSION INTERESTS, OFFICER WROTE THIS MEMO [redacted]. THE MEMO [redacted] DOES RECORD BRANCH LEVEL DISCUSSION BUT STATES THAT WRITER DOES NOT KNOW WHAT ACTION WAS TAKEN. E-2, IMPDET.H

DATE: 1 OCT 76
ORIG: CHAS.BRIGGS:DCM
UNIT: C/ISS
EXT: 1596

CHRONO

DDO W. W. Wells

RELEASING OFFICER COORDINATING OFFICERS

THEODORE G. SHACKLEY, ADDO
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION

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~~SECRET~~

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 053990

13-00000

INSPECTOR GENERAL
76-3086

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

FROM : John H. Waller
Inspector General

SUBJECT : Washington Star Story, 1 October 1976

1. This is for your information only.

2. On 1 October 1976 the Washington Star published a news story with an Associated Press credit line, headlined CIA Viewed Oswald As Information Source (copy attached). The lead stated:

> Contrary to sworn testimony, the CIA once considered using presidential assassin Lee Harvey Oswald as a source of intelligence information about the Soviet Union, according to a newly released CIA document.
>
> In sworn testimony before the Warren Commission, former CIA Director Richard Helms said the Agency never had "or even contemplated" any contacts with Oswald.

The news story, in another section, made the following statement:

> The November 25, 1963, memo explained that the Agency's interest in Oswald as a potential intelligence source was due to his "unusual behavior in the USSR," to which he had defected in 1959.

13-00000

[redacted]

3. There was such a memorandum, written by a case officer then stationed in Paris, recently released under FOIA. Writing three days after President Kennedy's assassination, this case officer recalled that there had been interest in Oswald.

> As soon as I had heard Oswald's name, I recalled that as Chief of the 6 Branch I had discussed -- sometime in the summer of 1960 -- with the then Chief and Deputy Chief of the 6 Research Section the laying on of interview (s) through KUJUMP or other suitable channels . . .
>
> I remember that Oswald's unusual behavior in the USSR had struck me from the moment I had read the first ODACID dispatch on him, and I told my subordinates something amounting to "Don't push too hard to get the information we need, because this individual looks odd."
>
> . . . . I do not know what action developed thereafter . . . .

4. The Helms testimony before the Warren Commission on this subject was as follows:

> Mr. Helms. On Mr. McCone's behalf, I had all our records searched to see if there had been any contacts at any time prior to President Kennedy's assassination by anyone in the Central Intelligence Agency with Lee Harvey Oswald. We checked our card files and our personal files and all our records.
>
> Now this check turned out to be negative. In addition I got in touch with those officers who were in positions of responsibility at the times in question to see if anybody had any recollection of any contact having even been suggested with this man. This also turned out to be negative, so there is no material in the Central Intelligence Agency, either in the records or in the mind of any of the individuals, that there was any contact had or even contemplated with him.

[redacted]

13-00000

[illegible] ONLY

5. Mr. Helms did state exactly the words quoted in the news story -- "or even contemplated." But the context of those words was what was reported to him as the result of a search of records and memories. To this day those familiar with the extensive Oswald records state that there is no reflection in those records that anyone even undertook to propose or approve a contact with Oswald. It would have been natural to do so, but apparently any such thoughts did not progress to formal action. From the memorandum quoted, it is apparent that someone at Branch level did think about it, even if nothing ever came of it. This hardly constitutes a responsible or official or serious "contemplation" of the idea. Mr. Helms' full statement on this point seems literally correct in the full context of his statement, although more refined qualifications might have reiterated the basis for his conclusions. The news story is misleading on this point.

6. The news story statement that Oswald was considered due to his "unusual behavior in the USSR," is exactly the opposite of the statements of the quoted memorandum, which reported the care that should be used if Oswald were approached, because of his strange conduct.

7. The statement in the news story about Mr. Dulles consulting with Agency personnel on how to answer questions is basically true. The interpretation to be placed on this counselling will depend on the interpreter. The inference of the news story is that Mr. Dulles was counselling slanted responses on the Oswald issue, thereby tending to reinforce the interpretation of deception attributed to Mr. Helms.

John H. Waller

Attachment:
As Stated
cc: DDCI w/atts
DIG:SDBreckinridge:js (R 1407) 6 October 1976
Distribution:
Orig w/atts - Addressee
1 w/atts - DDCI
1 w/atts - ER
1 w/atts - IG Chrono
1 w/atts - SDB Chrono
1 w/atts - IG Subj File

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